The second option—and this is the one that both Nagy in 1956 and the Prague leaders in 1968 chose—consisted of attempting to avoid the conflict with society and yielding gradually to societal pressures. At the same time, it was necessary to convince the Soviets that the political reforms, no matter how far reaching they might appear, were still within the framework of the Socialist system. The Czechoslovak leadership did not accede to the Soviet demands contained in the agreement of Čierna nad Tisou in August 1968 because they understandably concluded that this would be interpreted by the people as a betrayal of the cause of the Prague Spring and provoke determined resistance.10 The Soviets in their turn viewed the inactivity of the Prague leadership as irrefutable proof of their inability and their unwillingness—which was even worse—to channel developments into the direction of Soviet expectations.
In view of an unreliable party leadership and an increasingly free press, Moscow had by early August also lost confidence in the Czechoslovak security services and in the country’s military leadership, as they, too, seemed loyal not to the Soviet Union, but to the Prague leadership.
It was the same four factors as in Hungary in 1956 that were interpreted as symptoms of a deep crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and this realization propelled Moscow toward the military intervention that spelled the end for the Prague Spring.11
In moral terms, the two actions constituted blatant interferences in the internal affairs of nominally independent allies, yet in terms of realpolitik, the Soviet Union, having its own imperial interests at heart, was making rationally justifiable decisions.12
KÁDÁR MEDIATES BETWEEN BREZHNEV AND DUBČEK
On taking office as leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), Alexander Dubček held his first international negotiation with János Kádár. Having received an official invitation to Moscow on 10 January, Dubček confidentially asked the Hungarian party leader for a secret meeting before his trip to Moscow.13 Kádár was an obvious choice for the Czechoslovak leader. De-Stalinization, which had been carried out successfully in Hungary in the early 1960s, and the reformist élan of the leadership made the Hungarian party automatically a potential ally of the Prague reformers and one to which they were looking for support of their policies.
Dubček was of course well aware that the Soviets would learn of the meeting, yet he possibly banked on the meeting being legitimized in the Kremlin’s eyes by an—ultimately unrealized—move that Leonid Brezhnev had suggested during the crisis of a month before, in December 1967, which would also have involved a mediating role for Hungary.
During his trip to Moscow in November, Antonín Novotný had invited Brezhnev to Prague without informing the leadership of the KSČ; he hoped that the presence of the Soviet leader would bolster his own weakened position. In a move unusual even by the standards of Soviet Bloc practice, Brezhnev made Novotný also invite Kádár to Prague, again without informing the KSČ. The Soviet leader had obviously concluded that Kádár’s international standing and his “experience” in dealing with domestic crises and in the consolidation of a difficult situation might help persuade the disgruntled members of the Prague leadership to defer Novotný’s ousting. As the Hungarian party leader shared this view regarding Novotný at the time, he signaled his willingness to accept the invitation.14
The following incident is evidence of the dramatic pace at which the Czechoslovak developments were unfolding. In a telephone call on 13 December 1967, Brezhnev attempted to motivate Kádár to undertake the trip to Prague, which was then only three days away, by saying that the Czechoslovak leaders were impatiently looking forward to his arrival—only to be told by Kádár that Novotný had withdrawn the invitation on that very day.15
The meeting between Dubček and Kádár, which also included a hunting expedition, took place on 20 and 21 January 1968 in Polarikovo and Topol’čianky in Slovakia. The two leaders had known each other for a long time, which gave the meeting an amicable atmosphere. This is also evidenced by Kádár’s greeting, which was not what one might call a standard formula: “Congratulations—and my most sincere condolences!” With this unusual phrase, he signaled that he was only too familiar with the Czechoslovak problems.16 “The atmosphere was excellent, Comrade Dubček even said that for obvious reasons there was hardly anyone apart from Kádár with whom he could have talked about those topics in the same manner.”17
Dubček gave Kádár a detailed report on the causes of the Czechoslovak crisis and mentioned the mistakes that had been made since the 1950s in a historical retrospective. He also spoke about the circumstances of Novotný’s removal and his own election. Kádár admitted openly that Brezhnev and he had felt in December that Novotný should have been removed at a later date. Kádár knew intuitively that Dubček had actually sought the meeting in the hope of being given friendly advice, and he was unlikely to disappoint him. Kádár therefore advised restoring unity in the party leadership and tackling the problems methodically, calmly, and patiently. He also told Dubček that he must on no account embark on an “offended” political course and that he had to put up with other fraternal parties not being happy about the changes in Prague.18 “Tell yourself that they are only insufficiently aware of the circumstances and of your own point of view. They will become more aware of the actual situation before long and revise their assessment accordingly.”19
These encouraging words reflect Kádár’s initial optimism. They also proved to have been a prophesy which was soon to come true—if in a way that was disastrous for the Czechoslovak leaders. Kádár also mentioned that he deemed secret meetings inadvisable. It was agreed that the Czechoslovak leaders were to come to Budapest in late March or early April for a friendly visit, on which they would report. In retrospect, Kádár called the meeting “an open, straightforward private conversation” and Dubček a “sane, sober-minded communist motivated by a sense of responsibility and also struggling with problems.”20
The next meeting between Dubček and Kádár took place before March as developments were picking up momentum not only in Prague and Moscow, but also in East Berlin and Warsaw, where leaders were becoming increasingly concerned about the situation in Prague.21 The Czechoslovak leaders’ trip to Moscow took place earlier than originally planned, at the end of January. A meeting with Gomułka was arranged for 10 February.22 An invitation to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had also arrived. Therefore, it became important for Dubček, once he had completed his introductory visit to Moscow, to schedule the first official negotiations with one of the countries of the Soviet Bloc. This first country was to be Hungary, which was considered a close ally, a fact that Dubček openly addressed in the letter of 27 January to Kádár containing the invitation.23 The hectic pace of developments in Prague becomes apparent from the fact that Dubček originally planned to go to Budapest on 5 February; the information was accordingly conveyed to the Hungarian embassy in Prague. A few minutes later, Dubček himself called the ambassador and asked him to make arrangements for a meeting in Komárno on 4 or 5 February instead.24
In order to underline the official character of this meeting, which took place on Czechoslovak soil in Komárno, the list of participants included the foreign policy secretaries of the two parties, Vladimír Koucký and Zoltán Komócsin, as well as Hungarian deputy foreign minister Károly Erdélyi.25 Dubček reported on the Action Program that was going to be submitted to the session of the Central Committee scheduled for March, and mentioned that “they did not want to tackle too much at once.”26 For the time being, priority was given to solving the most important problems. The necessity of drafting a document that dealt in detail and from a long-term perspective with the problems confronting the party, the state, the economy, and society, which would have to be passed by the KSČ’s Central Committee, was not mentioned by anyone. Kádár expressed his concerns with regard to the Czechoslovak developments extremely diplomatically when he said: “Mark my words: now everyone is at work there on their own Action Program.”27