When my mother walked into the judgement room, having waited in the hallway for four hours, the rector fell upon her and demanded that she leave. If not, he would call the police and she would be taken out. When I tried to go out into the hallway, my path was blocked by two KGB agents. At that juncture the Komsomol secretary declared that I would not be held by force, but I stated that it was already being done. The rector promised that he would provide no certificate regarding my two years of study at the institute, and he kept his word! He also ordered that my school diploma not be returned to me.
Toward the end of the meeting, I was questioned as to who my friends were. I did not answer, so they provided names themselves. They tried to elicit whether I told them of my plans. A girl in my class whom I knew well was particularly besmirched. The filthiest rumors were circulated about her, the type that could only be heard at a Komsomol members meeting. She was then brought in for a demeaning confrontation and told to choose her friends more carefully. Our whole class of twenty-five came to see me on the day of departure. They had begged off from their philosophy seminar. They told their instructor that they were seeing off a friend who was leaving for Israel. He was stupefied and advised them not to go. Still, the students came and we parted in friendship.
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The same two KGB agents tailed us at the airport and there was another one from the institute. Evidently, this was to confirm that my student identification was invalid. When we submitted our tickets for verification, they demanded my student identification. Determining that I did not have it, they demanded that I surrender my plane ticket. Without a passport, a new ticket could not be purchased (my passport had already been turned in by my father in exchange for the visa). We were already prepared to go by train when luck helped us. In the confusion at the ticket counter, we were able to buy a ticket for another flight. We did not present our passports. Instead, we left the change for the ticket seller. When we were walking to the plane, we were noticed, for upon our arrival in Moscow, we discovered that our suitcases were forced open, the locks wrenched out, and the belongings searched.
Two weeks later we were already in Vienna, and Siberia was only a nightmare in our memory. Thank God!
Rome 8/VI/74
Chapter Thirty-Three
Leonid Shebarshin, Three Days in August
Leonid Shebarshin had a long and successful career in the KGB. He was the station chief at the Soviet Embassy in Teheran during the collapse of the Shah’s regime and endured a siege by Iranian militants. He later served as head of the First Directorate, the chief of intelligence. During the three-day coup attempt against the government of Mikhail Gorbachev (August 19–21, 1991) he was the de facto head at KGB headquarters. The selection which follows describes the days of the attempted coup. Taken from Leonid She-barshin, “Avgust” [August] in Druzhba narodov, Moscow, Nos. 5–6, 1992.
In the organizational structure of the KGB [Committee for State Security] the head of the intelligence branch is one of the vice-chairmen and thus a member of the highest leadership circle of the Committee.
The First Directorate is somewhat physically as well as organizationally and psychologically removed from the Committee [KGB headquarters]. Nevertheless, intelligence gathering is an integral part of State Security and whatever took place at the highest levels of the Committee concerned us. The rank and file heard echoes of internal conflicts and was the object of the chairman’s orders and of the Collegium of the KGB. As a rule all this was of little concern to us. The highest levels limited themselves to general instructions on the surveillance of foreign agents, on anti-Soviet organizations abroad, and on centers of ideological subversion. The First Chief Directorate [the intelligence service] was procedurally occupied with problems and directives from above and kept sharp surveillance over any particular situation.
It was not customary to hold meetings with all the vice-chairmen present. Kriuchkov [the KGB chairman] would meet with each separately. Meetings of the committee leadership were frequently called. These would include the
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heads of the major independent subdivisions. The Collegium of the Committee convened regularly and invited representatives of all the principal directorates and, on occasion, the KGB heads of the various Soviet republics, regions and districts.
Once or twice a week I would go from the First Chief Directorate to KGB headquarters on Lubianka Square in order to meet with my colleagues in an informal atmosphere and find out the latest news. At precisely 1330 hours [1:30 PM] the chairman and his vice-chairs would gather in the dining room on the fourth floor near the chairman’s office and seat themselves at a huge table. The meals were ordinary; the portions modest, with no lavish dishes. The service was quick and attentive.
During the meals conversation would flow freely. Hardly a day would go by without complaints at the mass media. Its attacks on the KGB were unrelenting. The magazine Ogonek was a particular irritant but other publications were also criticized for their lack of objectivity. The mood of the conversation was generally pessimistic, although Kriuchkov was by nature an optimist. One of his favorite sayings was: “We can lose anytime, what we ought to do is win.” It was significant, however, that upon listening to some joyless piece of news he would limit his response to a prolonged “ye-s-s” without expressing his opinion or giving orders.
The elections to the parliament of the Russian Federation went by. [Nikolai] Ryzhkov [chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers] who was supported by the KGB suffered defeat. We discussed the results. Here was a conversation among the leaders of the best informed and politically savvy agency of the nation—the KGB. What were the inferences? First inference: The mass media have duped the public. But then the logical question “Why wasn’t the party with its huge propaganda apparatus not been able to dupe the public?” hung suspended in an uneasy silence. The second inference: The elections were rigged and the ballot count falsified. But then where were the election officials and the party functionaries? And precisely at which point did the rigging take place? And a final argument based on the numbers voting and the percent supporting the victors. It turned out that less than half of the population voted for the victors. How many then voted for the losers? I suspect that such “informal analysis” was all the committee was capable of. To look with a dispassionate eye at the mood of the people was frightening. The Committee tried to hide behind the particulars in order not to see the whole.
According to tradition, the relations among the vice-chairmen were once marked by a spirit of competition. This was no longer true in my time, and, at the least, I could count on the understanding of my colleagues in all practical matters.
Leonid Shebarshin, Three Days in August