32. For a valuable, firsthand account, see “Dnevniki P. E. Shelesta,” in RGASPI, F. 666, Te. 6, Ll. 190–91, 193. Evidently, no full transcript of the ad-hoc sessions was compiled.
33. “K voprosu o polozhenii v Chekhoslovakii: Vypiska iz protokola No. 95 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK ot 17 avgusta 1968 g.,” Resolution No. P95/1 (top secret), 17 August 1968, in APRF, Prot. No. 38.
34. “Stenogramma Soveshchaniya predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii i pravitel’stv NRB, VNR, GDR, PNR i SSSR po voprosu o polozhenii v Chekhoslovakii,” verbatim transcript (top secret), 18 August 1968, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI), F. 89, Op. 38, D. 57, Ll. 1–22.
35. “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 19 avgusta 1968 g.,” 19 August 1968 (top secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, D. 99, Ll. 474–82.
36. Comments recorded in “Dnevniki P. E. Shelesta,” in RGASPI, F. 666, Te., 7, L. 213.
37. Cited in “Dnevniki P. E. Shelesta,” Ll. 213–14. See also the interview with Shelest in Leonid Shinkarev, “Avgustovskoe bezumie: K 25-letiyu vvoda voisk v Chekhoslovakiyu,” Izvestiya (Moscow), 21 August 1993, p. 10, and the recollections of Pavlovskii, “Eto bylo v Prage,” 5.
38. “Obdobie od 21.srpna do konca roku 1968,” from a report by Czechoslovak national defense minister General Martin Dzúr, 9 June 1970, in Národní Archiv České Republiky (NAČR), Archiv Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa (Arch. ÚV KSČ), 4. oddělení (Spr. G. Husák).
39. See the “extremely urgent” (vne ocheredi) cable from Chervonenko to the CPSU Politburo, 21 August 1968, in ÚSD-SK, Z/S-MID, Nos. 37 and 39.
40. “Prohlášení předsednictva ÚV KSČ z 21.8.1968,” Rudé právo (Prague), 21 August 1968 (2nd ed.), p. 1. For Pavlovskii’s statement, see “Obrashchenie Chekhoslovatskoi narodnoi armii,” in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), F. 059, Op. 58, Papka (P.) 127, D. 586, Ll. 33–35.
41. For firsthand accounts, see “Nedokončený rozhovor,” 16–18; Zdeněk Mlynář, Nachtfrost: Erfahrungen auf dem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus (Köln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1978), 181–87; František August and David Rees, Red Star over Prague (London: Sherwood, 1984), 134–42; Dubček, Hope Dies Last, 182–84; and Historický ústav ČSAV, Sedm pražských dnu˚, 21.–27. srpen 1968: Dokumentace (Prague: ČSAV, 1968), 53–58. On Černík’s arrest, see the firsthand account by Otomar Boček, chairman of the Supreme Court, delivered to the 14th Congress in Vysočaný, in Jiří Pelikán, ed., Tanky protí sjezdu: Protokol a dokumenty XIV. sjezdu KSČ (Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1970), 66–68.
42. The military operation itself, it should be noted, was not wholly flawless. See Leo Heiman, “Soviet Invasion Weaknesses,” Military Review 49, no. 8 (August 1969): 38–45. However, the same is true of almost any large-scale use of military force against a foreign country. Unexpected glitches are bound to arise.
43. “Shifrtelegramma,” 21 August 1968 (top secret), in AVPRF, F. 059, Op. 58, P. 124, D. 574, Ll. 184–86. For Mazurov’s retrospective account of his role in the invasion, see Pavlovskii, “Eto bylo v Prage,” 5.
44. “Prohlášení předsednictva ÚV KSČ z 21.8.1968,” 1.
45. “Shifrtelegramma,” 21 August 1968 (top secret), in AVPRF, F. 059, Op. 58, P. 124, D. 574, Ll. 184–86.
46. “Shifrtelegramma,” 7 August 1968 (top secret), from S. V. Chervonenko, Soviet ambassador in Czechoslovakia, to the CPSU Politburo, in AVPRF, F. 059, Op. 58, P. 124, D. 573, Ll. 183–85. For further relevant citations from the ex-Soviet archives, see Kramer, “The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” 6–8, 13, 54. See also Zdeněk Mlýnář, Československý pokus o reformu, 1968: Analyza jeho teorie a praxe (Köln: Index, 1975), 232–33.
47. “Rozkaz správcu posádky čislo 1, Trenčín, 21. avgusta 1968: Správca posádky Sovietskej armády podplukovník ŠMATKO,” in ÚSD-SK, A, from I. Šimovček. See also Historický ústav ČSAV, Sedm pražských dnu˚: Dokumentace (Prague: Historický ústav ČSAV, 1968), 123, 278–81, and 324–25.
48. See “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum No. 24996 (top secret), 6 September 1968, from Aleksandr Yakovlev, deputy head of the CPSU Propaganda Department, and Enver Mamedov, deputy head of Soviet television and radio, to the CPSU Politburo, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 19, Ll. 200–206; and “Nekotorye zamechaniya po voprosu podgotovki voenno-politicheskoi aktsii 21 avgusta 1968 g.,” Politburo Commission report (special dossier/strictly secret), 16 November 1968, in RGANI, F. 5 “OP,” Op. 6, D. 776, Ll. 128–44.
49. “Shifrtelegramma,” 21 August 1968 (top secret), from Kirill Mazurov to the CPSU Politburo, in AVPRF, F. 059, Op. 58, P. 124, D. 574, Ll. 184–86.
50. “Nekotorye zamechaniya po voprosu podgotovki voenno-politicheskoi aktsii 21 avgusta 1968 g.,” L. 137.
51. “Informatsiya o druzheskikh svyazyakh oblastei i gorodov Ukrainskoi SSR s oblastyami, voevodstvami, okrugami, uezdami i gorodami sotsialisticheskikh stran v 1968 godu,” 20 December 1968 (secret), in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 2, Ll. 46, 64–65.
52. The first quotation is from the Soviet participants in a high-level “Warsaw Five” meeting shortly after the invasion, “Záznam ze schůzek Varšavské pětky v Moskvě ve dnech 24.–27.8.1968,” verbatim transcript (top secret), 24–27 August 1968, in ÚSD-SK, Z/M 21; and the second quotation is from “Nekotorye zamechaniya po voprosu podgotovki voenno-politicheskoi aktsii 21 avgusta 1968 g.,” L. 129. This was also the view put forth by the four East European leaders of the “Warsaw Five.” See, for example, Gomulka’s secret speech on 29 August 1968 to the PZPR Central Committee, reproduced in “Gomułka o inwazji na Czechosłowacje w sierpniu ’68: Mysmy ich zaskoczyłi akcja wojskowa,” Polityka (Warsaw), No. 35 (29 August 1992): 13.
53. “Záznam ze schůzek Varšavské pětky v Moskvě ve dnech 24.–27.8.1968,” L. 3.
54. “Záznam ze schůzek Varšavské pětky v Moskvě ve dnech 24.–27.8.1968,” L. 5.
55. “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 25 avgusta 1968 g.,” verbatim transcript (top secret), 25 August 1968, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, D. 99, Ll. 484–91.
56. For an assessment of the postinvasion period based on declassified archival materials from former Czechoslovak archives, see Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968–1970 (New York: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1997), 39–59, 144–253.
57. “Rech’ tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva,” Pravda (Moscow), 13 November 1968, p. 2.
58. S. Kovalev, “O ‘mirnoi’ i nemirnoi kontrrevolyutsii,” Pravda (Moscow), 11 September 1968, p. 4.
59. “Proti zapomnění a manipulaci: O co šlo v roce 1968,” Lidové novin y (Prague), 12 March 2008, p. 3.
60. “‘Fast alle glaubten an diesen Traum’: Der tschechische Staatspräsident Václav Klaus im Standard-Interview über die Niederschlagang des Prager Frühlings,” Der Standard (Vienna), 27 March 1968, pp. 1, 5.
61. Interview with Černík, transcribed in “Bumerang ‘prazhskoi vesny,’” Izvestiya (Moscow), 21 August 1990, p. 7.
62. Lubomír Brokl et al., Postoje československých občanůk demokracii v roce 1968, Working Paper No. 99:8 (Prague: Sociologický ústav Akademie věd České republiky, 1999).