67. Dmitriev, “Administrativnaya reforma,” 202–203.
68. See Chislennost’ rabotnikov gosudarstvennykh organov i organov mestnogo samoupravleniya po vetvyam vlasti i urovnyam upravleniya, www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/gosudar/chisl_vetv.htm, accessed September 7, 2021.
69. For some critical assessments, see Peter Solomon, “Law in Public Administration: How Russia Differs,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 24, no. 1 (2008): 115–135; Dmitry Goncharov, Anton Shirikov, “Public Administration in Russia,” in Public Administration in Post-Communist Countries: Former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Mongolia, eds. Saltanat Liebert, Stephen E. Condrey, Dmitry Goncharov (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 23–43.
70. See Gustafson, Wheel of Fortune, chapters 6 and 8.
71. For accounts of state-business relations in Russia in the 2000s, see Andrey Yakovlev, “The Evolution of Business-State Interactions in Russia: From State Capture to Business Capture?” Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 7 (2006): 1033–1056; Vladimir Gel’man, “The Logic of Crony Capitalism: Big Oil, Big Politics, and Big Business in Russia,” in Resource Curse and Post-Soviet Eurasia: Oil, Gas, and Modernization, eds. Vladimir Gel’man, Otar Marganiya (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 97–122.
72. See Pismennaya, Sistema Kudrina, chapter 6.
73. For analyses of “monetization,” see Anastassia Alexandrova, Raymond J. Stryuk, “Reform of In-Kind Benefits in Russia: High Cost for a Small Gain,” Journal of European Social Policy 17, no. 2 (2007): 153–166; Susanne Wengle, Michael Rasell, “The Monetisation of L’goty: Changing Patterns of Welfare Politics and Provision in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 5 (2008): 739–756.
74. For an overview of regional elections in Russia in the 2000s, see Grigorii V. Golosov, “Regional Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 4 (2011): 623–639.
75. See Pismennaya, Sistema Kudrina, chapter 6.
76. For a detailed account of police reform, see Brian Taylor, “The Police Reform in Russia: Policy Process in a Hybrid Regime,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 2–3 (2014): 226–255.
77. See Ella Paneyakh, “Faking Performances Together: Systems of Performance Evaluation in Russian Enforcement Agencies and Production of Bias and Privilege,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 2–3 (2014): 115–136; Ella Paneyakh, Kirill Titaev, Maria Shklyaruk, Traektoriya ugolovnogo dela: institutsional’nyi analiz (Saint Petersburg: European University at Saint Petersburg Press, 2018).
78. See Ekaterina Alyab’eva, “VShE o reforme meditsiny: imitatsiya i pokazukha,” Slon.ru, February 9, 2014, https://republic.ru/posts/l/1081189, accessed September 7, 2021.
79. For a comprehensive account of military reforms in post-Soviet Russia, see Alexander Golts, Military Reform and Militarism in Russia (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2018).
80. For different accounts, see “Crisis in the Caucasus, Russia, Georgia, and the West,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 20, no. 2 (2009): special issue; The Great Power (Mis)management: The Russian-Georgian War and Its Implications for Global Political Order, ed. Alexander Astrov (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011).
81. For a detailed account, see Kirill Shamiev, “Against a Bitter Pilclass="underline" The Role of Interest Groups in Armed Forces Reform in Russia,” Armed Forces and Society 47, no. 2 (2021): 319–342. Some observers noted that in 2011 Serdyukov endorsed the idea of a second term in office for then-President Dmitry Medvedev, and that this could have been perceived as a sign of his political disloyalty to Putin. See Golts, Military Reform and Militarism in Russia, chapter 2.
82. For different accounts of the effects of the military reforms initiated by Serdyukov, see Dmitry Gorenburg, “The Russian Military under Sergei Shoigu: Will the Reform Continue?,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memos, no. 253 (2013), www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/russian-military-under-sergei-shoigu-will-reform-continue, accessed September 7, 2021; Pavel Baev, Ukraine: A Test for Russian Military Reforms (Paris, IFRI, 2015), https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_rnr_19_pavel_baev_russian_military_reform_eng_may_2015_0.pdf, accessed September 7, 2021.
83. See Golts, Military Reform and Militarism in Russia, chapter 2.
84. See Pismennaya, Sistema Kudrina, chapter 6.
85. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).
Chapter 5
1. Alexey Ulyukaev, “Liberalizm i politika perekhodnogo perioda v sovremennoi Rossii,” Mir Rossii 4, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 8.
2. See Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), especially chapters 5 and 6.
3. For theoretically driven arguments, see Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 567–576; Ronald Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).