4. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), especially chapter 5.
5. See Barbara Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), chapter 2.
6. See William Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (New York: Basic Books, 2014), especially chapter 1.
7. On awkward combinations of politics and policy-making during market transitions in Russia and other post-Communist countries, see Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Timothy M. Frye, Building States and Markets after Communism: The Perils of Polarized Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
8. For a strong critique, see Anders Åslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reforms Succeeded and Democracy Failed (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007).
9. See chapter 4 of this book.
10. See Ivan S. Grigoriev, Anna A. Dekalchuk, “Collective Learning and Regime Dynamics under Uncertainty: Labour Reform and the Way to Autocracy in Russia,” Democratization 24, no. 3 (2017): 481–497.
11. See Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, chapter 1.
12. There are numerous intermediate forms of interaction between politics and policy-making, but their analysis lies beyond the scope of this discussion.
13. See Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook, especially chapter 3.
14. For a systematic account, see Georgii Egorov, Konstantin Sonin, “Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-off,” Journal of the European Economic Association 9, no. 5 (2011): 903–930.
15. See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), especially chapter 3.
16. See Shleifer, Treisman, Without a Map, chapter 1; Åslund, Russia’s Capitalist Revolution, especially chapters 3–5.
17. For this argument, see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chapter 4.
18. See Joel Hellman, “Winners Take Alclass="underline" The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 203–234.
19. For an empirical analysis, see Stephen Fortescue, “Russia’s Civil Service: Professional or Patrimonial? Executive-Level Officials in Five Federal Ministries,” Post-Soviet Affairs 36, no. 4 (2020): 365–388.
20. See Fabian Burkhardt, “Foolproofing Putinism,” ridl.io, March 29, 2021, https://www.ridl.io/en/foolproofing-putinism/, accessed September 7, 2021.
21. See chapter 2 of this book.
22. See Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), especially chapter 4.
23. See Anna A. Dekalchuk, “Choosing between Bureaucracy and the Reformers: The Russian Pension Reform of 2001 as a Compromise Squared,” in Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, and Policies, ed. Vladimir Gel’man (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 166–182.
24. Yegor Gaidar, Days of Defeat and Victory (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), 259.
25. See Evgeniya Pismennaya, Sistema Kudrina. Istoriya klyuchevogo ekonomista putinskoi epokhi (Moscow: Mann, Ivanov & Ferber, 2013), especially chapter 5.
26. See Analiz faktorov realizatsii dokumentov strategicheskogo planirovaniya verkhnego urovnya, ed. Mikhail Dmitriev (Moscow: Center for Strategic Research, 2016), https://polit.ru/media/files/2016/12/27/Report-on-strategy.pdf, accessed September 7, 2021.
27. For a detailed comparative analysis, see Hilary Appel, A New Capitalist Order: Privatization and Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004).
28. See Shleifer, Treisman, Without a Map; Martin Gilman, No Precedent, No Plan: Inside Russia’s 1998 Default (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010).
29. See Frye, Building States and Markets, chapter 8.
30. See Vladimir Gel’man, Dmitry Travin, “Fathers versus Sons: Generational Changes and the Ideational Agenda of Reforms in Late Twentieth-Century Russia,” in Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, and Policies, ed. Vladimir Gel’man (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 22–38; Vladimir Gel’man, “‘Liberals’ versus ‘Democrats’: Ideational Trajectories of Russia’s Post-Communist Transformation,” Social Sciences 51, no. 2 (2020): 4–24.
31. For a detailed analysis, see Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), chapter 4.
32. For firsthand accounts by former members of the Russian government, see Petr Aven, Alfred Kokh, Gaidar’s Revolution: The Inside Account of the Economic Transformation in Russia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015).
33. See Vladimir Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), chapter 3.
34. See Richard Rose, William Mishler, Neil Munro, Popular Support for an Undemocratic Regime: The Changing Views of Russians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Daniel Treisman, “Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin,” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 3 (2011): 590–609.