91. See Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma, especially chapter 2.
92. Ibid., 61–73.
93. See Susanne Wengle, Michael Rasell, “The Monetisation of L’goty: Changing Patterns of Welfare Politics and Provision in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 5 (2008): 739–756; Brian Taylor, “The Police Reform in Russia: Policy Process in a Hybrid Regime,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 2–3 (2014): 226–255. See also chapter 4 of this book.
94. See Anna Dekalchuk, “Choosing between Bureaucracy and the Reformers: The Russian Pension Reform of 2001 as a Compromise Squared,” in Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, and Policies, ed. Vladimir Gel’man (Abingdon, NY: Routledge, 2017), 166–182. For an analysis from an alternative perspective, see Sarah Wilson Sokhey, “Market-Oriented Reform as a Tool of State-Building: Russian Pension Reform of 2001,” Europe-Asia Studies 67, no. 5 (2015): 695–717.
95. See Linda Cook, Aadne Aasland, Daria Prisyazhnyuk, “Russian Pension Reform under Quadruple Influence,” Problems of Post-Communism 66, no. 2 (2019): 96–108; Elena Maltseva, “The Politics of Retirement Age Increase in Russia: Proposals, Protests, and Concessions,” Russian Politics 4, no. 3 (2019): 375–399.
96. See Grigoriev, Dekalchuk, “Collective Learning and Regime Dynamics.”
97. See Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire, chapter 4.
98. For some critical interpretations, see Stefan Hedlund, Russian Path Dependency: A People with Troubled History (London: Routledge, 2005); Andrey Zaostrovtsev, Polemika o modernizatsii: obshchie dorogi ili osobye puti? (Saint Petersburg: European University at Saint Petersburg Press, 2020).
99. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
100. For a critical overview, see Zastoi-2: Posledstviya, riski i al’ternativy dlya rossiiskoi ekonomiki, ed. Kirill Rogov (Moscow: Liberal’naya missiya, 2021).
101. See Kirill Rogov, “Forty Years in the Desert: The Political Cycles of Post-Soviet Transition,” in Russia 2025: Scenarios for the Russian Future, eds. Maria Lipman, Nikolay Petrov (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 18–45.
102. For a content analysis, see Jukka Pietiläinen, “Framing of Modernization in Russian Newspapers: Words, Not Deeds,” in Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, and Policies, ed. Vladimir Gel’man (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 71–89.
103. See Rogov, ed., Zastoi-2: Posledstviya, riski i al’ternativy dlya rossiiskoi ekonomiki.
Chapter 4
1. For a detailed account of policy reforms in Russia during the 1990s, see Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
2. For an initial assessment, see Kirill Rogov, “O sovetnikakh i begemote,”Novaya Gazeta, June 7, 2010, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/3214.html, accessed September 7, 2021. For a more detailed analysis, see Analiz faktorov realizatsii dokumentov strategicheskogo planirovaniya verkhnego urovnya, eds. Mikhail Dmitriev (Moscow: Center for Strategic Research, 2016), https://polit.ru/media/files/2016/12/27/Report-on-strategy.pdf, accessed September 7, 2021.
3. See Shleifer, Treisman, Without a Map.
4. For a critical account, see Anders Åslund, Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019).
5. See Stephan Haggard, Matthew D. McCubbins, eds., Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
6. For some exceptions, see Joseph Wright, “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment,” American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 2 (2008): 322–343; Alexander Libman, Michael Rochlitz, Federalism in China and Russia: Story of Success and Story of Failure? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019).
7. For a comparative analysis, see Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions under Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
8. For a theoretical account, see Matthew S. Shugart, John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); for a detailed analysis of intraexecutive relations in Russia, see Edward Morgan-Jones, Petra Shleiter, “Governmental Change in a Presidential-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia, 1994–2003,” Post-Soviet Affairs 20, no. 2 (2004): 123–163.
9. See Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999); Iulia Shevchenko, The Central Government of Russia: From Gorbachev to Putin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); Fabian Burkhardt, “The Institutionalization of Relative Advantage: Formal Institutions, Subconstitutional Presidential Powers, and the Rise of Authoritarian Politics in Russia, 1994–2012,” Post-Soviet Affairs 33, no. 6 (2017): 472–495.
10. On the impact of policy performance on presidential support in Russia, see Richard Rose, William Mishler, Neil Munro, Popular Support for an Undemocratic Regime: The Changing Views of Russians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Daniel Treisman, “Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin,” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 3 (2011): 590–609.