14. For a detailed historical account, see The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945, eds. R. W. Davies, Mark Harrison, S. G. Wheatcroft (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chapter 8.
15. See Pittman, “Blame the Switchman?”; Khusainov, Zheleznye dorogi i rynok, 71–92.
16. In particular, the leader of the Russian opposition Alexei Navalny achieved his nationwide name recognition because of numerous disclosures of high-profile corruption among top officials and state managers, presented in much detail on his website, www.navalny.com, accessed September 7, 2021. See “On vam ne Dimon,” https://dimon.navalny.com/, accessed September 7, 2021.
17. For a detailed overview, see The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy, eds. Michael Alexeev, Shlomo Weber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). See also chapter 4 of this book.
18. See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Changes, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 16.
19. See Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), especially chapters 3 and 4; Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz, How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), especially chapters 4 and 5.
20. See Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
21. See Marc Morje Howard, Philip G. Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (2006): 365–381.
22. For overviews, see Grigore Pop-Eleches, “Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change,” Journal of Politics 69, no. 4 (2007): 908–926; Jody La Porte, Danielle Lussier, “What Was the Leninist Legacy? Assessing Twenty Years of Scholarship,” Slavic Review 70, no. 3 (2011): 637–654.
23. See Michael Bratton, Nicolas van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” World Politics 46, no. 4 (1994): 453–489; Gero Erdmann, Ulf Engel, Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a Catch-all Concept (Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies, 2006), GIGA Working Paper no. 16, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71729549.pdf, accessed September 7, 2021.
24. See Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (New York: Scribner, 1974).
25. See Kenneth Jowitt, “Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime,” Soviet Studies 35 no. 3 (1983): 275–297.
26. See Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, Gabor Toka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 21–24.
27. See Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), especially chapter 3.
28. See Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks, and Informal Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), especially chapter 1.
29. See Stefan Hedlund, Russian Path Dependence (London: Routledge, 2005).
30. On the “track” as a Russian understanding of path dependency, see Aleksandr Auzan, “Lovushka ‘kolei,’” Colta.ru, September 4, 2015, http://www.colta.ru/articles/society/8428, accessed September 7, 2021.
31. For a detailed account of the “Cotton Affair,” the most notorious case of high-level corruption in Soviet Uzbekistan, see Riccardo Mario Cucciolla, The Crisis of Soviet Power in Central Asia: The ‘Uzbek Cotton Affair, 1975–1991 (PhD dissertation, Lucca: IMT School of Advanced Studies, 2017), http://e-theses.imtlucca.it/213/1/Cucciolla_phdthesis.pdf, accessed September 7, 2021.
32. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), especially chapter 3.
33. See Konstantin Sonin, “Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31, no. 4 (2003): 715–731; Anders Åslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reforms Succeeded and Democracy Failed (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007); Oleksandr Fisun, “Rethinking Post-Soviet Politics from a Neopatrimonial Perspective,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 20, no. 2 (2012): 87–96; Hale, Patronal Politics, especially chapter 6.
34. See North, Institutions, 3.
35. Stephen Kotkin, Mark R. Beissinger, “The Historical Legacies of Communism: An Empirical Agenda,” in Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, eds. Mark R. Beissinger, Stephen Kotkin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7.
36. Ibid., 16.
37. See Clifford G. Gaddy, “Room for Error: The Economic Legacy of Soviet Spatial Misallocation,” in Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, eds. Mark R. Beissinger, Stephen Kotkin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 52–67.
38. See Vladimir Gel’man, Otar Marganiya, Dmitry Travin, Reexamining Economic and Political Reforms in Russia, 1985–2000: Generations, Ideas, and Changes (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), especially chapter 6.
39. See Arthur Denzau, Douglass C. North, “Sharing Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions,” Kyklos 47, no. 1 (1994): 3–31.
40. See Eugene Huskey, “Legacies and Departures in the Russian State Executive,” in Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, eds. Mark R. Beissinger, Stephen Kotkin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 111–127.
41. See Brian Taylor, “From Police State to Police State? Legacies and Law Enforcement in Russia,” in Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, eds. Mark R. Beissinger, Stephen Kotkin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 128–151.