At the end of April, the Bulgarian Communist Party passed on their assessment of the state of the KSČ leadership to the general secretaries of those parties present at the Dresden conference, and attempted to arrange, according to personnel, the different opposing centers operating within the leadership.38 Ulbricht saw in this report a confirmation of his own analysis. Toward the Bulgarian ambassador in Berlin, he initially advanced the Dresden line: “We must win Dubček and help him to take measures in order to obtain control over the press, the radio and television; that is very important.”39 To a statement in the Bulgarian report to the effect that in Prague “no conclusions were drawn from the meeting in Dresden,” Ulbricht responded, “In all probability, a second Dresden consultation is unavoidable.”
MOSCOW, 8 MAY 1968: MILITARY PRESSURE AND THE QUESTION OF “HEALTHY FORCES”
The second “Dresden” took place on 8 May directly after the discussion between the CPSU and the KSČ in Moscow.40 The two most important results for the CPSU leadership were that the Czechoslovak delegation agreed to Warsaw Pact maneuvers in their country and that the differences in the Presidium of the KSČ became visible.41 This time, the Warsaw Five met without the KSČ. By the end of their conference, the building of an interventionist coalition had been decided. At Brezhnev’s suggestion, a “hotwire” was set up between the five parties. The CPSU, like the SED, set up a special task force in its Central Committee in order to prepare analyses of the developments in the ČSSR.42
In Moscow, Brezhnev demanded that the “sister parties” sign a joint communiqué with a clear warning to Prague. Its core statement should be that the KSČ was not alone and could not decide on its course of action independently of the five parties. This, however, they had just done with their Action Program, in which Gomułka saw the “general line of counterrevolution” and which Brezhnev did not want to publish.
In contrast to Dresden, the military card was now openly brought into play. There was unanimity that the maneuvers agreed on between the High Command of the Warsaw Pact and the ČSSR would have to begin soon. The SED had insisted in advance to the still hesitant Soviet side that the National People’s Army (Nationale Volksarmee or NVA) should take part in these maneuvers.43 Ulbricht combined the maneuvers with the aim of strengthening the position of the “healthy forces” in the KSČ with a demonstration of power.
The main problem for the Warsaw Five was still who within the KSČ party leadership should become their partner. During deliberations between the CPSU and the KSČ, Bil’ak alone from the Czechoslovak delegation had accepted the Soviet criticism. Ulbricht demanded, even when it was “only a minority group in the Presidium of the KSČ that advances the correct line, then I am in favor of us helping this minority group.” Opinions on Dubček were divided in this context; above all Kádár and Brezhnev had not yet given up on him. Both called attention to the popularity that Dubček enjoyed not only nationwide, but also internationally. As such, the question as to who in the KSČ leadership would be prepared to take on the struggle for the restoration of the Party’s monopoly on power was still open for the Warsaw Five. While Ulbricht suggested relying on the right wing of the KSČ—which ultimately happened—Brezhnev hoped until into August that Dubček could be won over to the idea of taking on this role himself.
At the end of the conference, Brezhnev drew the conclusion that was to become known as the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty of the Socialist states: “By defending Czechoslovakia, we are defending the entire socialist camp, the entire international Communist movement. We must recognize our strengths and become active.” Toward Dubček and his delegation, the same message read as follows: “We are ready to give you help, if this becomes necessary. We are ready to do this, and in awareness of the mood of Comrades Gomułka, Ulbricht, Zhivkov and others, I can say that such a readiness is also at hand from them.”44
Ulbricht demanded in Moscow a concerted international campaign against the “revisionism” in Prague, as part of which it should be openly said “that there is counterrevolution in the ČSSR.” He repeated his thesis, according to which the main thrust of this counterrevolution was directed against the GDR. The SED could no longer accept that the GDR would be taken in a political pincer attack: on the one hand from the new eastern policy of the Federal Republic and on the other hand from the reformers in Prague. The first secretary of the SED was concerned that both events could contribute to the erosion of the SED’s monopoly on power in the GDR.
This fear was not unfounded. Both events elicited hope for change in the GDR. The new Bonn eastern policy opened up the prospect of an improvement in German internal relations and the reforms in Prague awoke the hope among Socialists for analogous improvements in the GDR. The Leipzig historian Hartmut Zwahr noted in his diary, “Beneath the surface, a wave of sympathy is rolling; a large proportion of the youth is trembling with the Czechs.”45
The SED confronted the danger of the Czech infection in the GDR with campaigns and prescribed ideological terminology. “With the power of the apparatus and of the entire state, the Party establishes Party opinion, the ‘orientation’: before it all public discussions fell silent. A new taboo is created.”46 Not everyone fell silent; Robert Havemann gave an interview to a Czech magazine.47 Turning to the reformers, he said, “[S]ocialists and communists across the world are following political developments in the ČSSR with genuine sympathy and filled with great hopes.”48 He stressed the self-assessment of the reform Communists, that they attempted for the first time to reconcile socialism and democracy. He was concerned with Stalinism being overcome.49 Havemann was able to publish his German text in the Federal Republic, but not in the GDR. A Danish journalist who published this interview in Copenhagen was identified on Ulbricht’s direct orders. The MfS received the directive to intensify the surveillance on Havemann and his circle of friends. The distribution of the German-language Prager Volkszeitung (Prague People’s Newspaper) was prohibited in the GDR.
In the KSČ, the May plenum (29 May until 1 June) was supposed to set the course; it decided to convene the 14th Party Congress in September. The party had in the meantime split into two wings: the conservatives and the reformers. Dubček constituted the integrating clip between them. In the resolution accepted by the plenum, the Soviet criticism was absorbed. Both wings agreed on the struggle against the counterrevolutionary danger. The KSČ’s claim on the leading role in the political system was strengthened.50 Initially, it looked as though the resolutions and decisions of the May plenum had consolidated the position of the leadership in order that they could prepare for the Party Congress in peace.51 This proved to be a fallacy in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. Thus Florin reported from Berlin that at the plenum no “debate was conducted with those revisionist views strongly represented among those persons active in the cultural sector and the middle-class intelligentsia, above all with regard to the leading role of the Communist Party in society.”52 It was precisely this that the Warsaw Five expected from Dubček.53 The SED’s skepticism as to whether the necessary turnaround in the KSČ’s politics would come about was also demonstrated by the prognosis of the ambassador regarding the probable result of the 14th Party Congress: “During the preparation of the Party Congress, the Party will as hitherto lose itself in a general discussion and questions on the new composition of the Central Committee will take center stage. The danger exists that the KSČ will take a social democratic development on the basis of the Action Program.”54 The Soviet ambassador in Prague personalized the consequences that “the healthy forces will disintegrate at the Party Congress” and the party would split. It was now already clear that Drahomír Kolder, Alois Indra, Bil’ak, and others would not be elected as members of the Central Committee and, perhaps, not even as delegates to the Party Congress. Should this situation be consolidated, the party would be led across to the right at the Party Congress.55 Neither ambassador allowed himself to be deceived by the resolution. While Florin stressed the change in character of the KSČ, his Soviet college had the “cadre question” in mind, without which the monopoly on power of the Party in the ČSSR could not be restored.56 Mikhail Prozumenshchikov has dealt with the consequences that Dubček’s politics had for the Soviet leadership, concluding: “To a certain extent, Dubček himself with his constant promises to improve the situation (which were not, however, fulfilled) also contributed to the increase within the Russian leadership of the number of those who advocated a solution of the problem by force.”57 A party reform requires an alteration in its statute. Florin did not, however, address the draft of the new party statute, although the text would have confirmed his prognosis, for he envisaged an extension of membership rights as well as the secret ballot for leadership functions and a protection of minorities.58