5. The Soviet action opens up excellent possibilities for exploitation to our and the free world advantage.
a. Without any effort on our part, the implications of the present move are such that the world should now fully understand the nature of the Soviet regime and the lengths to which it will go to maintain its control over other countries. Although we should not stand back, we should let others carry the burden of explaining this wherever possible. In showing their hand so clearly, the Soviets move should have a particular effect on the attitude of the world youth. It should, if the young people involved are sincere in the goals they profess, bring the Soviets into their direct line of criticism and attack. Efforts should be made discreetly to encourage this.
b. A new opportunity should be provided to obtain many of our objectives within NATO which we have not been able to accomplish on account of a general apathy on the part of other states. We should be able at least to stabilize present force goals.
c. There is possibility that the Soviet action might precipitate a fundamental review of French policy, possibly leading to the French being willing to establish closer relations with the NATO organization and closer cooperation with U.S. and other NATO countries in their relations with the Soviet Union.
d. The Soviet move will, it is believed, take the steam out of the efforts of those in Congress who have sought a drastic unilateral reduction in U.S. forces in Europe. The opportunity should be taken to try to get public statements recognizing the changed situation by some of the Congressional leaders involved, particularly Senators Russell, Mansfield and Symington.
6. The move against Czechoslovakia clearly demonstrates the renewed strong influence of Ulbricht on the Soviets (after what appeared to be a temporary eclipse), even though this influence largely stems from his personal weakness and that of his regime. Since this may presage Ulbricht’s desire for renewed attacks against the FRG and threats to Berlin access, it might be advisable to warn the Soviets in advance of the serious consequences of such action.
Folder 1, Box 1, Czech Crisis Files, Lot 70 D 19, Office of the Executive Secretariat, RG 59, NARA.
Appendix 8
Svoboda about Dubček: “If He Were to Resign from His Post, It Would Be Better for All of Us”
Stenographic notes of the conversation between the Soviet leadership and the president of the ČSSR, L. Svoboda, and M. Klusák
23 August 19681
[7:00 p.m.]
Top Secret2
Svoboda: In Prague parliament held a session and so did the government; there has also been a CC meeting. I was asked yesterday to form a new government but I think this would be unconstitutional.
Brezhnev: Sorry, I don’t quite understand.
Svoboda: The situation has now changed for the better… In the Czechoslovak army 265 have been wounded and twenty-three killed, who are being buried now.
Podgornyi: And how many casualties among the Soviet comrades?
Svoboda: I can’t say for sure but there are some. We have taken all measures so that there are as few casualties as possible.
(Comrade Svoboda proposes that Comrade Dubček go to Prague, openly confess his guilt and resign his powers. If some other course was adopted instead, it was likely to result in popular discontent.)
Brezhnev: Ludvík Ivanović [Svoboda], if Comrade Dubček resigns his powers, who would then become First Secretary?
Svoboda: It is obvious you have not understood me quite correctly. Where is Dubček now?
Brezhnev: He is alright.
Svoboda: If he were to resign from his post, it would be better for all of us. If he remains where he is, that is alright as well. In any case it is necessary for Comrade Dubček to step forward.
Brezhnev: Where, here?
Svoboda: No, in Prague. All the members of the government have said that they will keep their posts only if Černík becomes the head of the government. People say about Bil’ak that he is a traitor. Bil’ak cannot be the head of the government, he has no authority with most members of our party.
Brezhnev: That’s all very well, Ludvík Ivanovič [Svoboda], but right now we should not be looking back, we should be looking ahead how we are going to avoid great bloodshed. Let’s be frank: the whole country is in a psychosis. Even before the trip to Čierná nad Tisou an atmosphere of utmost nationalist tension was created. No other slogans were shouted there apart from Dubček, Dubček, save Dubček. A great tension was in evidence even then. I do believe there must be reason why this situation was brought about. Moreover it now transpires that various underground radio transmitters and arms caches have been discovered. Today for instance submachine guns and other arms were found in a cellar of the Ministry of Agriculture. The whole thing looks as if there was some group, let’s cautiously call them rightists, counterrevolutionaries, that had been expecting things to take this turn. That they conducted the party conference in the way they did is further proof.
If we proceed in the manner that you suggest, if Dubček were to go to Prague, openly confess his guilt and resign his powers—let’s call this an option—what would happen? So he accepts the role of scapegoat and explains why he resigns his powers. And who is going to succeed him as First Secretary? To elect a First Secretary you first need to make sure there is agreement in the presidium of the CC in its old form. As it is, neither Piller nor Kolder nor Bil’ak nor Indra are included. Who is supposed to be elected? Will Dubček’s influence be sufficient for the purpose?
It is necessary for Comrades Dubček, Smrkovský and Černík as well as for your whole delegation to declare in advance that the present party conference has been convened illegally and has no function. This declaration has to be made first of all. Then the presidium becomes active in the old form which is considered legitimate. If you’re going to consider the party conference as legally convened and neither Bil’ak nor Indra nor Švestka nor Kolder are there, if there are, to put it quite frankly, no healthy forces present, who is then supposed to be elected? This is a course we simply cannot give our consent to because it is for this very reason that we have sent our troops into Czechoslovakia: to prevent the country from going down the wrong road. […]
We will evacuate our troops only when we have a binding commitment from you. We are under obligation to our allies, the other Socialist countries, and are unable to evacuate troops on our own.
Klusák: Were there German soldiers on Czechoslovak territory?
Podgornyi: No, not a single German set foot on Czechoslovak territory.
Klusák: Is it maybe necessary to put this point to the Minister of Defense?
Brezhnev: It is absolutely certain that there were no German soldiers on Czechoslovak territory. We kept them back.
Klusák: In Prague people are absolutely convinced that they’re there even now.
Brezhnev: This is an act of provocation. Between you and me: the German comrades were offended because they felt that they were not being trusted somehow.
Podgornyi: We did this at your request. We took the whole situation into account even though they were to have marched with the others initially.3