Against this backdrop, it is understandable that in November 1968 Waldheim, in a diplomatically brilliant, indirect manner, rebutted in Brussels the statement of U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk that Austria and Yugoslavia touched on U.S. security interests. He did so by pointing out that safeguarding Austrian independence and territorial integrity was an obligation shared by all four signatories of the State Treaty. Waldheim’s words were ultimately greeted with approval in the Soviet press.67
After the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968, Austria followed lines similar to those of the major powers in its reactions. Priority was given to avoiding anything that might provoke the “Russian bear.” For this reason, the army was stationed thirty kilometers away from the Austrian border, and units that had originally been deployed in the immediate vicinity of the border were pulled back to avoid the outbreak of border-related hostilities of the kind that had led to the killing of a Soviet soldier during the Hungarian crisis in 1956.
Austria’s policies were politically, if not ideologically, consistent with its neutral status. The Czech and Slovak reformers enjoyed a tremendous reputation in Austria, which was at least partly the result of the reports on Austrian television.
In 1968, most Austrians viewed Czechoslovakia as a country that was being deprived of its legitimate freedom; they were severely criticized for this view by the Soviets. There were also allegations that Austria had veered from its course as a neutral country. These allegations were a cause for considerable concern, especially for people in the gas industry. Would the Soviets still consider themselves bound by their contract to supply Austria with natural gas? They would. On 1 September 1968, gas deliveries started via a pipeline that pierced the Iron Curtain. What had looked like a test of Austria’s neutrality in the crucible of the Cold War left behind no more than a mild sense of irritation, which evaporated in no time.
NOTES
Translated from German into English by Otmar Binder, Vienna.
1. For further information on the Soviet occupation of Austria, see Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Sowjetische Besatzung 1945–1955, vol. 1, Beiträge, vol. 2, Dokumente, ed. Stefan Karner et al., Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig Boltzmann-Instituts für Kriegsfolgen-Forschung, Sonderband 4, 5 (Graz: Oldenbourg, 2005).
2. Text of a statement delivered by Federal Chancellor J. Klaus, on Austrian television (ORF), 21 August 1968 (7:00 a.m.), Ktn. 1347, 129.266-6 (Pol.) 68, Austrian State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna (hereafter abbreviated as ÖStA, BMfaA).
3. Podtserob was a long-serving Soviet diplomat. Active in the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs from 1937, he had worked for Molotov from 1943. In 1952, he was promoted to deputy foreign minister, became head of the 1st European Department and ambassador to Turkey and, in 1956, to Austria, where he remained until 1971. For more details, see G. P. Kynin and J. Laufer, SSSR i germanskii vopros: 22 iyunya 1941g.–8 maya 1945, SSSR i germanskii vopros 1941–1949, Tom I. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1996), 750.
4. Cf. the instructions for the Soviet ambassadors in different countries prepared by the Politburo of the CC CPSU. Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU P 96 (V), “On the declarations of the government of the USSR addressed to foreign governments concerning the events in Czechoslovakia,” 19 August 1968, F. 3, op. 72, d. 198, pp. 4, 20–30, Russian State Archives of Contemporary History, Moscow (hereafter abbreviated as RGANI), reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente, #165.
5. At the beginning of August, a group of Czechoslovak Communists loyal to Moscow around Vasil Bil’ak handed a “request” written in Russian to Leonid Brezhnev in Bratislava asking the Soviet leadership for “assistance.” For details, see the Prozumenshchikov chapter in this volume.
6. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 21 August 1968, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 163–64, Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Affairs, Moscow (hereafter abbreviated as AVP RF). In his 1968 Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen, Reiner Eger concluded that on the basis of the sources available at the time it was impossible to say with certainty whether on 21 August the Soviet ambassador had already given Chancellor Klaus “an assurance… that no Soviet moves of any kind would be taken against Austria,” but he inferred quite correctly that this must have been the case. See Reiner Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen: Das Verhalten Österreichs während des Ungarnaufstandes 1956 und der tschechoslowakischen Krise 1968. Ein Vergleich (Vienna: Herold Verlag, 1981), 90–91.
7. ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1350, 124.434-6 (Pol.) 68.
8. ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1350, 124.434-6 (Pol.) 68.
9. ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1350, 124.434-6 (Pol.) 68; From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 21 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 163–64. The transcript was made on 25 August 1968 and dispatched to Moscow by the Soviet embassy on 31 August 1968.
10. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 21 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 163–64. In the afternoon of the previous day, the first demonstrations outside the Soviet embassy occurred, which had resulted in two Molotov cocktails being thrown against the door of the embassy. One man was arrested. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 22 August 1968, p. 1 and 4.
11. Minutes no. 91a of the extraordinary session of the Austrian Council of Ministers, 21 August 1968 (1:25 p.m.). ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1347, 129.266-6 (Pol.) 68.
12. ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1347, 129.266-6 (Pol.) 68, official communiqué on the session of the Council of Ministers, 21 August 1968. Owing to the visit of the Soviet ambassador, the beginning of the session of the Council of Ministers was delayed until 1:30 p.m. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 22 August 1968, p. 1.
13. Andreas Steiger, “‘zum Schutz der Grenze bestimmt’? Das Bundesheer und die CSSR/Krise 1968,” ÖMZ 5 (1998): 540–41.
14. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 21 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 165–66. The transcript was made on 29 August 1968 and dispatched to Moscow by the Soviet embassy on 31 August 1968. Waldheim had not lodged a formal protest, as Eger claims. Cf. Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen, 91.