42. See Vadim Volkov, Ivan Griroriev, Arina Dmitrieva, Ekaterina Moiseeva, Ella Paneyakh, Mikhail Pozdnyakov, Kirill Titaev, Irina Chetverikova, Maria Shklyaruk, Kontseptsiya kompleksnoi organizatsionno-upravlencheskoi reformy pravookhranitel’nykh organov RF (Saint Petersburg, European University at Saint Petersburg, Institute for the Rule of Law, 2013), http://www.enforce.spb.ru/images/Issledovanya/IRL_KGI_Reform_final_11.13.pdf, accessed September 7, 2021; Ella Paneyakh, “Faking Performances Together: Systems of Performance Evaluation in Russian Enforcement Agencies and Production of Bias and Privilege,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 2–3 (2014): 115–136; Brian D. Taylor, “The Transformation of the Russian State,” in The Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State, eds. Stephan Leibfried, Evelyne Huber, Matthew Lange, Johan D. Levy, John D. Stephens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 637–653.
43. On the “power vertical,” see Vladimir Gel’man, Sergei Ryzhenkov, “Local Regimes, Sub-National Governance, and the Power Vertical” in Contemporary Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 3 (2011): 449–465.
44. For example, workplace mobilization during the 2011–2012 national elections in Russia was less typical for private enterprises in comparison with state-owned companies and the public sector. See Timothy Frye, Ora John Reuter, David Szakonyi, “Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace,” World Politics 66, no. 2 (2014): 195–228.
45. See Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Role of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), chapters 5 and 6.
46. See Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, “Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Contract with His Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev,” Publius 40, no. 4 (2010): 672–696; Gel’man, Ryzhenkov, “Local Regimes.”
47. For comparisons of subnational governance in China and Russia, see Michael Rochlitz, Vera Kulpina, Thomas Remington, Andrei Yakovlev, “Performance Incentives and Economic Growth: Regional Officials in Russia and China,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 56, no. 4 (2015): 421–445; Alexander Libman, Michael Rochlitz, Federalism in China and Russia: Story of Success and Story of Failure? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019).
48. See Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999).
49. For an in-depth analysis of the complex web of relationships between Russia’s law enforcement agencies and its effects on their performance, see Ella Paneyakh, Kirill Titaev, Maria Shklyaruk, Traektoriya ugolovnogo dela: institutsional’nyi analiz (Saint Petersburg: European University at Saint Petersburg Press, 2018).
50. For example, more than 10 percent of Russian city mayors faced with criminal charges during the period between 2002 and 2018. See Noah Buckley, Ora John Reuter, Michael Rochlitz, Anton Aisin, “Staying Out of Trouble: Criminal Cases Against Russian Mayors,” Comparative Political Studies, online first, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00104140211047399, accessed February 18, 2022.
51. See Kirill Rogov, “The Art of Coercion: Repressions and Repressiveness in Putin’s Russia,” Russian Politics 3, no. 2 (2018): 151–174.
52. For empirical evidence and analyses, see Keith Darden, “The Integrity of Corrupt State: Graft as an Informal Political Institution,” Politics and Society 36, no. 1 (2008): 35–59; Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?
53. On the role of schools in vote delivery during elections in Russia, see Natalia Forrat, “Shock-Resistant Authoritarianism: Schoolteachers and Infrastructural State Capacity in Putin’s Russia,” Comparative Politics 50, no. 3 (2018): 417–449.
54. See Ivan Petrov, Viktor Yadukha, “Molodezh’ mechtaet o trube,” rbc.ru, May 27, 2009, https://www.udbiz.ru/novosti/38/5792/, accessed September 7, 2021.
55. See Kontseptsiya kompleksnoi organizatsionno-upravlencheskoi reformy; Paneyakh, Titaev, Shklayruk, Traektoriya ugolovnogo dela, chapter 2.
56. For a detailed account, see Thane Gustafson, Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012).
57. For various interpretations of intraelite relationships in Russia, see Petrov, “Nomenklatura and the Elite”; Evgeny Minchenko, Kirill Petrov, Politburo 2.0: Renovation Instead of Dismantling, October 12, 2017, https://minchenko.ru/netcat_files/userfiles/2/Dokumenty/Politburo_2.0_October_2017_ENG.pdf, accessed September 7, 2021. See also “The Foreign Policy Attitudes of Russian Elites, 1993–2016,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 5–6 (2019), special issue.
58. See Erdmann, Engel, Neopatrimonialism Revisited.
59. See Bratton, van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions.”
60. For a detailed overview, see Russia after the Global Economic Crisis, eds. Anders Åslund, Sergei Guriev, Andrew C. Kuchins (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010).
61. See Michael Bratton, Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Erdmann, Engel, Neopatrimonialism Revisited.
62. See Zastoi-2: Posledstviya, riski i al’ternativy dlya rossiiskoi ekonomiki, ed. Kirill Rogov (Moscow: Liberal’naya missiya, 2021).
63. For this argument, see Kirill Rogov, “Forty Years in the Desert: The Political Cycles of Post-Soviet Transition,” in Russia 2025: Scenarios for the Russian Future, eds. Maria Lipman, Nikolay Petrov (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 18–45.
64. For an in-depth analysis, see Brian Taylor, “The Police Reform in Russia: Policy Process in a Hybrid Regime,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 2–3 (2014): 226–255.
65. See William R. Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), part II.