1. The resolution was put to the vote and passed. Those who voted in favor were L. I. Brezhnev, G. I. Voronov, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, K. T. Mazurov, A. J. Pel’she, N. V. Podgornyi, D. S. Polyanskii, M. A. Suslov, A. N. Shelepin, and P. E. Shelest.
RGANI, F. 3, op 72, d. 191, pp. 84–85. Translated from the German translation of the original Russian document (original Russian and German translation in Karner et al., Dokumente, #191).
Appendix 6
“Secret” Memorandum by Nathaniel Davis, “Czechoslovak Contingencies”
[No date, but from file location end of July/beginning of August 1968]
Tension continues to build, partly because tomorrow is the day the Czechs say the Soviets will start moving out. These are added disquieting signs: (1) [one line redacted] (2) Reportedly, an agreed paragraph in the Warsaw Pact announcement, saying Soviet troops would be leaving, was deleted when the announcement was made; and (3) An unspecified People’s Militia “operation” is due to start at 9:00 tonight.
Possibilities include:
• The beginning of at least token withdrawals, followed by Czech-Soviet bilateral talks early next week and some sort of inconclusive accommodation.
• Soviet unwillingness to remove any troops, continued pressure and continued maneuver.
• Soviet provocation of an incident, perhaps in connection with an ostensible movement to withdraw, followed by a Warsaw Pact call for re-enforcements to protect existing forces.
• Public disorder and violence, in Prague or elsewhere, which would trigger an unraveling of the Czech party and government.
• Militia arrests of liberals, with or without Dubcek acquiescence, or moves toward a coup of some kind.
Alternatives for the United States:
We are obviously not prepared to intervene militarily. Recourse to the UN is probably an “after-the-fact” alternative—certainly not an immediate option. In the very short term, the following seem to be areas where we have alternatives:
1. World public attention. We could find ways to intensify world-wide press, public and government attention and concern. This might have some inhibiting effect on the Soviets. The disadvantage is that it could further destabilize the situation in Czechoslovakia—including the discipline and calm of the Czech public.
2. As a further step, we could make various kinds of official U.S. government statements. We could also stimulate European governments to parallel action. However, we must be careful we do not repeat the mistake of 1956, in creating expectations we are not prepared to follow through on.
3. [A word redacted] may have some capability of stimulating Western European or other Communist Parties and press to call on the Soviets to stop interfering in the internal affairs of a brother Communist Party and nation.
Anything we could do to mobilize independent-minded Communist opinion, before rather than after the fact, would seem worth doing.
4. We might consider what kind of approach to the Romanians and/or Yugoslavs might be useful. Perhaps some discreet comparing of notes would be helpful.
5. We might consider what kind of diplomatic approach to the Russians could be helpful. The difficulty is that we are dealing with a vital interest of the USSR, and it is doubtful they would be responsive to any pressures we could apply or would be willing to bring to bear. Nevertheless, there might be some possibilities.
We have a whole range of things we could do in our Soviet relationship—including cancelling the PanAm inaugural, suspending exchange negotiations, bringing Ambassador Thompson home on consultations, deferring our strategic-arms talks proposals, etc. However, our relationship with the Soviets has historically always been paramount, and our Eastern European interest secondary. This is, no doubt, still true.
6. Conceivably we might have some way through a third party, etc; to signal to the Czech leadership to “cool it,” pull in their horns on reform, curb their press, etc.—if we think this is the best and only way to avert a debacle. There are certainly observers who think we should have done this sort of thing at an earlier stage in Hungary. On the other hand, we are not close enough to Czech developments or their leadership to have much realistic chance of trying to steer them.
Folder 5 “Memos Czechoslovakia, 1/68–8/68,” Box 179, Country File Europe, USSR, Czechoslovakia, National Security File, LBJ Library.
Appendix 7
Memorandum from Ambassador McGhee to the Secretary of State, 21 August 1968
Subject: U.S. Reaction to Soviet Move Against Czechoslovakia
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
1. We should, I believe, denounce in the clearest possible terms the action of the Soviets and certain of their Warsaw Pact allies against Czechoslovakia as being an unprovoked and unjustified act of aggression—both publicly at the highest level, in the Security Council and in the NATO, because:
a. We must make it clear that we do not accept the Soviet interpretation of the move as being a purely internal Communist affair. Otherwise, both the Soviets and the peoples of Eastern Europe will assume that we have given the Soviets a free hand within the Communist sphere.
b. We must disprove that we, as is often alleged in Europe, accept the status quo in Europe because of a desire to achieve a détente with the Soviets or a settlement in Vietnam.
c. Since the UN was formed largely to prevent aggression, we have no choice but to raise a case of aggression against one of its members, even in the face of a certain veto in the Security Council.
d. NATO, having been founded to defend against Communist encroachment against the Atlantic Nations, cannot ignore the drastic change in the European power balance caused by the Soviet move.
2. We should, at the same time, not give any impression that we intend to take unilateral action. It is not necessary to enunciate or explain this since the world fully understands it. We should not, on the other hand, give as explanation the fact that the Czech leaders did not ask for assistance. Everyone understands that this was not practical in the circumstances.
3. The Soviet move demonstrates once more, as clearly as in Hungary in 1956 and in East Germany in 1953, their continuing intent to use whatever means are required to keep control over the Communist nations, even in the face of overwhelming world—and even other Communist opinion. This sets severe practical limits on our détente effort, which must be taken into account in our future negotiations with the Soviet Union. This is particularly true in the case of the FRG, whose goals in this regard have become increasingly unrealistic.
4. Although we should not, I believe backtrack on any bilateral agreements already negotiated, i.e. Civil Air and Consular, we should not in deference to reality and world opinion proceed with discussion of any new détente efforts for the time being. Our engagement in disarmament discussions would appear to many as being as cynical on our part—as on the part of the Soviets. The NPT, which is a largely fait accompli and stands on its own merits, should not be affected.