The leaders in Peking are to blame for the fact that the stretch of the Socialist countries’ defensive line that the Chinese are in charge of has proved to be the weakest. It is no coincidence that it is here, in Southeast Asia, that the American imperialism is at its most active.
[…] We are ready at any time, pending a party resolution, to assist the Czechoslovak people together with the armies of the countries of the Warsaw Pact if the imperialists and counterrevolutionaries should attempt to wrest socialist Czechoslovakia from the socialist camp.
[…] Let me add a few words on the situation in Vietnam. We all know about the latest triumphs that the Vietnamese army has achieved in its struggle with American imperialism. The steadfastness and perseverance of the Vietnamese people and its fighters are a source of deep satisfaction for all of us. At the same time it must be said that the military gains of the Vietnamese patriots are inseparably linked to the efforts of our people and our country that are aimed at assisting this heroic nation. To put it bluntly: this war is waged not only by the Vietnamese but by the Soviet people as well. It is common knowledge that both in the North and in the South it is our weapons that are used to fight the American aggressors.
Let me give you some figures. Only recently did we deliver to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam hundreds of Flak rocket launching pads and thousands of rockets; 3,000 or so flak cannon, 2,500 field cannon and grenade launchers, approximately 250,000 machine guns and carbines, approximately 400 airplanes and choppers and a great deal of other weapons and military technology. All this was given free of charge, with only one aim in mind—to assist the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the American aggressors. Our assistance is set to continue and we despatch weapons and military technology to Vietnam on a daily basis.
In addition to this we train whole regiments of flak soldiers, pilots and other specialists who are sent to the front when they are needed. In Vietnam there are hundreds of our advisers who help the Vietnamese control the war and handle modern weapons. Often our officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers take part in the fighting, and many of the airplanes destroyed in the war were brought down by our brave fighters.
It needs to be said however that our Soviet military personnel are not treated as comrades taking part in a joint struggle. Contacts between our people and the Vietnamese soldiers are discouraged, their contacts with Vietnamese troops are limited, and those Vietnamese with sympathies for the Soviet state are subject to persecution. The truth about the war is kept secret and access to destroyed American airplanes is made difficult under one pretext or another.
All this seems to happen at the instigation of the Chinese who are active in the Vietnamese army as advisers and observers of one kind or another. Such attitudes towards soldiers from the Soviet Union obviously sadden us but we carry out our work regardless because we have been mandated to do so by the party in the name of our internationalist duty to pay tribute to our friendship with the Vietnamese people and to fight our common enemy, imperialism, and we will continue to do so by assisting the Vietnamese people.
[…] On behalf of the Armed Forces allow me to signal my unqualified approval […] of the realization of the plenum’s resolutions; the Armed Forces are standing by to implement them. [Applause.]
RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 94, S. 1–15. Unedited stenographic notes. Translated from the German translation of the original Russian document (original Russian and German translation in Karner et al., Dokumente, #33).
Appendix 3
“Secret” Memorandum: Eugene V. Rostow to Dean Rusk, 10 May 1968
Subject: Soviet Threat to Czechoslovakia1
I have thought further about our conversation yesterday.
I conclude that it would be a serious mistake not to give the Soviets a private signal of concern about troop movements near Czechoslovakia.
1. In retrospect, our failure to deter the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948 was one of the most serious mistakes of our foreign policy since the war. Firm diplomatic action then—a period of our nuclear monopoly—could well have prevented the Cold War. Similarly, our public statement in 1956 that we would not intervene gave the Soviets a full license. Obviously, the situation has profoundly changed.
2. What is at stake now is the process of movement towards détente—the policy of the President’s speech of October 7, 1966; the NATO Resolution of last September accepting the Harmel Exercise Report; the German Eastern policy, and the possibility of real improvement in the political climate in Europe, leading to mutual balanced force reductions. Progress in this direction would be set back if the Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia. I simply do not agree that Soviet efforts in Eastern Europe would fail to stamp out liberal trends. They have long since proved their capacity to keep the animals tame by police methods, and their willingness to do so.
3. The Russians must be hesitating. The moment to give them a deterrent signal is therefore now. It will be too late once they cross the border.
1. On top of this memorandum is the handwritten note “No action DR” (Dean Rusk).
Folder “6/1/68,” Box 1558, POL Czech—USSR DEF 4 NATO, Central Foreign Policy Files 1968–1969, RG 59, NARA.
Appendix 4
On the Results of the Warsaw Meeting of the Delegations of Communist Parties and Workers’ Parties from Socialist Countries
Plenary Session of the CC CPSU
Speech by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev
17 July 1968
Comrades!
The Poliburo of the CC CPSU has considered it imperative to convene this meeting, where our purpose is to report on the results of a meeting that took place in Warsaw on 14/15 July of the party and government leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union.
The most important issue discussed at this meeting, indeed the issue around which the whole meeting revolved, was the dangerous sequence of events in Czechoslovakia. Before I proceed to present to this meeting the relevant documents let me remind you that after the April plenum of the CC the prevalent notion in the Politburo of the CC CPSU with regard to the events in Czechoslovakia had been the one expressed at that plenum; it held that assistance should be given to the healthy forces and above all to the communist party of Czechoslovakia in their efforts to fend off the loss of socialist achievements in Czechoslovakia as well as the country’s alienation from the socialist camp. […]
As they encountered no courageous and determined resistance, the rightist forces threw all moderation over board, with the result that four leading Czechoslovak papers simultaneously published an openly counterrevolutionary manifesto—the so-called “2,000 Words.” It bore the signatures of a number of people, some of them well-known, others unknown. A detail that should be mentioned is the fact that some of the signatures are those of nonexistent people who have obviously been invented for the purpose.
This document is a direct attack on the KSČ, it is no less than a call to take up arms against the constitutional government. As we speak, it is being used to unite the antisocialist forces and to serve as a platform for their activities.