38. See Appel, Tax Politics in Eastern Europe, chapter 6.
39. For accounts, see Pauline Jones Luong, Erika Weinthal, Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Thane Gustafson, Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), especially chapter 5; Pismennaya, Sistema Kudrina, chapter 5.
40. See Remington, “Presidential Support in the Russian State Duma.”
41. See Gustafson, Wheel of Fortune, chapter 5.
42. See Pismennaya, Sistema Kudrina, chapter 5.
43. See Nazarov, “Nalogovaya sistema Rossii.”
44. See Zaostrovtsev, “Oil Boom and Government Finance in Russia.”
45. See Ilya Sokolov, “Byudzhetnaya Sistema Novoi Rossii,” in Istoriya novoi Rossii: ocherki, interv’yu, vol. 1, ed. Petr Filippov (Saint Petersburg: Norma, 2011), 517–551; Pismennaya, Sistema Kudrina.
46. For an overview, see Mark Agranovich, Olga Kozhevnikova, Sostoyanie i razvitie sistemy obshchego srednego obrazovaniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: natsional’nyi doklad (Moscow: Aspekt-Press, 2006).
47. See Boris Startsev, Khroniki obrazovatel’noi politiki: 1991–2011 (Moscow: National Research University—Higher School of Economics, 2012).
48. See Tatiana Kliachko, “Gosudarstvennye imennye finansovye obyazatel’stva (GIFO),” Universitetskoe Upravlenie, no. 4 (2002): 70–73.
49. See Sergey Podosenov, “Rossiyane stali dumat’ o EGE eshche khuzhe chem ran’she,” Izvestiya, June 6, 2013, http://izvestia.ru/news/551551, accessed September 7, 2021.
50. See Startsev, Khroniki obrazovatel’noi politiki, 107.
51. See Alexander Chernykh, “Andrey Fursenko popal v nestandartnoe polozhenie,” Kommersant, April 20, 2011, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1625019, accessed September 7, 2021.
52. For a detailed account, see Andrey Starodubtsev, “How Does the Government Implement Unpopular Reforms? Evidence from Education Policy in Russia,” in Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, and Policies, ed. Vladimir Gel’man (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 148–165.
53. See Ivan Sterligov, “Experiment po vvedeniyu GIFO nuzhdaetsya v novoi otsenke,” RIA Novosti, July 17, 2009, http://ria.ru/education/20090709/176794627.html, accessed September 7, 2021.
54. See Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980).
55. See Vladimir Popov, “The State in the New Russia (1992–2004): From Collapse to Gradual Revival?” PONARS Policy Memos, no. 324 (2004), https://www.ponarseurasia.org/the-state-in-the-new-russia-1992-2004-from-collapse-to-gradual-revival/, accessed September 7, 2021.
56. See Joel S. Hellman, “Winners Take Alclass="underline" The Politics of Partial Reforms in Post-Communist Transitions,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 203–234.
57. See William Thompson, “From ‘Clientelism’ to a ‘Client-Centered Orientation’? The Challenge of Public Administration Reform in Russia,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, no. 536 (2007), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/332450142780, accessed September 7, 2021.
58. See Daniel Treisman, After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Mikhail Filippov, Olga Shvetsova, “Asymmetric Bilateral Bargaining in the New Russian Federation: A Path-Dependent Explanation,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 32, no. 1 (1999): 61–76; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
59. That year saw the initial implementation of the federal program “Reforming Public Service in the Russian Federation (2003–2005).”
60. For an overview, see Alexei Barabashev, Jeffrey D. Strausmann, “Public Service Reform in Russia, 1991–2006,” Public Administration Review 67, no. 3 (2007): 373–382.
61According to World Bank data; https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/, accessed September 7, 2021, in 2012 the percentile rank of Governance Effectiveness in Russia approached 41, and the rank of Regulatory Quality approached 39, while the reformers had set a target of 70 for both indicators by 2010. See “Rasporyazhenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 25 oktyabrya 2005 goda no. 1889-r (v redaktsii rasporyazheniya Pravitel’stva RF ot 09.02.2008 no. 157-r, postanovlenii Pravitel’stva RF ot 28.03.2008 no. 221, ot 10.03.2009 no. 219),” Konsul’tant, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_86001/, accessed September 7, 2021. Russia’s position in the rankings of the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index has declined: in 2012, Russia took 133th place out of 174. See http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results, accessed September 7, 2021.
62. For a detailed analysis, see Andrey Starodubtsev, Federalism and Regional Policy in Contemporary Russia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).
63. See Mikhail Dmitriev, “Administrativnaya reforma,” Istoriya novoi Rossii: ocherki, interv’yu, vol. 1, ed. Petr Filippov (Saint Petersburg: Norma, 2011), 198–216.
64. See Brym, Gimpelson, “The Size, Composition, and Dynamics of the Russian State Bureaucracy.”
65. See Andrei Logunov, “Administrativnaya reforma v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: osnovnye etapy realizatsii,”Analiticheskii Vestnik, no. 22 (2006): 23.
66. For the text of the 2003 annual address, see Vladimir Putin, Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii, May 16, 2003, www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21998, accessed September 7, 2021.