11. For this analytical perspective, see Henry E. Hale, “Democracy or Autocracy on the March? The Colored Revolutions as Normal Dynamics of Patronal Presidentialism,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 305–329.
12. See Shevchenko, The Central Government of Russia; Eugene Huskey, “Elite Recruitment and State-Society Relationships in Technocratic Authoritarian Regimes: The Russian Case,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43, no. 4 (2010): 363–372. See also chapter 5 of this book.
13. For a firsthand account, see Mikhail Kasyanov, Bez Putina: politicheskie dialogi s Evgeniem Kiselevym (Moscow: Novaya gazeta, 2009).
14. See Martin Gilman, No Precedent, No Plan: Inside Russia’s 1998 Default (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010).
15. For an account of the period of the 1990s, see Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia, chapter 5.
16. See Gilman, No Precedent, No Plan.
17. See Evgeniya Pismennaya, Sistema Kudrina: istoriya klyuchevogo ekonomista putinskoi epokhi (Moscow: Mann, Ivanov, and Ferber, 2013), especially chapter 5.
18. For some accounts, see Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, “Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Contract with His Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev,” Publius 40 no. 4 (2010): 672–696; Vladimir Gel’man, Sergey Ryzhenkov, “Local Regimes, Sub-National Governance, and the ‘Power Vertical’ in Contemporary Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 3 (2011): 449–465.
19. See Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
20. For an assessment, see Robert J. Brym, Vladimir Gimpelson, “The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy in the 1990s,” Slavic Review 63, no. 1 (2004): 90–112. See also Fabian Burkhardt, “Institutionalising Authoritarian Presidencies: Polymorphous Power and Russia’s Presidential Administration,” Europe-Asia Studies 73, no. 3 (2021): 472–504.
21. See Treisman, “Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime.”
22. For a detailed analysis, see Thomas F. Remington, “Presidential Support in the Russian State Duma,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2006): 5–32.
23. See Gerald M. Easter, “The Russian State in the Time of Putin,” Post-Soviet Affairs 24, no. 3 (2008): 199–230.
24. See Vladimir Gel’man, “Leviathan’s Return? The Policy of Recentralization in Contemporary Russia,” in Federalism and Local Politics in Russia, eds. Cameron Ross, Adrian Campbell (London: Routledge, 2009), 1–24.
25. See John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Longman, 2003).
26. See Shleifer, Treisman, Without a Map; Anders Åslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reforms Succeeded and Democracy Failed (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007).
27. For a programmatic statement, see Vladimir Putin, “Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheletii,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 30, 1999, www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html, accessed September 7, 2021.
28. See Gerald M. Easter, “Building Fiscal Capacity,” in The State after Communism: Governance in the New Russia, eds. Timothy J. Colton, Stephen Holmes (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 21–51.
29. See Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Kenneth F. Greene, “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 7 (2010): 803–834.
30. See Daniel Treisman, Vladimir Gimpelson, “Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or the Manipulations of ‘Chudar,’” British Journal of Political Science 31, no. 2 (2001): 225–246.
31. See Kas’yanov, Bez Putina; Pismennaya, Sistema Kudrina, chapter 5.
32. For a classic account, see Jeffrey L. Pressman, Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
33. For critical assessments, see Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Role of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), especially chapter 6; Gerald M. Easter, Capital, Coercion, and Postcommunist States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).
34. For a detailed overview, see Vladimir Nazarov, “Nalogovaya sistema Rossii v 1991–2008 godakh,” in Istoriya novoi Rossii: ocherki, interv’yu, vol. 1, ed. Petr Filippov (Saint Petersburg: Norma, 2011), 449–516.
35. For an analysis of Russian tax reform from a comparative perspective, see Hilary Appel, Tax Politics in Eastern Europe: Globalization, Regional Integration, and the Democratic Compromise (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), especially chapter 6.
36. See Nazarov, “Nalogovaya sistema Rossii,”495.
37. See Andrey Zaostrovtsev, “Oil Boom and Government Finance in Russia: Stabilization Fund and Its Fate,” in Resource Curse and Post-Soviet Eurasia: Oil, Gas, and Modernization, eds. Vladimir Gel’man, Otar Marganiya (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 123–147; Eva Dabrowska, Joachim Zweynert, “Economic Ideas and Institutional Change: The Case of the Russian Stabilization Fund,” New Political Economy 20, no. 4 (2015): 518–544.