Generally speaking, the Soviet ambassador’s call on Chancellor Klaus fell short of a downright “protest” on the part of Moscow against the course taken by the Austrian government. On the previous day, the Moscow Politburo had charged Soviet ambassadors all over the world to communicate clearly the Soviet point of view “regarding the latest developments centering on Czechoslovakia.” Some indication of how important it was in Moscow’s eyes that Austria should maintain its neutral position in 1968 derives from the fact that in the distribution schedule of this brief, which comprised dozens of countries, Austria ranked in fifth place, after the United States, France, Great Britain, and West Germany.53
NO DAMAGE DONE TO SOVIET-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS
Austria’s avowals of intending to keep to a strictly neutral course amounted to more than empty words during the following weeks. At the UN Conference of Nuclear-Free States in Geneva, Waldheim reiterated on 6 September 1968 that “Austria has always asserted its special interest in the creation of a climate of détente and international cooperation that is free from the dangers of armed conflict and confrontation.” “Austria,” Waldheim went on to say, “deplores any acts of violence as they jeopardize the order which is the foundation of security for all of us. We condemn these acts in the most categorical manner.”54 Diplomatic words like these were apt to meet with all around approval. In the West, they could be interpreted as a condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, even though Waldheim was not explicitly referring to the Czechoslovak crisis, and there was no need for Moscow to feel incriminated since the Soviet government was painting the invasion as a means of enhancing security in Europe. A “counterrevolutionary” victory would have endangered that security by impinging on the USSR’s vital interests. Waldheim was already positioning himself for the role of UN secretary-general, the post that he assumed on 1 January 1972, and was able in this manner to grow in stature in the Kremlin’s eyes. That Waldheim managed in this crucial phase of Austrian foreign politics to build a good relationship with the Soviets without having much explicit knowledge of internal Soviet deliberations that have only recently become apparent and intuitively to steer the correct course—correct also in light of the principles of Austrian neutrality which were not even hammered out yet—is evidenced by the confidential talk he had with the Soviet ambassador on 28 September, immediately before his trip to Yugoslavia as a member of the entourage of Federal President Franz Jonas.55 Waldheim explained to Podtserob that the forthcoming visit was a purely ceremonial one and only served for Vienna to reciprocate Tito’s visit.56 Podtserob, in turn, professed that while the peoples of the USSR entertained special feelings for the peoples of Yugoslavia on account of the war in which they had fought side by side against National Socialism and while Moscow was interested in good relations with Belgrade, these feelings only made sense on a basis of reciprocity. Waldheim, appearing immediately to have spotted a role for himself as a mediator, underlined the significance of his partner’s utterances, particularly because “rumors were being circulated by the media as regards Soviet military measures against Yugoslavia.”57 The Soviet ambassador disclaimed any such rumors. He and Waldheim agreed that it must be Yugoslavia that was spreading such rumors. Waldheim also mentioned the report circulated by the Deutsche Presse Agentur about a hypothetical demand put forward by Moscow to be granted the right to march through Austria to Yugoslavia. He claimed he had denied the existence of such a demand in the strongest of terms, which had even provoked the expression of a certain uneasiness toward him on the part of several West German politicians.
The extremely conciliatory course that Waldheim opted for in his encounter with the Soviet ambassador made the latter remark that the reporting on developments in Czechoslovakia in Austrian media, above all in the ORF, had become less partisan.58 The state visit of the Soviet minister for the gas industry, Aleksei Kortunov, in Austria had contributed noticeably to a consolidation of Soviet-Austrian relations.59 Podtserob thanked Waldheim for the hospitality with which Minister Kortunov and his entourage had been met in Austria and “for the amicable atmosphere.” Waldheim replied by expressing the hope that it would be possible to continue intensifying the economic ties between Austria and the Soviet Union, and somewhat bluntly pointed out to the Soviet diplomat that such a development might strengthen the position of the Austrian government, which was facing increasing pressure to secure the country’s accession to the European Communities (EC) at the earliest possible date.60 According to the ambassador’s notes, Waldheim said, “Some people vociferously complain that the end of Austria’s industry is imminent in case the country does not join the EC. The development of economic ties with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries would deal a blow to these critics.” In this way, Waldheim clearly conveyed the impression to Moscow that EC accession was not a top priority of the Austrian government for the time being and that, as far as the economy was concerned, Austria was prepared to cooperate more closely with Eastern Europe.61 Finally Waldheim also addressed the issue of South Tyrol and informed the ambassador of the latest developments. He did so presumably in the hope that the Soviet Union’s position on this issue might change one day. Having pointed out that the South Tyrol issue was, after all, a product of World War I, he added that Italy had been allotted South Tyrol for strategic reasons (“The Brenner Pass is now in Italian hands”). Podtserob asserted that the Soviet Union did not want “this controversy to be exploited for objectives that were at odds with the interests of peace in Europe.”62 In this way, the postponement of the trip to the Soviet Union of the president of the Austrian Parliament, Alfred Maleta, was Austria’s only concrete reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.63 Even accusations against Austria in KGB reports that look bizarre in retrospect and that surfaced in part in the “White Book” published in the autumn of 1968 remained without impact on the bilateral level.64
CONCLUSION
In his study on the foreign policy of Austria’s Second Republic, Michael Gehler concludes that the hesitant, tactically motivated way in which the Austrian government reacted to the invasion of Czechoslovakia led to a sense of bewilderment in the population and ultimately to a loss of stature for the Klaus government. Whether Austria’s politicians really felt out of their depth is another matter. Yet Gehler is no doubt right when he asks whether history would have taken a different course if the Austrian government had managed to appear more sure of itself and more resolute.65
Austria’s cautiousness with regard to the invasion of the troops of the Warsaw Pact’s pro-interventionist coalition may ultimately be explained by the absence of a U.S. security guarantee. In 1956, just such an explicit guarantee had existed. At that time, Washington would not have tolerated an infringement of Austrian sovereignty. In the crucial days of August 1968, no such guarantee materialized, presumably because the U.S. government took it for granted that the Warsaw Pact military action was going to remain confined to Czechoslovakia. Austrian diplomats are said to have lobbied for a U.S. guarantee; it is unlikely, however, that in this matter they got much support from the foreign minister. The assessment of the newly created situation that Waldheim made was a sober and unexcited one, and he attempted to make the most of it for Austria. The crisis in Hungary, which occurred barely a year after Austria declared everlasting neutrality, tested that neutrality to the full on the stage of world politics. In 1968, the situation was entirely different. Not only was Austria’s interpretation of neutrality “more comprehensive and more consistent than in 1956,” but the country in general and the Klaus government in particular were pursuing their own interests.66 The intensive shuttle diplomacy between Austria and the countries of the Eastern Bloc was beginning to bear fruit, which exposed the government to opposition criticism for its “Eastern bias.” From a purely economic perspective, Austria could easily have ended up in a cul-de-sac if it had behaved differently toward Moscow. Closing the gap that separated the country from accession to the EC remained a dubious undertaking on account of the issue of South Tyrol.