66. See Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma.
67. See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).
68. For the essence of these risk perceptions among Russia’s liberal reformers, see “Zhestkim kursom . . . Analiticheskaya zapiska Leningradskoi assotsiatsii sotsial’no-ekonomicheskikh nauk,” Vek ХХ i mir, no. 6 (1990): 15–19.
69. For an account of the effects of distributional coalitions in Russia’s regions, see Anton Shirikov, Anatomiya bezdeistviya: politicheskie instituty i byudzhetnye konflikty v regionakh Rossii (Saint Petersburg: European University at Saint Petersburg Press, 2010).
70. For a classic account, see Jeffrey L. Pressman, Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
71. For a critique of “high modernism,” see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
72. See Paneyakh, “Faking Performances Together”; Paneyakh, Titaev, Shklyaruk, Traektoriya ugolovnogo dela, chapter 3.
73. For an analysis of the “loyalty versus efficiency” dilemma among Russia’s regional chief executives, see Ora John Reuter, Graeme B. Robertson, “Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments,” Journal of Politics 74, no. 4 (2012): 1023–1037.
74. See Lev Lyubimov, “Ne nuzhno vsem vydavat’ attestaty. Pochemu v Rossii pora menyat’ podkhod k obucheniyu v shkolakh,” Lenta.ru, February 19, 2015, http://lenta.ru/articles/2015/02/19/school/, accessed September 7, 2021.
75. On these changes, see Doing Business 2015: Going beyond Efficiency (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015), http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2015, accessed September 7, 2021. For a critical overview of the use of global rankings in various countries, see Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance, ed. Alexander Cooley, Jack Snyder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
76. For a detailed yet controversial account, see Grigory Rodchenkov, The Rodchenkov Affair: How I Brought Down Russia’s Secret Doping Empire (London: Penguin Random House, 2020).
77. See “Doing Business—Data Irregularities Statement,” The World Bank, August 27, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2020/08/27/doing-business-data-irregularities-statement, accessed September 7, 2021.
78. For a critical account, see Andrei Yakovlev, Denis Ivanov, “Tekhnicheskii uspekh: pochemu vzlet Rossii v Doing Business ne pomog biznesu,” Rbc.ru, November 14, 2018, https://www.rbc.ru/opinions/economics/14/11/2018/5bebd6db9a7947c705e43594, accessed September 7, 2021.
79. For a detailed overview, see The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy.
80. See Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth, part I.
81. See Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, Why Nations Faiclass="underline" The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012), especially chapter 3.
82. On these strategies, see Yaroslav Kuzminov, Vadim Radaev, Andrei Yakovlev, Yevgeny Yasin, “Instituty: ot zaimstvovaniya k vyrashchivaniyu (opyt rossiiskikh reform i vozmozhnosti kul’tivirovaniya institutsional’nykh izmenenii),” Voprosy ekonomiki, no. 5 (2005): 5–27.
83. On the role of experts in policy-making under authoritarianism, see, in particular, William R. Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (New York: Basic Books, 2014), especially chapter 13; Calvert W. Jones, “Adviser to the King: Experts, Rationality, and Legitimacy,” World Politics 71, no. 1 (2019): 1–43.
84. See Andrey Zaostrovtsev, “Zakon vseobshchei shitizatsii,” fontanka.ru, August 11, 2009, http://www.fontanka.ru/2009/08/11/116/, accessed September 7, 2021.
85. For a detailed account of implementation of the EGE in the 2000s, see Andrey Starodubtsev, “How Does the Government Implement Unpopular Reforms? Evidence from Education Policy in Russia,” in Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, and Policies, ed. Vladimir Gel’man (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 148–165.
86. North, Institutions, 16.
87. See Vladimir Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), chapter 5.
88. The minister, Mikhail Abyzov, a close ally of Dmitry Medvedev, left this post in 2018 because the ministerial office as such was abolished. In 2019, he was jailed due to accusations of embezzling state funds.
89. See Nikolay Petrov, Maria Lipman, Henry E. Hale, “Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia from Putin to Putin,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 1 (2014): 1–26.
90. See chapter 4 of this book.
91. For a vivid account, see Alexei Navalny. “Dlya bor’by s korruptsiei v pravitel’stve net kvoruma,” navalny.com, February 9, 2015, https://navalny.com/p/4117/, accessed September 7, 2021.
92. See Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma, 63–69; The Politics of Public Sector Performance: Pockets of Effectiveness in Developing Countries, ed. Michael Roll (London: Routledge, 2014).
93. See Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts, especially part II.
94. For polemics, see Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Valerie J. Bunce, Sharon Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Lucan A. Way, Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015).
95. See Levitsky, Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, especially chapter 2.