As the days went by, it was more and more borne in on Roger's mind that the French High Command had great cause for worry. The heat was almost unbearable and even the march to Vilna had proved so great a strain on the troops that the size of the army had shrunk. Dysentery from drinking stagnant water, heat-stroke and partial suffocation after breathing in for hours on end the clouds of dust kicked up by endless columns of marching men, had caused hundreds a day to drop by the wayside. Still more serious was the loss from desertion and this was only the opening of the campaign.
In the blazing heat the men could march only a few miles without becoming exhausted. Water was so scarce that they fought for it, and the supply trains were so far behind schedule in coming up that both men and horses were on half-rations.
It was presumably for this reason-to rest his troops and better their condition that Napoleon lingered for seventeen days at Vilna. In the old days he would have pushed on regardless, caught up with the Russians and probably inflicted a defeat on them that would have ended the war; but now he allowed the days to slip away as though time was of no importance.
Meanwhile, Barclay de Tolly, and Alexander with him, had retired on to the great redoubt at Drissa. Within twenty-four hours they realised the folly of von Phull's brilliant conception. Although Napoleon kept his main forces dallying in the neighborhood of Vilna, he had allowed the corps forming his left wing to follow up the Russians. Oudinot bypassed the Drissa redoubt on one side, and St. Gyr on the other. On July 18th Barclay's army fled from it. Narrowly escaping encirclement, it retreated along the north bank of the River Dvina to Polotsk.
In the third week in July intelligence came in that the Czar had left the army and was on his way back to St. Petersburg. Having spent two months at his headquarters, Roger could guess the reason. As an autocrat who fancied himself as a strategist, he was a menace to his Generals. During his first campaign against Napoleon in Austria, he had shown himself to be a hopeless blunderer. Evidently all his people had combined to persuade him, with tactful flattery, that to govern his vast realms it was necessary for him to return to his capital in the north.
Although the Grand Army remained comparatively inactive up to mid July, the corps on the left flank continued to fight a series of bloody engagements. Oudinot had been ordered to link up with Macdonald, who was besieging Riga, but failed to do so and was attacked with the greatest ferocity by Wittgenstein's army. His subordinate, General Kulnev, not only inflicted a severe defeat on the French, but captured their entire baggage train and nine hundred prisoners.
Bagration, too, unlike Barclay, stood to fight when the main army did advance from Vilna. Greatly outnumbered, he soon found himself in serious difficulties. The brilliant Davout very nearly encircled him and would have annihilated his whole army had the lazy Jerome done what was expected of him. But he failed to bring up his Westphalians in time, so Bagration succeeded in fighting his way out of the trap. Davout complained bitterly to the Emperor who, furious with his useless brother, placed him under the Marshal. Jerome took such umbrage at this that he threw his hand in and, without even asking leave, rode away to his German kingdom.
The advance to Vitebsk proved a terrible ordeal. Alternately the blazing sunshine drove the men frantic with thirst, or pouring rain turned the roads into rivers of mud. This delayed further the coming up of the transports, so the army began to suffer from semi-starvation. The country was almost featureless, half covered with thickets of birch and elder, and the few villages consisted only of a score or so of small huts. Inside, as they had only slits for windows, they were almost pitch dark and they stank to high heaven. Cartridges had to be burned in them to sweeten the atmosphere. Horse flies and cockroaches abounded in them, making sleep impossible.
Few prisoners were taken, but from the interrogation of some of them it was learned that conditions in the Russian Army were still worse. Army contractors all over Europe had for years been making fortunes by giving short measure and supplying goods of inferior quality; but the Russians exceeded all others and the officers of their Commissariat were no better than criminals. It was common practice for them to sell a large percentage of the food for the troops and fodder for the horses; often they simply pocketed the money and did not bother to deliver any goods at all. Semi-starvation was therefore the lot of the troops but, being tougher than southern Europeans, their survival rate was much higher.
On July 26th Napoleon arrived outside Vitebsk. It was strongly garrisoned and Barclay's army lay behind it. Napoleon radiated optimism. Here, he was convinced, the Russians would make their big stand. He would storm the town, then inflict a crushing defeat on Barclay. His Grenadiers attacked, but not with the élan they had displayed in the old days when led by the great Lannes. It was the Russians who displayed the real fighting spirit. Wild with joy to have at last a chance to get at the hated French, their officers could not restrain them from dashing out from their defences and throwing away their lives for the pleasure of bayoneting an enemy.
The bloody conflict went on all day, in clouds of choking dust and a stifling heat, the like of which the older French troops had previously endured only in their Egyptian campaign. Again and again the attackers were repulsed. When night fell, the French had failed to penetrate the city. But in spite of the terrible losses during the past month, caused by sickness, desertion and casualties, Napoleon still had great masses of troops at his disposal. That night he declared gleefully that next day the tired garrison would be overwhelmed, and the strong, flanking columns he had sent out would encircle Barclay.
When, at dawn, the first attack was launched, there was no opposition. Vitebsk was a city of the dead and dying. Beyond it, Barclay's camp-fires were still burning; but he had slipped away in the night.
This gave Roger much food for thought. Before the invasion and while in Vilna, the Czar's advisers had been at sixes and sevens. The Generals had argued endlessly; but no plan, other than the creation of von Phull's redoubt at Drissa, had been decided on. It was simply assumed that, if the Czar's troops failed to hold the French, they would fall back on Drissa and make a stand there; but several of the more cautious commanders had urged the Czar to take the advice that Bernadotte had given him.
This was to refrain from giving battle to Napoleon as long as he had superior numbers. To fight only a series of rearguard actions, while falling back all the time and rendering the ground over which Napoleon advanced incapable of supporting an army; just as Wellington had done in mid-Portugal before retiring behind the lines of Torres Vedras. Thus, Bernadotte had argued, Napoleon's army could be reduced by wastage and starvation until he could be attacked with a good hope of victory, or forced to retreat without even fighting a battle.
Barclay having got away, the general opinion was that no time should be lost in following him up and forcing
him to give battle. But for miles round, the reddish, sandy soil had been so churned up by horses, wagons and men that it had formed a fog of dust, greatly limiting visibility and thus preventing Murat's cavalry from determining in which direction the main Russian army had withdrawn. However, the Emperor appeared to be in no hurry, because he was convinced that, rather than allow the French to penetrate further into Russia, the Czar would again send Balashov to him this time to ask for terms. But the days passed and the Minister of Police did not appear. Napoleon then began to talk of a three year campaign and of spending the first winter in Vitebsk.