To do this, we are redoubling our work on educating the young generation, providing support for civil rights, training hundreds of independent journalists and grassroots activists. We are increasing our output of opposition publications and seeking alliances with other political forces that are committed to a law-based future for the new Russia. In the current global climate, it isn’t easy: the world has seen a rising tide of authoritarianism; people have become wary of changes associated with globalisation; political leaders have lost the trust of society, and society itself has failed to respond to the new challenges in constructive ways. Populist politicians promising simple, easy solutions have found unwarranted support: in some countries, especially the young democracies of Eastern Europe, social institutions have crumbled and autocracy has returned.
Our overriding concern is that when change comes in Russia, the country does not follow the same path. Despite all the problems, I have faith in my nation. I would be delighted if Vladimir Putin were gradually to share the autocratic presidential power he now wields with an honestly elected parliament, an independent judiciary and a coalition government. I would rejoice if a new president were to be a man or woman of compromise, a conciliator, a guarantor of citizens’ rights, eschewing the authoritarianism that has done so much damage to my country in the past 20 years, ready to work with a coalition of opposition forces and other branches of political power. The likelihood that events will develop that way is, sadly, not high. Rejecting the template of ‘strongman’ rule is not easy and Russians have become increasingly seduced by the nostrums of simplistic populism. Unlimited presidential powers, the cult of personality and authoritarianism all militate against change, but the system is under strain. The repression of political opposition, the curtailing of social mobility, the ageing of Putin and his entourage, Putin’s extrajudicial arbitration of constant conflicts between competing factions of his inner circle, and the refusal to engage in dialogue with society have created fertile ground for politicians from outside the current structures. After Putin leaves, there is likely to be a brief period of rule by his appointed ‘heir’, followed by an inevitable political crisis and a relaunch of how the country is run, perhaps involving a shift away from presidential autocracy via a constituent assembly towards a parliamentary, genuinely federal republic. We, the democratic opposition and our friends in the West, must encourage and be ready for this future.
A future democratic Russia will arise because her people now recognise that freedom is better than unfreedom, and that a society of free people is best equipped to deal with the challenges that humanity faces. But we recognise that before we can demand changes from others, we too must be willing to change ourselves. Each of us has flaws. While denouncing and condemning the current regime – a necessary process for reforming the state and healing society – we must remember that forgiveness is dearer than punishment. A new society cannot be built through anger and revenge. The true, lasting solution is not the settling of scores, but the introduction of genuine institutional reforms to the benefit of all.
My task, the task of the democratic opposition and the task of our friends in the West, involves the preservation of a viable alternative to the current reality in Russia; it involves helping people who are prepared to become the personnel of this alternative to gain experience of political struggle. We have created, and will continue to create, platforms for free discussion of the country’s future. We have told, and shall continue to tell, the truth in writing and in film. We are fighting, and shall continue to fight, for the rights of political prisoners, and against repressive, anti-constitutional laws. I envisage Russia as a law-governed state with an independent judiciary and an independent parliament exerting broad budgetary and executive powers. If these conditions are met, there is no reason that a future Russia cannot be welcomed into the global community of nations, to her deep and lasting benefit and to the equal benefit of the West.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable help of Maria Logan, Elena Cook, Albert DePetrillo and Hana Teraie-Wood in the production of this book.
NOTES
1. Nowadays this claim may be debatable, but the National Health Service remains undoubtedly better than anything in Russia outside of Moscow.
2. Potemkin villages are as old as the times of Catherine the Great. When Catherine came to inspect the newly conquered Crimea in 1787, the province’s governor (and Catherine’s former lover) Grigory Potemkin was desperate to impress her. There is a historical story – perhaps true and perhaps not – that in order to disguise the reality of poverty and destitution, he built fake villages consisting solely of wooden facades that could be erected along her route, hastily dismantled and then reassembled further on as if they were additional examples of the region’s prosperity. In the same way that Gorbachev created his own Potemkin village for Thatcher, Putin is doing the same, on a grand scale, to show off to the Russian people and the West – an idea I will address later, in chapter 15.
3. The first incarnation of the Bolshevik secret police after the 1917 revolution was called the Cheka.
4. People in the West have a fairly uniform view that the Cheka, the OGPU, NKVD, KGB and FSB are a bad thing – run by sinister thugs, dedicated to repressing the Russian people and sowing evil abroad. But that is not how many Russians view them. For every Russian who reviled the KGB, there was another who admired them. My generation was brought up on tales of Soviet secret agents carrying out daring missions to protect the motherland; and in many instances, their missions were directed against the malevolent forces of the capitalist West. An iconic television programme of 1973 called Seventeen Moments of Spring depicted a Soviet intelligence agent fighting not just against the Axis powers, but battling at the same time to stop Britain and the USA joining forces with the Nazis to undermine the USSR. Another James Bond-like spy series, The Shield and the Sword, was instrumental in inspiring a young Vladimir Putin to volunteer for the KGB.
5. Unfortunately, I did not realise the full extent of Putin’s mendacity until I was already in jail. Only then did it become clear that this was not just a personal battle between us over the issue of Kremlin corruption – a battle in which I alone was at risk of ruin – but a fight on a national scale, in which Putin was willing to inflict irreparable damage on the nation’s economy by destroying Russia’s most successful company in order to hand it over as a gift to his cronies.
6. I heard this from my former business associates, who conveyed the information to my lawyers when I was already in prison. They got their information from Vladislav Surkov in the presidential administration, who had heard it at first hand.
7. Medvedev response: “Медведев о фильме Навального: это попытка добиться шкурных целей”. ria.ru (in Russian), 4 April 2017.
8. I learned this from the words of one of Putin’s friends, conveyed to me by my lawyers when I was already in jail.