All the orphans and children from broken families who came to us at Korallovo were given a proper education that prepared many of them to go on to university. Every child was given access to the internet, encouraged to explore a diverse range of opinions and to look critically at official propaganda. We wanted to roll out the internet programme to schools across the country to help children think for themselves, instead of just accepting what they were told by state television and newspapers. I gave many public lectures about the work of Open Russia, and reading them now makes me realise how optimistic we were at that time about the impact education could have on the generation that would decide Russia’s future.
We consider that our own mentality, the mentality of the older generation is very difficult to alter. But if our work with the youth of Russia is successful, then in 15 or 20 years they will start to determine the politics of our country. They will have been born in the new Russia and they will turn Russia into a normal country. The size of our big companies will no longer be dwarfed by those in the West; our pensions will no longer be smaller; things here will become normal.
By ‘normal’, I meant a turn away from the distorted model of social values that Putin had imposed on Russia and a move towards Western standards of openness, pluralism and enterprise.
The economic growth of Russia depends on its intellectual potential – the scientists, scholars and entrepreneurs, our intellectual elite … who are the active, driving force of our society. Our task is the production of highly qualified individuals; so, how do we do that? Most importantly through education and the cultivation of initiative … And equally importantly, we must ensure that it is attractive for these people to remain in Russia and not go abroad … The state should serve the interests of the people. The state should not be some great idol that they have created … An individual’s responsibility is first to serve his own interests, those of his family and then those of the society he lives in. The state should be there to serve the interests of the individual. We need to work hard so that these values become natural for our young generation. That is the work that Open Russia has been trying to do.
Open Russia’s emphasis on changing mindsets and its prescriptions for civic government and free-market capitalism were in stark contrast to Putin’s model of ‘managed democracy’. That was a model that had failed; it had destroyed the initiative and the originality of thought that underpin a thriving civil society, and I felt it was my duty to point it out.
We don’t even need to go back as far as Carnegie and Rockefeller for the example I was following; one needs only to look at Bill Gates, Warren Buffett and George Soros and the importance they have attached to education and the development of civil society. Our goal, like theirs, was helping people to be free, creating equal conditions for people to get quality education and build a normal future. The difference, of course, was that the Americans were operating in an open society, while we were attempting to produce free people in a country of restricted freedoms, in a nation whose leaders feared and opposed what we were doing and took every opportunity to try to foil us.
I have always said that I want my children and grandchildren to live in a democratic Russia. If I live to see the day that Russia gets a new political system, I will feel my life has been a success. But for that to happen, Russia needs to do more than just replace Vladimir Putin. If we do not make fundamental changes to the system, if we do not bring governance under the control of society as a whole, I fear that whoever takes Putin’s place will become another version of him. We need to remake our state into a parliamentary republic; we need this parliamentary republic to be based on democratic, federalist principles, similar to what took place when the United States was founded. And, like America, we need talented young leaders to take us forward.
Open Russia did much to develop these young leaders, working in political education and participatory electoral democracy, providing legal support and information to society. Our organisation had a presence in 40 of Russia’s largest regions, with more than a thousand associates. But today Open Russia has been declared ‘undesirable’ by the state, a completely senseless designation that exposes anyone who cooperates with it to civil and criminal charges. Because of her membership of Open Russia, Anastasia Shevchenko has been under house arrest for more than two years, charged with participating in an ‘undesirable’ organisation; when her daughter died, she was prevented from sharing her final days with her. Open Russia’s executive director, Andrei Pivovarov is now in prison on the same charge and other activists have been arrested or put on wanted lists. As a result, we have been forced to announce the cessation of our activities in Russia, although a large number of activists is continuing to work, either in secret or from exile abroad.
The aim of Open Russia is to give the Russian people the information they need to make decisions about their lives; to encourage free debate; to provide the means for people to think for themselves. In the West, none of these things is in any way controversial – they are the accepted norms of a free society. But Vladimir Putin sees things differently. When a ruler is so afraid of scrutiny by the people, it can mean only one thing: that he knows the legitimacy of his rule is tenuous, and he knows his power depends on deception and coercion, without which his authority would collapse and he himself would be in the dock.
CHAPTER 7
THE CONFRONTATION
In the early 2000s, Vladimir Putin and the Siloviki consolidated their power – and one method they chose was to crack down on independent critics and businesses. They wanted to seize the property of Russia’s leading industrialists because they wanted the cash, and because they wanted to show the country who was boss. Renationalising firms that had been privatised under Yeltsin would send a strong message that the era of liberal capitalism was over and the age of state power had begun. It would also allow them – and this was undoubtedly their main motivation – to take over confiscated assets and place them under their own control, just as they did in their criminal racketeering youth, with all the potential for self-enrichment that implied.
For Putin, the most important and attractive target was oil. He tasked Igor Sechin with bringing the privatised oil companies back under Kremlin control and gave him free rein to do so. Sechin had been in Putin’s service for many decades: he was Putin’s bag carrier in their home town of Leningrad, a KGB functionary who would become a leading member of the Siloviki. After Putin became president in 2000, he had made Sechin his closest adviser and now he appointed him chairman of the board of the state oil corporation, Rosneft, with the brief of taking over the companies that had been transferred to private ownership. Having gained control of Rosneft, Sechin was ruthless in pursuit of assets that would enrich himself and his Kremlin colleagues, including Vladimir Putin. The potential prize money amounted to billions of dollars and Sechin was not going to be deterred.