“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 22 July 1968
Mr. Clifford, Nr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, Mr. Baird (for Mr. Ignatius), Admiral Claret (for Admiral Moorer), Dr. Brown, General Wheeler, Dr Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.
1. Mr. Clifford’s trip to Southeast Asia
Mr. Clifford began the meeting at 0940.
[…]
5. U.S. Forces in Europe
Mr. Nitze said that with regard to the Symington Amendment to reduce U.S. military forces in Europe we have had two good editorials recently in the New York [T]imes and the Washington Post. We have the problem of how to handle Senator Jackson and work with him on alternative proposals. The President does not want to suggest moving any troops out of Europe. We have talked with Dorothy Fordick of Senator Jackson’s staff. We are suggesting language in the report of the Senate committee covering several kinds of amendments that could be made rather than suggesting an amendment to the bill. Mr. Clifford emphasized that the President feels strongly on this matter and doesn’t want to cut our forces in Europe at all at this time.
[…]
The meeting adjourned at 1042.
R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary
“Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 29 July 1968
Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. McGiffert (for Mr. Resor), General Palmer (for General Westmoreland), Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Mr. Hoopes (for Dr. Brown), Lt. General McKee (for General McConnell), General Wheeler, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.
1. Negotiations in Paris
Mr. Clifford began the meeting 0938.
[….]
3. Negotiations with the Soviets on Strategic Weapons
Mr. Clifford said there is widespread public interest in the strategic talks with the Soviet Union. There is some indication that these could start within a month or two. He would caution that the press will be wanting to pick up pieces of information from Defense and State. All should be careful in this regard. No information of any kind whatsoever is to be given out. We can remain hopeful on the results of these talks. The talks will have a better chance of success if the lid is kept on comments.
4. USSR/Czechoslovakia Confrontation
Mr. Clifford said we are staying out of this one. We believe the best policy is to permit the Soviets and the Czechs to adjust their differences. We have a number of items going with the Soviet Union and it would be exceedingly unfortunate time to get involved. Here again he cautioned against comments on the situation by Defense personnel.
[…]
The meeting adjourned at 1038
R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary
“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 5 August 1968
Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. McGiffert (for Mr. Resor), General Westmoreland, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Wheeler, Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.
1. Negotiations in Paris
Mr. Clifford began the meeting at 0940.
[…]
2. USSR/Czechoslovakia
Mr. Clifford said although we do not have the whole story on the discussion by the Czechs, the Soviets and others, the results appear to be a signal accomplishment for Dubcek and the Czechs. The effects will run through the rest of Eastern Europe. The Soviets had a sticky problem. The 1968 Czechoslovakian crisis is a far cry from the 1956 Hungarian crisis. He feels that the Soviets wanted to do everything except march into Czechoslovakia. The manner in which the Soviets and other communist nations deployed troops around Czechoslovakia was interesting. General Wheeler said the Communists had elements of between eleven and eighteen divisions deployed in the southern portion of East Germany. Three Polish divisions plus Soviets were deployed in Poland at the border. Other Soviet divisions were in the Carpathian District of the Soviet Union. In addition, there were two Soviet Divisions inside Czechoslovakia. Our intelligence people are looking into why we were unable to identify earlier some of the divisions deployed. One moved in radio silence and was not known to be in Czechoslovakia until our military attaché saw it while on a trip through the countryside. He noted around 3,000 vehicles. This casts some doubt on assumptions that we have made in the past that if the Communists plan a possible attack against NATO we would receive strategic warning. The Soviets imposed press censorship, security measures, radio silence and concentrated sizeable numbers of troops without our getting early notice. There is no question that they could have overrun Czechoslovakia in a matter of about two days. It would have been an easier task than in Hungary.
[…]
The meeting adjourned at 1048
R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretry
“Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 12 August 1968
Mr. Clifford, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Resor, General Westmoreland, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Clarey (for Admiral Moorer), Mr. Hoopes (for Dr. Brown), General McConnell, Lt. General McPherson (for General Wheeler), Dr. Enthoven, Mr. Warnke et al.
1. Negotiations in Paris
Mr. Clifford began meeting 0936.
[…]
2. MIRVs
Mr. Clifford made reference to the decision to test MINUTEMAN III and POSEIDON. He again cautioned and asked all not to get into any discussions involving the U.S./USSR strategic missiles talks or these tests. We expect that the talks will be coming up within the next month or so. It will be a long, arduous, and sometimes frustrating negotiation. It will add to the burden of the negotiators if unauthorized statements are made. Over the weekend there was an article in the Washington Post by George Wilson entitled “Russians Slow Work on Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Etc.” The information in the article indicates that he got some of it from somebody either in the Pentagon or in the State Department. With problems on the Hill, being in the midst of a political campaign, it will prevent a lot of alarms and excursions if we do not talk about the talks and MIRVs.
[No separate item on “USSR/Czechoslovakia in the minutes of this meeting!]
[…]
The meeting adjourned at 1048
R. Eugene Livesay, Staff Secretary
“Top Secret” Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, 26 August 1968
Mr. Clifford, Mr. McGiffert (for Mr. Resor), General Westmoreland, Mr. Ignatius, Admiral Moorer, Dr. Brown, General McConnell, General Chapman, Dr. Foster, Mr. Warnke et al.
1. Review of Past Week
Mr. Clifford began meeting 0937
[…]
a. Southeast Asia
[…]
b. Czechoslovakia
Mr. Clifford said on Tuesday came the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets and other Warsaw Pact military forces. The first he heard of this action was in a phone call a little after 9:00 p.m. that evening to advise him to come to the White House for an NSC meeting. Soviet Ambassador Dobroynin [sic] had called on the President shortly after 8:00 p.m. to advise him as to why the Soviets were taking this step because of the presence of internal and external aggression against Czechoslovakia. Dobroynin [sic] stated that the Soviets had been petitioned to interfere by the government of Czechoslovakia. These statements created great skepticism that night. There is still no indication of who the individuals are that allegedly called on the Soviets to interfere.
Mr. Clifford said it is difficult to understand the manner of the Soviet action. From a military standpoint it was a sophisticated operation but politically it was a bust. He would have expected a prearranged plan for a new government in Czechoslovakia. He would have expected a group to step forward and say they are the individuals who asked the Soviets to interfere, and who were willing to have a new form of government. He personally thinks there was a debate within the Soviet politburo. He knows that they were having extensive meetings. The decision appears to have been made hurriedly. They were ready to move because of the training exercises and practice for invasion which have been conducted over a long period of time. The buttons were pushed and once they moved into Czechoslovakia the whole thing collapsed. Some of the Soviet troops shot at the Czechs and some didn’t. The Russians could have made a contrived case of the external aggression accusing West Germany of infiltrating. The Soviet’s [sic] haven’t made a case in any sense of the word. World opinion thinks it is a shocking and appalling case of naked aggression.