96. For a critical insider’s account of Russia’s relations with the IMF in the 1990s, see Martin Gilman, No Precedent, No Plan: Inside Russia’s 1998 Default (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010).
97. See Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth, part III.
98. For a critique about Eastern Europe see Neil Abrams, M. Steven Fish, “Policies First, Institutions Second: Lessons from Estonia’s Economic Reforms,” Post-Soviet Affairs 31, no. 6 (2015): 491–513.
99. For a perceptive account of the behavior of Central Asian leaders and elites, see Alexander Cooley, John Heathershaw, Dictators without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017). For analysis of the legalization of status and wealth of Russian elites in the West, see Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, Karen Dawisha, “The Escape from Institution-Building in a Globalized World: Lessons from Russia,” Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 2 (2017): 361–378.
100. For an in-depth analysis, see Juliet Johnson, Priests of Prosperity: How Central Bankers Transformed the Postcommunist World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).
101. See Yoshiko M. Herrera, Mirrors of the Economy: National Accounts and International Norms in Russia and Beyond (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
102. See Hilary Appel, Tax Politics in Eastern Europe: Globalization, Regional Integration, and the Democratic Compromise (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011).
103. For a similar argument, see Hale, Patronal Politics, 458–466.
104. See Balint Magyar, Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2016); see also chapter 7 of this book.
Chapter 3
1. For the most vigorous arguments in favor of authoritarian modernization during the Cold War, see Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). For a detailed critical account of practical uses of this approach in developing countries, see William R. Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (New York: Basic Books, 2014).
2. For twenty-first-century discussions, see, for example, Parag Hanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order (New York: Random House, 2008); Roberto Stefan Foa, “Modernization and Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (2018): 129–140. Scholars of the political economy of populism concentrate on the controversial impact of populist politicians on government performance. See Sergei Guriev and Elias Papaioannou, “The Political Economy of Populism,” Journal of Economic Literature, forthcoming https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.20201595&from=f, accessed February 15, 2022.
3. For a comprehensive account of various aspects of Russia’s modernization, see Russian Modernization: A New Paradigm, eds. Markku Kivinen, Brendan Humphreys (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021).
4. On the concept of “triple transition,” see Claus Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe,” Social Research 58, no. 4 (1991): 865–892.
5. See Vladimir Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), especially chapter 3.
6. For various accounts, see Anders Åslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reforms Succeeded and Democracy Failed (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007); Clifford G. Gaddy, Barry W. Ickes, Bear Traps on Russia’s Road to Modernization (London: Routledge, 2013); Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks, and Informal Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
7. See Brian Taylor, The Code of Putinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia, ed. Daniel Treisman (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2018); Timothy Frye, Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021).
8. See Åslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution; Gaddy, Ickes, Bear Traps; The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy, eds. Michael Alexeev, Shlomo Weber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
9. See Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Role of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Brian Taylor, State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Gerald Easter, Coercion, Capital, and Postcommunist States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).
10. See Marie Mendras, Russian Politics: The Paradox of a Weak State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?; Taylor, The Code of Putinism, especially chapter 5.
11. See Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, eds. Mark R. Beissinger, Stephen Kotkin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
12. See Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), especially chapter 2.
13. See Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), especially chapter 12; Daniel Treisman, “Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover,” American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 4 (2007): 927–942.