The case here is not only Czechoslovakia. As a matter of fact it is about us. We are the real opposition to the Soviet leadership with our internal development, with our determination not to allow interference in our internal issues. It is understandable; an attack on Czechoslovakia does not mean that one day we might not be attacked, too.69
On 23 August 1968, the party CC met in Belgrade. Before his comrades had a chance to say anything, Tito stressed that the news from Czechoslovakia had made him dizzy.70 Later that day, he met Bruce Elbrick, the U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia.71 The purpose of the “occupation of Czechoslovakia” was to undermine the Socialist development based on the democracy, Tito concluded. Aware that Yugoslav-Soviet relations would not stay as good as they were, Tito was clear-minded regarding how global considerations this time were much more important for the Yugoslavs, which was why Yugoslavia would stay firm on the position of independence, equality, and noninterference.72 If relations between the Socialist countries were not based on equality, how could they ask for equal treatment from the capitalist countries, asked Tito. State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Marko Nikezić was more direct in his conversation with the U.S. ambassador a few days later. He reminded Elbrick of their conversation in July when the American had stated how Washington’s goal was not to complicate further the Czechoslovaks’ situation. At the same time, they were not ready to endanger relationships with their “big partner.”73 Closer negotiations between Moscow and Washington were positive, but not at the expense of the small and weak, the Yugoslav secretary concluded.
Less than twenty-four hours later on August 24, on the Romanian’s initiative, Tito met Ceaus¸escu in Vršac, Vojvodina.74 The Romanian dictator had informed Tito about the founding of the Patriotic Guard which was tasked with defending the independence of their “Socialist motherland.” Ceaus¸escu went further, asking whether the Yugoslavs would have allowed armed Romanian forces to occupy Yugoslav territory, if they were not planning on shooting at the Soviets if attacked. The Yugoslav leader had promised to receive only unarmed individuals or to disarm soldiers before they crossed the border.75 In the report given to the Soviets by the Hungarian diplomats in Belgrade, Tito was very depressed during the meeting. “The good atmosphere we had been creating for years, has suddenly gone,” Tito said.76 Moreover,
American Cold War policy brought the USA to isolation. The foreign policy of France had undermined the unity of the imperialist countries. There was a crisis in NATO. Socialism was a general tendency in the developing countries. There was a growing tendency to democratization in the Socialist countries. That has all changed now. The only side benefiting from this was the United States and reactionary forces. The root of evil is in the Soviet leadership.77
The Soviets were, as always, unwilling to admit any mistake, which was part of how they suppressed the independence of other countries. As well as the Romanians, Yugoslav politicians were ready to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. The Yugoslavs were, nevertheless, determined to fight, but not to continue with their provocations. They were aware of the differences between the “Five.” As a matter of fact, the Yugoslav diplomats in Prague were informed of the same. Polish diplomat Stičinski, who was far from friendly when Dubček became the first secretary, had admitted that he was to defend the opinion of his government in spite of the “huge loss of prestige of all Warsaw Pact countries.”78 It was impossible to prove or disprove that counterrevolution was taking place in Prague. Certainly, there was no invitation sent to invade Czechoslovakia. Propaganda preparation was bad, and Radio Vltava horrible, Štičinski said.
On 31 August 1968, Tito was back on the Brijuni Islands. Ivan Benediktov, the Soviet representative in Belgrade, came to deliver his demarche protesting the anti-Soviet propaganda. Benediktov was cold and professional. His presumptuous way of talking and the information he shared about the mistreatment of Yugoslavs in Moscow had annoyed Tito. He was interrupting the Soviet ambassador, saying many undiplomatic things. The Kremlin was listening to Walter Ulbricht and Todor Zhivkov, rather than Tito. Lyndon Johnson was probably the only one happy with the intervention, Tito said to the Soviet ambassador. The Soviets were spreading “obvious lies” when talking about Yugoslavia.79 Sergei Astavin, head of the Fifth Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, while complaining to the Yugoslav diplomats in Moscow about the harsh reactions from Belgrade, expressed his surprise. The Yugoslavs, he said, “were informed” of the Soviet intention to use troops in Czechoslovakia.80
Belgrade was determined to resist. The Americans and the British were ready to help, at least to a certain extent. On 27 August 1968, Ivo Sarajčić, the Yugoslav ambassador in London, had approached the British authorities. If the decision was not to interfere in the Lager, what would be the policy toward the states outside the blocs, he asked?81 Only one day later, Sarajčić was approached by the former British Foreign Office boss George Brown. He wanted Sarajčić to inform Belgrade how any threat to Yugoslav security would be responded to in kind. He was clear that Britain would threaten with force all those who would dare to do the same to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav ambassador in the United States, Bogdan Crnobrnja, had approached Dean Rusk, the U.S. secretary of state, on 29 August with no particular requests to make, only stressing his country’s determination to fight back if attacked.82 The Western countries had promised to help Belgrade in the event of a Soviet military intervention. The “occupation of Yugoslavia or Austria would have a particularly serious effect on NATO interests and it follows from this that any threat to or attack upon either of these countries would create a tense political atmosphere,” said the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Defense Policy Staff in London.83 Dean Rusk even stressed how the eventual Soviet presence on the Adriatic “was of vital concern to the entire Western world.”84 There was a panic in Belgrade and on the Brijuni Islands for a few days. As soon as it became clear how firm the guarantees from the West were and how small the Soviet interest to intervene, big changes began to take place in Yugoslavia.
THE U.S. COMMUNIST ALLY—FOR A SECOND TIME?
After the initial fear and insecurity, a few days after the invasion the Yugoslavs were convinced that their independence still mattered to the world. Early in September 1968, the British Foreign secretary and secretary of defense had agreed that a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia was unlikely. The Prague Spring had been “designed to maintain the status quo,” not to change radically the conservationist policy of the Warsaw Pact.85 Anyhow, an invasion of Yugoslavia would change the balance of power on the Old Continent. Therefore, during the meeting with the Americans, the British government concluded: “It should be made clear to the Russians that any attack on Yugoslavia would have the same effect as one on a member of NATO.”86 “The occupation of Rumania, serious though it would be, would not in itself touch upon vital Western security interests, but the invasion of Yugoslavia would be quite another matter.”87 The U.S. ambassador in Belgrade, Elbrick, after the interview with President Johnson on 14 October, once more stressed how “[t]he President cited our long tradition of assistance to Yugoslavia and expressed his admiration for the Yugoslav people and their dedication to freedom. The President made very clear his continuing interest in that country’s independence, sovereignty, and economic development.”88