If the antisocialist forces were to become so powerful as to endanger the socialist system, they [Dubček and the other leaders] would not hesitate to confront them and neither their hands nor their knees would be trembling as they did so. They were powerful enough to call those who were scheming against the socialist system to account, even if there was the threat of external interference.52
This determination began to sound increasingly hollow to Moscow, and the news from Prague was ever more worrisome. An article published by Literární Noviny on the tenth anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy, which called him wrongfully executed and a martyr, caused indignation in Budapest as well as in Moscow. Kádár considered this as sniping that was taking aim at him personally and at his support for the Prague leadership. What he found particularly galling was the fact that the leadership of KSČ did not react unequivocally to this provocation. The “2,000 Words” manifesto, which was published on 27 June, was counterrevolutionary in the eyes of the Hungarian leadership, and they expected it to draw a number of resolute administrative responses. In a letter to Dubček of 5 July, Kádár outlined in detail his utter condemnation of the two documents. Whereas in his reply Dubček classified the article on Nagy as a provocation, he defended the KSČ’s attitude concerning the “2,000 Words” by pointing out that the manifesto had produced no tangible result.53 It is important to declare that contrary to previous interpretations, neither the Nagy article nor the “2,000 Words” manifesto was a turning point in the policy of the Hungarian leadership, since the HSWP’s position remained to avoid a military solution at all costs, even in the middle of July.
Toward the end of June, Kádár traveled to Moscow at the head of a party delegation. Brezhnev painted a somber picture of the ČSSR: Dubček was gradually drifting to the right, the right was growing in strength, Czechoslovakia was getting ever closer to going down the road of Yugoslavia, and its further trajectory might even take it into the bourgeois camp.54 Brezhnev announced that Moscow was planning two moves: first, a letter to the KSČ and, second, another meeting with those of its allies who had been present in Dresden. Kádár agreed in principle, but remembering the negative Czechoslovak echoes of the meeting of the “Five” in Moscow in May, he underlined the crucial importance of allowing Czechoslovakia to participate in the meeting. The Hungarian leadership itself differed at that time from the Soviet line on a number of issues, such as economic relations with the West in general and relations with the FRG in particular, so it seemed important to maintain the goodwill of the Soviet leadership. Kádár presumably felt that the time had come to make it quite clear that, while the Hungarian party favored a political solution for the Czechoslovak crisis in principle, it would support a military intervention as a measure of last resort if a political settlement could not be achieved and the continued existence of the Socialist order was in danger. This had been his point of view all along yet from what he had said so far, the Soviets could not be sure. This is why his “declaration of loyalty” was so important. Kádár did not want to irritate Moscow with aberrations of which he was not guilty. The minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU of 3 July 1968 contain Brezhnev’s take on the topic: “In expound ing his thoughts on the Czechoslovak situation, Cde. Kádár said it was obvious that an occupation of Czechoslovakia was inevitable. ‘If this should become necessary, we will vote in favour of this move.’”55 In the version of the report prepared for the Politburo of the HSWP, this pledge is not mentioned. Nevertheless, we may follow Tibor Huszár in believing that Kádár actually made some similar statement, provided we assume that it was made in the dialectical form outlined above in which military intervention was seen as a measure of last resort.
Brezhnev distorted Kádár’s statement to foreground the part that he himself played and to be able to present it as evidence of an important political victory he had gained by forcing a wavering ally back into line with the rest of the Soviet camp. This was certainly the interpretation that the members of the Politburo of the CPSU made of it.56 It was by no means Brezhnev’s first “distortion” of Kádár’s point of view: in the meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU on 17 July 1968, he claimed that in their assessment of the Czechoslovak situation at the Moscow meeting of the “Five” on 8 May there had been “unanimous agreement,” even though Kádár had put forward a point of view there that differed sharply from that of the others.57
Kádár also came to play an important role in preparing the meeting of the “Warsaw Five” on 14 and 15 July in Warsaw. Brezhnev had informed the others on 9 July that the Presidium of the KSČ had on the previous day declined at short notice the invitation to another meeting of the six “Dresden” allies. Kádár was taken aback by the reaction of the KSČ, for during his visit to Budapest, Dubček had voiced his dissatisfaction with the fact that in May the “Five” had met for consultations in Moscow without the Czechoslovaks. This is why Kádár proposed a meeting between representatives of the KSČ and the CPSU within a day or two, which would be followed in seven to ten days’ time by a meeting of the six allies. This would allow the leaders from Prague sufficient time to do their homework. If they were to decline this invitation as well, then the meeting would have to go ahead without them.58 On the next day, Presidium member Oldřich Švestka, one of the representatives of the “healthy forces” told János Gosztonyi, editorin-chief of the HSWP’s daily who had been sent by Kádár on a secret mission to Prague to gather firsthand information, that the Presidium of the KSČ had come out unanimously against the proposal. Kádár therefore, echoing Švestka, told Brezhnev that the Warsaw meeting was making the situation of the left more difficult by shifting the center to the right.59 Vasil Bil’ak, another representative of the “healthy forces,” had been in Budapest a few days before; in his talks with Kádár and György Aczél, he had repeatedly stressed that Czechoslovakia was capable of solving its problems on its own and needed no help from outside.60 Kádár therefore suggested to Brezhnev wording the letter to the KSČ in a tone that would make the Czechoslovaks’ participation possible. He added for tactical reasons that the topic of the talks had better not be the situation in Czechoslovakia; each party was to be asked to report on its own situation.61
In this difficult situation, Dubček asked Kádár urgently to meet him in secret. The meeting took place on 13 July on Hungarian soil, in Komárom. Yet the hopes of Dubček and his companion Černík were disappointed. Instead of offering assurances of continued support, Kádár and Fock severely criticized them for declining to take part in the Warsaw meeting. Kádár told them not only that this had been their worst mistake since January, but that they had also reached a point of no return, which meant “that we have parted ways and will be fighting on opposing sides.”62