Ulbricht likewise addressed the Bloc confrontation; he combined the theory of peaceful system change, as formulated by Gomułka and with which he agreed, with western, imperialist politics toward the Socialist states. For him there was no doubt that the organizers of the “counterrevolution” were located in Washington and Bonn.72 He apodictically declared:
The current measures and the appearance of counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia are part of the strategy of the U.S. and West German imperialism in the struggle for hegemony in Europe. Comrade Gomułka is right when he says it is not a question of whether businesses remain owned by the people or are transferred to private ownership. A state capitalist Czechoslovakia… can also come completely under the command and control of the World Bank and the West German Bundesbank; completely, even under the enterprise of socialism, the new socialism.
For Ulbricht, it was not the property question that was the decisive one; rather, “political power is what it’s about.”
Brezhnev himself shared this view and emphasized: “There is no example where socialism has been victorious and is firmly established, of capitalist circumstances triumphing anew. That does not exist and we are convinced that it also never should and also never will.”
The invocation of socialism and internationalism and the references to the existing treaties among the Socialist states already served to legitimize the imminent “collective action” in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev justified at length why it did not represent interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Prior to the decision on this “collective assistance” for socialism in Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev asked once more: Would the KSČ leadership have the courage to take resolute measures “to topple the reaction, to rescue the position of socialism?”
If it did not do this, the downfall of socialism loomed, which the Five could not allow! Therefore, it remained necessary “to support” the “healthy forces” in the KSČ. Moreover, the “sister parties” must be ready at the “first call of the Czechoslovak comrades to arise or, in the event that the circumstances required such an appearance and if the Czechoslovak comrades were having difficulties, to turn to us for assistance.” The new keyword for the intervention was “assistance.”
The Bulgarian party leader Zhivkov translated what this word really meant in the context of July 1968. He began solemnly, explaining that prior to the 14th KSČ Party Congress, which should never have taken place, the Five had had a “historic task” to fulfilclass="underline" “There is only one way out, namely for the socialist countries, the Communist Parties and the Warsaw Pact to provide decisive assistance to the ČSSR.” The “inner forces of the ČSSR” could no longer be entrusted with rescuing socialism. “We can address diverse appeals and letters to them, of course, but unfortunately at present there are no such forces in the ČSSR that could assume the task mentioned in the letters. Czechoslovakia must be supported by the assistance of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties, by the assistance of the Warsaw Pact, primarily by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. First of all, the dictatorship of the proletariat must essentially be resurrected there.”
This demand did not yet, however, answer the question as to who in the ČSSR should restore the dictatorship and rebuild the KSČ. The “collective assistance,” should it fulfill its political aim, required party followers in the ČSSR who were to assume the task of restoring the monopoly on power into their own hands.
In his report on the Warsaw meeting before the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on 17 July, General Secretary Brezhnev fell back on the suggestion from Ulbricht in May in Moscow in order to find a solution to these questions: “When we see that the leadership of the KSČ does not wish to adhere to our considerations, one must pursue efforts to promote other healthy forces in the Party and search for the opportunity to turn to these forces in the Party, which perhaps emerge with the initiative in the struggle for the restoration of the leading role of the KSČ and for the normalization of conditions in the country.”73 In order to organize this, there must be a meeting at which “representatives with the initiative group empowered by us… who represent the healthy forces in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ and convey our position to the political stage, on the basis of whom one can consolidate the Party, issue a rebuff to the anti-socialist elements and above all declare our readiness to provide our necessary support.” Then he repeated the passage from his speech in Warsaw, in which he had called on the “sister states” to look out for the first call for help from Prague. The Central Committee approved the report, and with this the Politburo was given a free hand.
On 22 July, the Soviet foreign minister, Marshal Grechko, was commissioned by the Politburo “to take measures.” At the same time, documents were drawn up in Moscow, “which had supposedly been written by the future leadership of the ČSSR, who should displace the current leaders.”74 At the July plenum of the Central Committee, Brezhnev had devised the contours of the Soviet approach during the action of collective assistance. In the event of doubt, an “initiative group” of “healthy forces” in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ would solicit assistance from abroad for the protection of socialism in the ČSSR. This “appeal” was the indispensable political prerequisite for the implementation of the military operation. In this way, as Brezhnev evidently hoped, the “measures” could be legitimized and lose their character of an intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state.
On 18 July, the GDR ambassador Florin announced from Prague that the Presidium of the KSČ had substantiated its “negative attitude” to the Warsaw Letter with the “principle of personal responsibility for domestic developments.” The course of the session had shown that the “Party leadership is still not prepared to engage in an energetic struggle, supported by the sister parties, against the counterrevolutionary activities.”75 In view of the approach of the Czechoslovak leadership, collective action became more and more probable. The SED began to prepare itself. The first measure was a resolution from the SED Politburo on 19 July to install a radio transmitter in the region of Dresden, which was to broadcast political information mornings and evenings in Czech and Slovak. As the technical equipment of GDR Radio was not sufficient, the mobile transmitter of GDR-Ferienwelle (GDR Holiday Wave) was used for this purpose.76
The military preparations were complete.77 On GDR territory alone, 650,000 soldiers were mobilized. “Overall, the military concentration of the troops of the five ‘fraternal armies’ reached its highpoint on the borders of the ČSSR on 29 and 30 July. The intervention had become militarily possible; the Soviet generals awaited the political approval of the CPSU leadership.”78 The GDR was also prepared. On 29 July, the National Defense Council (NVR) had convened and received reports on the status of military preparations and those from the Interior Ministry and the MfS.79 When the Presidium of the KSČ met with that of the CPSU on 29 July in Čierna nad Tisou, the SED had completed the political and military preparations for the intervention in the ČSSR, but the SED like the Soviet generals also had to wait for the order to deploy.