For the time being, Dubček had to explain the policies of his party without any preparation.22 Following his comments, the confrontation began. Brezhnev presented his assessment of events in the ČSSR and explained bluntly that the meeting in Dresden was not about discussing reforms with the KSČ, but about coordinating a mutual evaluation of developments in the ČSSR. Four parties toed the line laid down by Brezhnev. The question posed to the KSČ delegation was would it yield to this verdict and alter its course?
Brezhnev’s keyword in describing the situation in the ČSSR was “counterrevolution,” which was organized by “an entire group or entire center” in public life in the ČSSR. He asked Dubček directly what he understood “democratization” or “liberalization” to mean. “Have you not had democracy thus far?” For him, the “main processes” of the preceding few weeks were: “Public attacks against the Central Committee” and “defamation” of all the “achievements” of the previous twenty-five years “that will be printed in West Germany, in America, in Austria, everywhere.” “Attacks against the leading cadre of the Party, against the government, against the Ministry of Defence, against the Ministry of the Interior…. It’s all being denigrated.” He demonstrated what the consequences might be by citing Foreign Minister Václav David: “For twenty years he led the struggle against imperialism in alliance and agreement with us… but he was also pelted with dirt in order to create a basis for the ‘independent foreign policy.’”
The antisocialist background to all these campaigns seemed for Brezhnev to be no secret: he saw this in the tendencies of a “Czech socialism.” In order to emphasize this judgment on the danger of a domestic system change, he followed on with the question, “Yes, what will come next?”
What did the enemy want? That was the key question in the struggle against “counterrevolution.” The “enemy acted skillfully, very tactfully and organized. We cannot claim that one single center is being established today in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps there are several centers.”23 But all events—this must be stressed—are consummated in intellectual circles, in youth circles, but not in the sphere in which one could find strong support for the Presidium and the Central Committee, in order to fight against the counterrevolution. That is, namely, the working class.24
The concern over the potential change of sides on the part of the ČSSR, which was already hinted at in the question regarding an autonomous foreign policy, was repeated as a question pertaining to the Warsaw Pact. Why was the view being disseminated: “Our people do not know what the contents of the Warsaw Pact are, but if our people did know it, our people would very quickly withdraw from the treaty. As though it was a gagging treaty in the event of a war.”
In the Dresden debate on the autonomy of Socialist states and their Communist parties as well as on how binding the Warsaw Pact was, Soviet prime minister Aleksei Kosygin positioned himself unequivocally. The discussions in the Czechoslovak media on the role of the Communist Party and relations with the Soviet Union were not only followed worldwide, they “not only concern the entire socialist camp,” but affected the whole Communist movement. With this, Kosygin formulated the keynote of the later so-called Brezhnev Doctrine of the limited sovereignty of the Socialist states. For him, the Dresden meeting served to support the KSČ in the struggle against the “counterrevolution.” Addressing Dubček directly, he said that here “the support for Czechoslovakia in the struggle for a Socialist and Communist Czechoslovak country was forged,… for the business of Czechoslovakia is our mutual business and we do not surrender this business to our enemy, whatever it might cost us!” Brezhnev’s comments on the—from the point of view of the Communists—negative reports in the ČSSR media were accentuated by Kosygin: they found themselves “in the hands of the enemy.”
Brezhnev personalized the term “counterrevolution” and mounted a massive attack on Josef Smrkovský.25 His list of transgressions began with the interview on West German Radio (WDR). Brezhnev quoted him: “We are convinced that that which we are undertaking will set an example for the comrades of other socialist countries. That’s what he said! He assured the Federal Republic that that which they are doing will set an example for everyone. We will do and achieve that, and believe that it will be interesting for both German socialists and the socialists of other western countries, he said.” Addressing Dubček directly, the Soviet party leader commented “[and you] give him a good appraisal, honest etc.” Using the example of Smrkovský, he demonstrated at the same time the leadership weaknesses of the KSČ Presidium and Central Committee: “In Party practice it is not common that some coal minister or forestry minister replaces the Central Committee and gives interviews to the Federal Republic, indeed an anti-socialist, anti-communist interview for which one could pay millions of dollars…. How is it that the Central Committee did not know that such an interview exists?” Brezhnev’s next charge was Smrkovský’s relationship with the Soviet Union. “The same Smrkovský says: Oh well, what does it mean if the Soviet Union has lost 100,000 soldiers, but the Czechs have also lost, and why? The Party has made so many mistakes.” Again addressing the KSČ delegation, he passed judgment: “That means, dear comrades, behind your back this highly praised politician of yours carries out his anti-socialist, anti-Party activities.” Once more he quoted the WDR interview. From Brezhnev’s point of view, Smrkovský answered the question as to what was to be done in the ČSSR with a challenge: “Perhaps something that no communist party has done, namely the combining of socialism with freedom.” Brezhnev clarified that the CPSU regarded the events in the ČSSR not as an “experiment” but as a “premeditated scheme” to bring about a change of system. This view became very clear at the end of his speech:
We have the authorization of our Politburo, to express the hope to you who are seated here today that you at the top will be in a position to alter events and prevent a very dangerous development. We are prepared to give you moral, political and democratic assistance. I would be very pleased and happy—and so would our Party—if I could at the same time express the support of all other parties present here.
He remarked threateningly:
If that should not be possible, however, or if you consider that to be incorrect, then we are nevertheless unable to remain detached toward developments in Czechoslovakia. We are united with one another by means of friendship, by means of international commitments, by means of the security of the socialist countries, by means of the security of our states.
The KSČ’s political goal was formulated as follows: the KSČ should assert its monopoly on power in Czechoslovakia and strike down the “counterrevolution” using its own power. In order to achieve this aim, it could count on the assistance of the CPSU. In order to achieve it ultimately without and against the KSČ, the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops took place on 21 August. The restorative aim had already been formulated in Dresden.
What everyone expected from Dubček was repeated by Gomułka as head of the Polish delegation: “We are of the opinion that it is today still possible to face these dangers, I would say, to face these dangers in a peaceful way, nonetheless with an energetic counteroffensive that must in our opinion be undertaken by the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia against the counterrevolutionary forces.”
Dubček immediately received pledges of assistance from the PUWP, the SED, the HSWP, and the BCP. In addition, each of the parties communicated specific messages to the KSČ. The minutes convey the impression of a well thought-out performance. It began with the “confession” of the accused Dubček, the “plea” by Brezhnev, to which the SED, the BCP, the PUWP, and the HSWP acquiesced and with which a united course was constituted; it became the binding frame of reference. The PUWP and the HSWP then reminded the KSČ of the lessons of the counterrevolutionary experiences of the year 1956. Hungary’s party leader János Kádár delivered a historic analogy in order to underline Brezhnev’s judgment: “[T]his process is extremely similar to the prologue of the Hungarian counterrevolution at a time when it wasn’t yet a counterrevolution. This means that is the process that took place in Hungary from February 1956 to the end of October. And we ask that you give that some thought.”