The external wrappings of democracy are present: elections, parliament and so on, but the essence is absolutely different. In the Russian case, we are dealing with … the deliberate use of democratic institutions as Potemkin villages in order to conceal traditional power arrangements … The political regime that has consolidated itself resembles the ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ of Latin American regimes in the 1960s and 1970s. It has all the characteristics: personalised power, bureaucratisation of society, political exclusion of the populace … and an active role for the secret services (in Latin America it was the military).
For much of the early 2000s, Putin continued to call himself a democrat, while suggesting that the suppression of some civil liberties was justified by the need to restore state control. ‘Russia is in the midst of one of the most difficult periods in its history,’ he wrote. ‘For the first time in the past two or three hundred years, it is facing the real danger of sliding to the second, if not third, echelon of world states. We are running out of time to avoid this.’ Putin’s swagger on the international stage won him support from those Russians who yearned for a strong leader to restore national prestige after a decade of weakness. He pandered to nostalgia for the days of Soviet belligerence by reinstating the Soviet national anthem (albeit with new words) and military parades through Red Square with convoys of missiles and tanks and marching regiments shouting ‘Hurrah!’ to their president. Putin’s picture was hung in schoolrooms and public buildings. He acquired a taste for pomp and ceremony, making regal entrances along red carpets with trumpets blaring.
His personality cult has become reminiscent of that of Stalin. He now appears in military uniform at army and naval bases, piloting a fighter plane into Chechnya or standing beside a tank, tranquillising a Siberian tiger, driving a Formula One car, diving to recover antique treasures from the seabed, shooting a whale with a crossbow, scoring unopposed goals in ice-hockey games, even flying a microlight to guide migrating cranes on their journey to the south. When a photoshoot of the shirtless president boosted his standing among female voters, he was delighted; when it was co-opted with ribald comments by Russia’s gay websites, he was furious. The newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda splashed the he-man photos under the headline ‘Be Like Putin!’ and a pop song titled ‘Putin Is a Man of Strength’ shot up the charts. There have been sarcastic suggestions that it might soon be time for St Petersburg to be renamed Putinburg.
Vladimir Putin strutting his stuff in Tuva, 2007
The adulation inflated Putin’s self-importance; slights to his dignity, even constructive criticism, were met with vengeful punishment. When the Kursk nuclear submarine sank in the Barents Sea in August 2000, he didn’t return from his summer holiday; when the vessel was finally lifted, all 118 of those on board were dead. When the ORT television channel voiced criticism of the Kursk operation, its controlling owner Boris Berezovsky was targeted by the Kremlin and soon found himself in exile. Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of another independent television channel, NTV, was arrested and held in jail until he agreed to hand over his business interests to the state, and then expelled from the country.
A January 2018 report for the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate, titled ‘Putin’s Asymmetrical Assault on Democracy’, summed up the very undemocratic means by which he gained and now maintains his hold on power:
Vladimir Putin gained and solidified power by exploiting blackmail, fears of terrorism, and war. Since then, he has combined military adventurism and aggression abroad with propaganda and political repression at home, to persuade a domestic audience that he is restoring Russia to greatness and a respected position on the world stage. All the while, he has empowered the state security services and employed them to consolidate his hold on the levers of political, social, and economic power, which he has used to make himself and a circle of loyalists extraordinarily wealthy … Putin’s overarching domestic objectives are to preserve his power and increase his net worth.
The senators describe Putin’s model of state power as ‘authoritarianism secured by corruption, apathy, and an iron fist’; but they are careful to note that this is not the fault of the Russian people, who should not be tainted by the crimes of the regime that rules over them. Put simply, Putin is not Russia and Russia is not Putin.
All anti-democratic regimes fear independent scrutiny; the illegitimate nature of their right to rule makes them unwilling to countenance open debate, so they move to suppress it. Putin has done so through intimidation and violence, backed up by fabricated legal restrictions and administrative penalties. Legislation introduced in 2005, then reinforced in 2012, banned foreign NGOs from operating in Russia, as well as any native organisation deemed by the Kremlin to be a ‘threat to the national interest’. Scores of groups have been shut down, including nearly all of those monitoring human rights and democracy.
Civil society activists have been subjected to abuse and physical attacks. Politically motivated prosecutions against myself and other critics of Putin’s leadership, with concocted charge sheets, automatic guilty verdicts and ‘exemplary’ sentences, were a signal to others that speaking out carries great risk to one’s personal wellbeing. Smear campaigns, fake sting operations and lies have been used to demonise political opposition figures, with the pro-government media characterising criticism as disloyalty and critics as traitors. In February 2015, the leading political activist and former deputy prime minister Boris Nemtsov was shot dead within sight of the Kremlin walls, following a concerted campaign of vilification against him. Nemtsov had been organising protests against the Kremlin’s economic mismanagement and was due to release a report on Russia’s interference in Ukraine.
At the same time, Putin has cosseted institutions willing to support the Kremlin and speak on its behalf. While harassing genuine political opposition, he has created ‘rubber-stamp’ parties that play the game of providing ersatz competition in bogus elections. He has granted the Russian Orthodox Church special recognition under Russian law, while targeting other religions with onerous registration processes and restrictions on proselytising. The Orthodox Church’s hierarchy have benefited from presidential grants and the restitution of property forfeited under communist rule. In return, the Church has bestowed its blessing on Putin and promoted his policies as a willing instrument of the Russian state. Patriarch Kirill has declared Putin’s reign a ‘miracle of God’ and given thanks that he has corrected the ‘deviation’ of Russia’s flirtation with liberal democracy. In February 2012, Church and state cemented their alliance with a shared paroxysm of righteous indignation after the rock group Pussy Riot performed their ‘Punk Prayer’ in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour.
Virgin Mary, Mother of God, banish Putin!
Banish Putin, banish Putin!
The priest’s black robes have epaulettes,
And all parishioners crawl and bow.
Liberty’s a phantom, gone to heaven,
Gay-pride’s in chains in Siberia now.
The KGB chief, their holy saint,
Leads protesters to prison vans.
Women, don’t offend His Holiness!
Stick to making love and babies.