The paradox is that a weak Russia will seek to assert its strength, to take what it wants by force, to breach the rules of civilised behaviour; while a strong, confident Russia possesses the self-belief to focus on its own problems at home and play by the rules abroad. The security of the West can be assured only if Russia is strong and democratically governed. The West, ironically, needs to encourage a worthy competitor in Russia if it wants to be certain of its own safety. It may seem counterintuitive, but it will be worth it: Europe’s choice is between Russia as a difficult but civilised competitor and Russia as an aggressor, threatening the foundations of European civilisation. Despotism in Russia will always be a threat, no matter how much Europe tries to convince itself otherwise. That is why it is in Europe’s interest to help Russia become a modern, civilised country with a stable economy and predictable policies.
Russia cannot become a modern country while it maintains its current archaic system of governance. It is a burden that weighs it down, condemning the nation to stagnation in industrial or even pre-industrial conditions, while fostering dissatisfaction among society’s most productive forces with their country’s lack of development. The exodus abroad of the most active and educated members of Russian society exacerbates the problem, as the economy suffers from their loss. Like all authoritarian regimes, Putin’s answer is even more foreign aggression, to keep Europe always on the defensive, and – following the invasion of Ukraine – on the brink of war.
If the West wants to protect itself from the threat from the East, it would be a mistake to try to weaken or break up Russia. The consequences of that would be an internal power struggle in Russia with a predictable outcome – power would be seized by the toughest, most unprincipled autocrat who, in order to maintain his position, would inevitably provoke a confrontation with the West. If this is to be avoided, we need democratic states in the East and West to work together. Competing and collaborating with a strong Russia is a much better solution for everyone. As a geographic neighbour and sister civilisation, a future Russia can either be part of the problem or she can become part of the solution to much bigger problems. The creation of a Russian civic state is the greatest goal towards which the people of Russia have laboured historically, but it is yet to be achieved. With greater informational freedom, the internet, social media, international travel and an increasingly integrated world community, that task is now possible.
CHAPTER 18
EXPANSIONIST DREAMS
Whatever politicians may say, the foreign policy agenda of all nations is based on self-interest. Political leaders may declare they are taking action to support other nations and help right moral wrongs, but altruism is rarely the true motivation.
When the West sent support to the anti-Assad opposition in Syria, it was a gamble aimed at shoring up its own presence there. When Vladimir Putin sent the Russian military to defend Assad, he was doing the same. This was not a moral crusade, but an East–West arm wrestle. The difference was that Putin played things more ruthlessly and with greater purpose, and his aims were less the interests of the Russian state than the venal self-interest of his clique of cronies. Western leaders, on the other hand, were constrained by pressure from parliaments and critical voices at home, in ways that Putin was not.
Putin’s aim is always to secure for himself and his entourage a strong position in relations with the West, which will allow him to maintain his grip on power in Russia without criticism of the methods he uses, to legitimise his authority at home through recognition abroad and to persuade Russian citizens that the country is surrounded by hostile forces. The West allowed him to do this. The US withdrew from Syria, leaving the field to the forces of the Kremlin, while American wavering on the future of NATO left the Baltic countries and others in anxious limbo. NATO may have advanced to Russia’s doorstep, but it no longer constrains the Kremlin.
Shortly after Joe Biden became president of the United States, I was asked by an American interviewer for my opinion of Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy intentions and whether his aggression against neighbouring countries was likely to continue. I could see that my interlocutor was concerned about the damage the Kremlin was inflicting on the prospects for world peace, but I could offer him little in the way of reassurance. My assessment, I told him, is that Putin is a former KGB agent who regrets the loss of the USSR and has set himself the goal of regaining control of as much of the old Soviet Union as possible.
When my interviewer asked me what the West could do to curb an escalation of international confrontation, my response was equally gloomy. The United States, I predicted, would do nothing, except maybe impose a few more sanctions. The Democrats’ lack of resolve would give the Trumpian faction of the Republican Party enough ammunition to beat up on Biden and proclaim that the US was now led by a weak and incompetent president. As for Europe, I expected that the EU would do even less than the US, since Germany, the only country whose opinion really matters, does not want to alienate the Kremlin and risk jeopardising its supplies of Russian gas or seeing Russian markets closed to German manufactured goods. The consequence of Western weakness, I concluded, would be to further embolden Putin in his campaign of foreign expansionism. It gives me no pleasure to note that just a year after my remarks to the American journalist, my predictions were borne out by his invasion of Ukraine.
Putin’s intentions evidently revolve around the acquisition of control over more and more territory, for reasons which, frankly speaking, make very little sense. Even if he achieves his aim, Russia will be no better off than before: it will have taken on responsibility for more territory, which it doesn’t need, and more people, most of whom will be unhappy and resentful, in political, economic and social terms.
Yet, despite all the obvious disadvantages, Putin has clung to his expansionist dreams. In his 2005 State of the Nation address, he called the collapse of the Soviet Union ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century’. ‘For the Russian people,’ he said, ‘it has become a genuine tragedy – tens of millions of our fellow countrymen are condemned to live beyond the boundaries of the Motherland … and the pestilence has spread to Russia herself.’ In 2018, he repeated his remarks to an audience in Kaliningrad, declaring that the dissolution of the USSR was ‘the one single event of Russian history’ he would most like to see reversed.
It is no secret why Putin was doing it. Opinion polls show that 55 per cent of Russian people expect Putin to make Russia ‘a great country’ again. The older generation have preserved the memory of the Soviet Union as a superpower and there is nostalgia for those bygone days. Many of them say they want Russia to be respected; but being respected is different from being feared. In opinion polls, however, they don’t differentiate between the two. Older Russians have been inculcated with the dangerous belief that for Russia to be respected by the world, she needs to be feared by the world. For younger folk, things are more complicated. I would say that maybe half of them share the same dead-end nostalgia for a lost superpower, having imbibed the values of their parents; but the other half genuinely want a Russia that is open and integrated into the global system of values. It is on this section of the population that we, in the democratic opposition in Russia and worldwide, must focus our best efforts to secure a more rational, less belligerent future for the nation.