61. For a comparative analysis, see Irina Denisova, Markus Eller, Timothy Frye, Ekaterina Zhurvaskaya, “Who Wants to Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions,” American Political Science Review 103, no. 2 (2009): 284–304.
62. See Andrei Yakovlev, “The Evolution of Business-State Interactions in Russia: From State Capture to Business Capture?” Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 7 (2006): 1033–1056.
63. See Maria Leiva, “FAS zayavila o kontrole gosudarstva nad 70% rossiskoi ekonomiki,” rbc.ru, September 29, 2016, http://www.rbc.ru/economics/29/09/2016/57ecd5429a794730e1479fac, accessed September 7, 2021.
64. See Vladimir Gel’man, “Leviathan’s Return? The Policy of Recentralization in Contemporary Russia,” in Federalism and Local Politics in Russia, eds. Cameron Ross, Adrian Campbell (London: Routledge, 2009), 1–24.
65. See Appel, Tax Politics in Eastern Europe, chapter 6.
66. For a comprehensive account, see Brian Taylor, “The Police Reform in Russia: Policy Process in a Hybrid Regime,” Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 2–3 (2014): 226–255.
67. See chapter 4 of this book.
68. See Johnson, Priests of Prosperity, especially chapter 6.
69. See Wengle, Rasell, “The Monetisation of L’goty”; Meri Kulmala, Markus Kainu, Jouko Nikula, Markku Kivinen, “Paradoxes of Agency: Democracy and Welfare in Russia,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democractization 22, no. 4 (2014): 523–552. For an original version of the concept, see Charles E. Lindbom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’” Public Administration Review 19, no. 1 (1959): 79–88.
70. For a detailed and positive account, see Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). For a similar view by an insider, see Alfred Kokh, The Selling of the Soviet Empire: Politics and Economics of Russia’s Privatization (New York: S. P. I. Books, 1998).
71. For critical accounts, see Chrystia Freeland, Sale of the Century: Russia’s Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism (New York: Crown Business, 2000); Hoffman, The Oligarchs, especially chapters 12–14.
72. See chapter 6 of this book.
73. See Appel, Tax Politics, chapter 6.
74. See Dekalchuk, “Choosing Between Bureaucracy and the Reformers.”
75. See Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.”
76. For a critique, see Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts, especially chapter 13.
77. For a critical analysis, see Ella Paneyakh, “Zaregulirovannoe gosudarstvo,” Pro et Contra 13, no. 1–2 (2013): 58–92; Ella Paneyakh, “The Overregulated State,” Social Sciences 45, no. 1 (2014): 20–33.
78. See Stanislav Markus, Property, Predation, and Protection: Piranha Capitalism in Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
79. For a typology of corruption, see Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no. 3 (1993): 599–617.
80. On this possible trajectory of Russia’s further development, see, in particular, Zastoi-2.
81. For journalist accounts Ilya Zhegulev, Ivan Golunov, Evgenii Berg, Alexandr Gorbachev, “Chelovek Gaidara, sporivshii s Putinym,” Meduza, November 15, 2016, https://meduza.io/feature/2016/11/15/chelovek-gaydara-sporivshiy-s-putinym, accessed September 7, 2021; “Spetsoperatsiya ‘privatizatsiya.’ Kogo perekhitril Igor Sechin,” Finanz.ru, December 15, 2016, http://www.finanz.ru/novosti/aktsii/specoperaciya-privatizaciya-kogo-perekhitril-igor-sechin-1001608380, accessed September 7, 2021.
Chapter 6
1. See Andrey Starodubtsev, “Usloviya uspeshnogo upravleniya v sovremennoi Rossii (subnatsional’nyi uroven’),” Politeia, no. 4 (2018): 70–89; Andrei Yakovlev, Lev Freinkman, Sergey Makarov, Victor Pogodaev, “How Do Russia’s Regions Adjust to External Shocks? Evidence from the Republic of Tatarstan,” Problems of Post-Communism 66, no. 4–5 (2020): 417–431.
2. See Susanne Wengle, “The New Plenty: Why Are Some Post-Soviet Farms Thriving?,” Governance 33, no. 4 (2020): 915–933; Susanne Wengle, Black Earth, White Bread: A Technopolitical History of Russian Agriculture and Food (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2022).
3. See Juliet Johnson, Priests of Prosperity: How Central Bankers Transformed the Postcommunist World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), especially chapter 6.
4. See Barbara Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
5. See The Politics of Public Sector Performance: Pockets of Effectiveness in Developing Countries, ed. Michael Roll (London: Routledge, 2014).
6. See Michael Roll, “Pockets of Effectiveness: Review and Analytical Framework,” in The Politics of Public Sector Performance: Pockets of Effectiveness in Developing Countries, ed. Michael Roll (London: Routledge, 2014), 22–42.
7. See Loren Graham, Lonely Ideas: Can Russia Compete? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013).
8. See Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma, 61–73.
9. See Roll, “Pockets of Effectiveness.”
10. See Graham, Lonely Ideas.
11. On the role of policy entrepreneurs as key drivers of policy changes, see John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Longman, 2003).
12. See Michael Roll, “Comparative Analysis: Deciphering Pockets of Effectiveness,” in The Politics of Public Sector Performance: Pockets of Effectiveness in Developing Countries, ed. Michael Roll (London: Routledge, 2014), 194–241.
13. For a classical analysis of mechanisms of governance in the last decades of the Soviet Union, see Jeffrey F. Hough, Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); on subnational governance, see Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); Peter Rutland, The Politics of Economic Stagnation in the Soviet Union: The Role of Local Party Organs in Economic Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).