64. For an empirical analysis, see Ora John Reuter, Graeme B. Robertson, “Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments,” Journal of Politics 74, no. 4 (2012): 1023–1037.
65. For a theoretical account, see Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin, “Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-off,” Journal of European Economic Association 9, no. 5 (2011): 903–930.
66. See Treisman, Gimpelson, “Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections.”
67. See Andrey Scherbak, “Ekonomicheskii rost i itogi dumskikh vyborov 2003 goda,” in Tretii elektoral’nyi tsikl v Rossii, 2003–2004 gody, ed. Vladimir Gel’man (Saint Petersburg: European University at Saint Petersburg Press, 2007), 196–216; Andrey Starodubtsev, Federalism and Regional Policy in Contemporary Russia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).
68. See Stephen E. Hanson, Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
69. For some implications of the “good Soviet Union” for bad governance in Russia, see chapter 2 of this book.
70. See Greene, “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance.”
71. For this argument, see Sergei Guriev, Daniel Treisman, “Informational Autocrats,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33, no. 4 (2019): 100–127; Sergei Guriev, Daniel Treisman, “A Theory of Informational Autocracy,” Journal of Public Economics 186 (2020), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272720300220, accessed February 18, 2022.
72. See Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia, especially chapter 5.
73. See Rodrik, “The Myth of Authoritarian Growth.”
74. For an in-depth account of the reception of Western economic ideas among Russia’s experts and policymakers, see Joachim Zweynert, When Ideas Fail: Economic Thought, the Failure of Transition, and the Rise of Institutional Instability in Post-Soviet Russia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018); for an analysis of surveys of Russian elites, see “The Foreign Policy Attitudes of Russian Elites, 1993–2016,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 5–6 (2019), special issue: 359–476.
75. See Shleifer, Treisman, Without a Map, especially chapters 1 and 9.
76. See Ivan Grigoriev, Anna Dekalchuk, “Collective Learning and Regime Dynamics under Uncertainty: Labour Reform and the Way to Autocracy in Russia,” Democratization 24, no. 3 (2017): 481–497.
77. See Hilary Appel, Tax Politics in Eastern Europe: Globalization, Regional Integration, and the Democratic Compromise (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), especially chapter 6.
78. See Medvedev, “Rossiya, Vpered!”
79. On Skolkovo, a beloved pet project of Dmitry Medvedev that served as a symbol of “modernization” during the period of his presidency, see Svetlana Reiter, Ivan Golunov, “Rassledovanie RBK: chto sluchilos’ so Skolkovo,” rbc.ru, March 23, 2015, http://daily.rbc.ru/special/business/23/03/2015/5509710a9a7947327e5f3a18, accessed September 7, 2021.
80. For a detailed critical account, see Dmitry Travin, Osobyi put’ Rossii: ot Dostoevskogo do Konchalovskogo (Saint Petersburg: European University at Saint Petersburg Press, 2018); see also Zweynert, When Ideas Fail.
81. See the interview Gleb Pavlovsky, “Real’nost’ otomstit Kremlyu i bez oppozitsii,” BBC Russian Service, December 31, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/12/141231_pavlovsky_putin_interview, accessed September 7, 2021.
82. See Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, chapter 3.
83. See Vladimir Gel’man, “The Politics of Fear: How Russia’s Rulers Counter Their Rivals,” Russian Politics 1, no. 1 (2016): 27–45; Kirill Rogov, “The Art of Coercion: Repressions and Repressiveness in Putin’s Russia,” Russian Politics 3, no. 2 (2018): 151–174.
84. See Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Treisman, “A Normal Country,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (2004): 20–38.
85. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 177–191.
86. On the wave of protests in Russia in 2011–2012 and their preconditions, see Graeme B. Robertson, “Protesting Putinism: The Election Protests of 2011–2012 in Broader Perspective,” Problems of Post-Communism 60, no. 2 (2013): 11–23; Samuel A. Greene, Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Russia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014). On controversies of the role of the Russian middle class in these protests, see Evgeny Gontmakher, Cameron Ross, “The Middle Class and Democratisation in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 67, no. 2 (2015): 269–284; Bryn Rosenfeld, “Reevaluating the Middle-Class Protest Paradigm: A Case Control Study of Democratic Protest Coalition in Russia,” American Political Science Review 111, no. 4 (2017): 637–652.
87. See Geddes, Wright, Frantz, How Dictatorships Work, especially chapters 4 and 5.
88. See Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, especially chapter 4.
89. See Nikolay Petrov, Maria Lipman, Henry E. Hale, “Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia from Putin to Putin,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 1 (2014): 1–26; Carolina Vendil Pallin, “Internet Control through Ownership: The Case of Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 33, no. 1 (2017): 16–33.
90. See Hilary Appel, Vladimir Gel’man, “Revising Russia’s Economic Modeclass="underline" The Shift from Development to Geopolitics,” PONARS Policy Memos, no. 397 (2015), http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/revising-russias-economic-model-shift-development-geopolitics, accessed September 7, 2021.