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1. Added by hand in the original.

2. “Strictly classified” added by hand.

3. This is the final proof that the decision to refrain from deploying the NVA was made in Moscow at the request of the Czechoslovaks. See Rüdiger Wenzke, “Die Nationale Volksarmee der DDR: Kein Einsatz in Prag,” in Karner et al., Beiträge, 673–86.

SOURCE

RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, pp. 1–19. Translated from the German translation of the original Russian document (original Russian and German translation in Karner et al., Dokumente, #107).

Appendix 9

“Secret” and “Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, 1968

“Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 1 July 1968

Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Johnson, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Wheeler, General Chapman, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke, et al.

1. Personnel Matters

Mr. Clifford began the meeting at 0937.

[…]

7. Troop Reductions in Europe

Mr. Clifford said that we are having an exceedingly difficult problem regarding our troops in Europe. He has talked with Senator Russell on this matter. Senator Symington has offered an amendment to the Appropriations Bill, which might pass in the current Congressional climate. He proposes to cut U.S. troops in Europe to 50,000. Senator Russell has indicated that he is prepared to vote for the proposal. Senator Mansfield has stated that he has sought Department of Defense cooperation to cut our troops in Europe. Unless Defense comes up with an alternative proposal, the Senate plans to go ahead with the Symington amendment. Mr. Clifford said he had taken up the matter with the President and he has expressed deep concern. He does not wish in the closing days of his Administration to have the dismantling of NATO take place. The Senate has the bit in its teeth and they plan to take action. Mr. Clifford said he believed that the House was with us. Senator Russell feels we have to have a substitute plan because we can’t beat something with nothing. We will want to give our preferred attention to this matter. We need to have a plan in addition to the 34,000 that are now scheduled to be out by 30 August 1968. When these troops return, our European forces will total around 300,000. This latter figure is the one being used on the Hill and which they is excessive and should be brought down. We need to come up with a plan and take it up with our NATO allies. We may be able to work out something reasonable and intelligent.

Mr. Nitze stated that there would be the problem of coordinating any proposed reductions with State. Mr. Clifford said that the State Department feels that any reductions is all wrong. They have said that they can’t agree with any kind of reduction. They want to stand firm. We feel we must “bend” with the wind. He will discuss the matter with Secretary Rusk.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1023

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 15 July 1968

Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, General Walt (for General Chapman, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, Admiral Johnson (for General Wheeler), Mr. Earle (for Mr. Warnke), Mr. McGiffert, Mr. Stempler et al. Staff meeting convened at 0937 under Mr. Nitze’s chairmanship.

Symington Amendment

Mr. Nitze summarized Mr. Clifford’s and his meeting of last Thursday (11 July) with Senators Russell, Stennis, and Jackson. He reported that Mr. Clifford emphasized to the Senators:

1. The importance of NATO to our strategic defense;

2. The relationship and sensitivity of our European force deployments to:

a. the political situation in France,

b. the current commercial and travel problems involving Berlin,

c. the Soviet deployments to the Mediterranean, and

d. the political and economic changes in eastern Europe;

3. The relationships of U.S. force reductions to the general proposition of NATO and Warsaw pact force reductions and to the forthcoming discussions with the Soviet union on arms limitations; and

4. The troops withdrawals which have already been made (e.g., REFORGER).

Senator Russell replied that while he recognized the eloquence of Mr. Clifford’s arguments, he had heard eloquent pleas before. The Senator remarked that the only new developments were the recent political changes in Czechoslovakia. Senator Russell said that while we had been maintaining sizable forces in Europe for twenty-three years, he wondered how much longer the U.S. planned to keep them there. He felt that our allies were not contributing their proportional share and that Mr. McNamara has not made the reductions in U.S. European force levels the Congress thought he was going to make. Senator Russell also said while he had not realized previously that the Symington proposal would reduce U.S. forces to 50,000, he thought [the] Symington Amendment would carry—in some form or another—unless an adequate substitute amendment could be presented. The Senator mentioned the possibility of developing a five-year reductionin-strength program, or, alternatively, the withdrawal of some 50,000 men over an eighteen-month period.

Senator Stennis generally supported current U.S./NATO policies but was disturbed by the lack of adequate force contributions to the common NATO defense by our European allies. He noted that serious balance of payments problems still persist and that the various bilateral offset agreements hadn’t been very satisfactory. Senator Stennis also said that a substitute amendment was desirable.

Senator Jackson was generally more sympathetic to the views expressed by Messrs. Clifford and Nitze and concurred in the view that the most practical alternative to the Symington Amendment was an acceptable substitute amendment.

Mr. Nitze expressed the view that the Executive branch should not be asked to develop “for-the-record” a substitute amendment because of the subsequent problems it would create with our NATO allies. The Senators accepted Mr. Nitze’s suggestion but asked if State and Defense could work informally with them in developing an acceptable substitute.

At a White House meeting last Friday evening, (which General Wheeler and Mr. Clifford attended) Mr. Nitze had been told that while the President was pleased that Messrs. Clifford and Nitze had met with the Senators, he didn’t want anyone in the Executive Branch taking positions which would endorse a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. The net result of the President’s instruction is that work should continue on the REDCOSTE proposals but that we should characterize this effort as an “investigation of possibilities and not as a “decision document.”

Mr. Nitze said that notwithstanding the President’s instructions of Friday evening, serious balance of payments problems persist. Dr. Brown remarked that the RECOSTE effort had been characterized as a series of proposals to reduce “people,” not “forces.” Mr. McGiffert asked if we were still obliged to work privately with Senators Jackson and Stennis. Mr. Stempler noted that the ground rule affecting our informal work on an acceptable substitute amendment with the Senators apparently had been changed. Mr. Nitze said that since the Senatorial debate over the Symington Amendment would not take place for about two weeks, there would be an opportunity to review again the Executive Branch’s position with the President. Mr. Nitze then suggested that if anyone had a good idea on how Senatorial support could be mobilized for current NATO deployments he should contact Jack Stempler.

[…]

Staff meeting adjourned at 1035.

Abbott C. Greenleaf, Colonel, USAF, Military Assistant

“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 22 July 1968

Mr. Clifford, Nr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, Mr. Baird (for Mr. Ignatius), Admiral Claret (for Admiral Moorer), Dr. Brown, General Wheeler, Dr Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.

1. Mr. Clifford’s trip to Southeast Asia

Mr. Clifford began the meeting at 0940.

[…]

5. U.S. Forces in Europe

Mr. Nitze said that with regard to the Symington Amendment to reduce U.S. military forces in Europe we have had two good editorials recently in the New York [T]imes and the Washington Post. We have the problem of how to handle Senator Jackson and work with him on alternative proposals. The President does not want to suggest moving any troops out of Europe. We have talked with Dorothy Fordick of Senator Jackson’s staff. We are suggesting language in the report of the Senate committee covering several kinds of amendments that could be made rather than suggesting an amendment to the bill. Mr. Clifford emphasized that the President feels strongly on this matter and doesn’t want to cut our forces in Europe at all at this time.

[…]

The meeting adjourned at 1042.

R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary