35. See chapter 4 of this book.
36. See Pismennaya, Sistema Kudrina, chapter 6.
37. See Hale, Patronal Politics, chapter 4.
38. For a detailed account of politics of expertise in Russia, see Marina Khmelnitskaya, “Socio-Economic Development and the Politics of Expertise in Putin’s Russia: The ‘Hollow Paradigm’ Perspective,” Europe-Asia Studies 73, no. 4 (2021): 625–646.
39. See chapter 4 of this book.
40. See Analiz faktorov.
41. See Yuliya Starostina, Egor Gubernatorov, Elizaveta Efimovich, Lyudmila Podobedova, Svetlana Burmistrova, “Shchetnaya palata ukazala nedostatki i riski natsproektov,” rbc.ru, January 13, 2020, https://www.rbc.ru/economics/13/01/2020/5e184e2a9a79470bf49655c3, accessed September 7, 2021.
42. See Polina Khimshiashvili, Artem Filippenok, “Kreml’ ob’yasnil ischeznovenie tseli voiti v top-5 krupneishikh ekonomik,” rbc.ru, July 21, 2020, https://www.rbc.ru/economics/21/07/2020/5f16b4479a7947289fd7c751, accessed September 7, 2021.
43. See Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Priglasite psikhiatra: Pravitel’stvo RF predstavilo proekt edinogo plana po dostizheniyu natsional’nykh tselei razvitiya do 2030 goda,” Novaya gazeta, September 10, 2020, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2020/09/10/87037-priglasite-psihiatra, accessed September 7, 2021.
44. For an in-depth analysis of post-Communist neoliberalism, see Hilary Appel, Mitchell Orenstein, From Triumph to Crisis: Neoliberal Economic Reform in Postcommunist Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
45. See Vladimir Gel’man, “Political Opposition in Russia: A Dying Species?,” Post-Soviet Affairs 21, no. 3 (2005): 226–246.
46. For a critical overview of “systemic liberals” (regime loyalists), see Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia: Did Liberals Bury Liberalism?,” IWM Post, no. 119 (June, 23, 2017), https://www.eurozine.com/russia-did-liberals-bury-liberalism/?pdf, accessed September 7, 2021; for a more positive account, see Philip Hanson, Elizabeth Teague, Liberal Insiders and Economic Reform in Russia (London: Chatham House, 2013), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0113pr_hansonteague.pdf, accessed September 7, 2021. The trend of Russia’s liberals becoming an open opposition to the regime was exemplified by Boris Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister of Russia under Yeltsin who was assassinated in February 2015. See Boris Nemtsov and Russian Politics: Power and Resistance, eds. Andrey Makarychev, Alexandra Yatsyk (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2018).
47. For a detailed account of reforms of the electricity sector in Russia in the 2000s, see Susanne A. Wengle, Post-Soviet Power: State-Led Development and Russia’s Marketization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
48. For critical accounts, see Anders Åslund, “Sergey Glazyev and the Revival of Soviet Economics,” Post-Soviet Affairs 29, no. 5 (2013): 375–386; Andrey Movchan, “Glazyev’s Economic Policy of the Absurd,” Carnegie Moscow Center, September 15, 2015, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/61271, accessed September 7, 2021.
49. For a detailed overview of the impact of economic ideas on policy-making in post-Soviet Russia, see Joachim Zweynert, When Ideas Fail: Economic Thought, the Failure of Transition, and the Rise of Institutional Instability in Post-Soviet Russia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).
50. For a critical overview, see Zastoi-2: Posledstviya, riski i al’ternativy dlya rossiiskoi ekonomiki, ed. Kirill Rogov (Moscow: Liberal’naya missiya, 2021). See also Andrei Yakovlev, “Composition of Ruling Elite, Incentives for Productive Usage of Rents, and the Prospects of Russia’s Limited Access Order,” Post-Soviet Affairs 37, no. 5 (2021): 417–434.
51. See Hilary Appel, Tax Politics in Eastern Europe: Globalization, Regional Integration, and the Democratic Compromise (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), especially chapter 6.
52. See Juliet Johnson, Priests of Prosperity: How Central Bankers Transformed the Postcommunist World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).
53. See Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook, chapter 3.
54. See chapter 1 of this book.
55. For a detailed analysis of the introduction of EGE in Russia in the 2000s, see Andrei Starodubtsev, “How Does the Government Implement Unpopular Reforms? Evidence from Education Policy in Russia,” in Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: Ideas, Institutions, and Policies, ed. Vladimir Gel’man (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 148–165.
56. See chapter 4 of this book.
57. For a systematic overview of the evolution of EGE, see Aleksandr Chernykh, “Sdachnyi roman. Vo chto prevratilsya Edinyi gosudarstvennyi ekzamen,” Kommersant-Vlast’, February 15, 2016, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2911647, accessed September 7, 2021.
58. See Starodubtsev, “How Does the Government Implement Unpopular Reforms?”
59. See Shleifer, Treisman, Without a Map, chapter 2; David Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2002), part II; Andrew Barnes, Owning Russia: The Struggle over Factories, Farms and Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). For analysis of the impact of privatization on property rights in Russia, see Konstantin Sonin, “Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31, no. 4 (2003): 715–731.
60. For these accounts, see Sergei Guriev, Andrei Rachinsky, “The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 1 (2005): 131–150; Daniel Treisman, “‘Loans for Shares’ Revisited,” Post-Soviet Affairs 26, no. 3 (2010): 207–227.