35. See Barbara Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Stephan Haggard, Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
36. See Venelin I. Ganev, “The Dorian Gray Effect: Winners as State Breakers in Postcommunism,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34, no. 1 (2001): 1–25; Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Political Competition and the Politicization of the State in East Central Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 10 (2003): 1123–1147.
37. See Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design?”
38. See Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, Democracy and Development, especially chapter 3.
39. See Popov, Mixed Fortunes, especially chapters 4 and 5.
40. For critical accounts, see Thomas Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007): 12–27; Dani Rodrik, “The Myth of Authoritarian Growth,” Project Syndicate, August 9, 2010, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-myth-of-authoritarian-growth, accessed September 7, 2021.
41. See Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); Black, The Dynamics of Modernization.
42. See Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
43. See Peter Evans, James E. Rauch, “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of Effects of the ‘Weberian’ State Structures on Economic Growth,” American Sociological Review 64, no. 5 (1999): 748–765.
44. See Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz, How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), especially chapters 8 and 9. See also Nicolas Charron, Victor Lapuente, “Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?,” Studies in Comparative International Development 46, no. 4 (2011): 397–423.
45. See Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Kenneth Greene, “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 7 (2010): 803–834.
46. See Hale, Patronal Politics, especially chapter 4.
47. See also chapter 4 of this book.
48. See Geddes, Wright, Frantz, How Dictatorships Work.
49. See Evans, Embedded Autonomy.
50. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011); Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
51. See Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (New York: Scribner, 1974).
52. For a comprehensive account by a Russian historian, see Boris Mironov, Rossiiskaya imperiya: ot traditisii k modernu, 3 vols. (Saint Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 2018).
53. See Beissinger, Kotkin, eds., Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe.
54. See Gaddy, Ickes, Bear Traps, especially chapters 2 and 3.
55. See Levitsky, Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, chapter 2.
56. See, in particular, Paul R. Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Anton Cheremukhin, Mikhail Golosov, Sergei Guriev, Aleh Tsyvinski, “Was Stalin Necessary for Russia’s Economic Development?,” NBER Working Papers, no. 19425 (2013), https://www.nber.org/papers/w19425.pdf, accessed September 7, 2021.
57. See Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), chapter 4; Popov, Mixed Fortunes, chapter 3.
58. See Vladimir Gel’man, Otar Marganiya, Dmitry Travin, Reexamining Economic and Political Reforms in Russia, 1985–2000: Generations, Ideas, and Changes (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), especially chapter 3.
59. See Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000); Åslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution.
60. See Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurship, chapter 6; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
61. See Joel S. Hellman, “Winners Take Alclass="underline" The Politics of Partial Reforms in Post-Communist Transitions,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 203–234; Shleifer, Treisman, Without a Map.
62. See Vadim Volkov, “Standard Oil and Yukos in the Context of Early Capitalism in the United States and Russia,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 16, no. 3 (2008): 240–264; Vladimir Gel’man, “Leviathan’s Return? The Policy of Recentralization in Contemporary Russia,” in Federalism and Local Politics in Russia, eds. Cameron Ross, Adrian Campbell (London: Routledge, 2009), 1–24.
63. See Robert J. Brym, Vladimir Gimpelson, “The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy in the 1990s,” Slavic Review 63, no. 1 (2004): 90–112; The State after Communism: Governance in the New Russia, eds. Timothy J. Colton, Stephen Holmes (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); Taylor, State Building in Putin’s Russia.