different kinds but a MYSTICAL ORGANISM, composed of nations mutually complementing each other and making up, under the leadership of the Russian people, a LIT! LE MANKIND — a spiritual trigger for the explosion of the great mankind.31
In other words, the USSR is merely the chosen people's laboratory for conducting experiments into the future 'Oithodoxization' of the world. In this sense the Russian people are an exception. Translating Shimanov's mystical revelations into the language of practical politics, it means that the Russian people are the only ones allowed to have an empire — one that is closed, 'impenetrable', isolated from other nations — until such time as these nations are willing to speak with it m its own language — that is, in the language of the Third Reich — sorry, 'Third Romej (to quote Shimanov). Briefly, that is how Shimanov tries to turn his Utopian scheme into a realistic programme for an imperial-isolationist Russia.
Strategy and Politics
In analysing Shimanov's works, one senses a kind of strange dualism — as though you have before you not one, but two writers, who change places with each other minute by minute. The mystical language of miracles alternates with cold officialese; fiery prophecies of the 'Third Rome' give way to the style of a commonplace clerk; pious anathemas against Western democracy are interspersed with vulgar propagandistic invective. This literary 'split personality' of Shimanov's calls for careful interpretation and analysis. Here is an example of one style:
Russia has literally suffered through a NEW THEOCRACY ... for it is quite obvious that we need a patriarchal structure of society different from the present one . . . and a new . . mystical attitude toward the land . . . [This] task is not within the capacity . . . of Western democracy ... but then who can do it? I think . . . that the best instrument may prove to be that force which from its very beginning has made war on God — the system that wrestles with God, which decided ... to turn the whole world around to suit itself — that is what might serve the glory of God better than anything else. I have in mind, of course, the Soviet system, with its essentially autocratic structure, its maximalist aims, and which is so contradictory in its nature and its ideology that it is able thanks to this circumstance, under the influence of the truth of life to change itself from a minus to a plus, and only win from such a metamorphosis.32
Tb;s Shimanov addresses to the Russian ntelligentsia of the era of Russian Orthodox renaissance' - an intelligentsia deep".\ disillusioned with socialism, which is sceptical about the miraculous potential of the 'transformation he promises. Here Shimanox is a sincere defender of the Soviet system; he speaks n a lofty pulpit style he prophesies, his language is full of pathos and fire
Then, in a nearby passage of the same book, another Shimanox speaks, discussing the 'Draft of the Basic Law of the USSR on Public Education and trying to convince the 'leaders' that a clique of Soviet priests' (, е., Marxist an '-religious propagandists) have written the draft 'n such a way that
the obiecr've contents of this . . . draft will do enormous harm to the Soviet state and will damage m the eyes of the progressive world the author.ty of Communist morality [For this reason the draft should be rejected], so as not to compromise our Soviet system by an accusation of violence . done to freedom of conscience — and whose71 . . not the exploiters, not the landlords and capitalists, but plain Soviet working people ... Is it not a sign of [Marxism's] weakness that we should abolish the well-known Leninist position on the freedom both of religious and of ami-religious propaganda0 . Here. 1 think it would be appropriate to recall those hard tunes when our sociew faced b\ a heav'y -armed advancing German Fascist enemy . abandoned the self-torment that was w eakening it. and conquered the foe b the moral and political urity of all our Soviet people. This moral and political unity . . . proved to be superior to all ideological divisions and was of such undoubted value, tested by life itself, that it would be criminal t'rom the point of \ ew of state policy, for us to give it up. The moral and political un.ty of the entire So\ let people is something that we must strengthen, not dissipate by incitement to conflict within our society , Decause, at the acute turning points of history, our state will more than oncc ha\e to encounter dangers no less than that of the past Great Patriotic \\ ar In the face of the very real and growing Chinese chauv inist threat . . w e must strengthen all the healthy forces of society so that at the moment of crisis, they can come to the aid of the state.
I his other voice s that of Shimanov the Party propagandist, who seems to have borrowed phrases such as 'well-known Leninist position he moral code of Communism' and 'the moral and political unity of our entire Soviet people' from an editorial in Pravdn. This Shimanov, using the bureaucratic and pragmatic language characteristic of the leaders', cautiously tries to sell them his own tactical concept of a transformation'. He tries to convince the Soviet state of the loyalty of the 'patriotic masses' and of the fact that they and not the Marxist ideological clique are the 'healthy forces' ready to come to the state's aid The price of this loyalty, however, is that the state return to the 'well-known Leninist position', remember the Stalinist moral and political unity', and agree to 'peaceful coexistence' with the devout Orthodox masses.34
What is of interest here, above all, is the fact that in the 1970s the Russian Idea was acqi-iring its own politics. Not only did it no longer call for the overthrow of the Soviet regime (as VSKhSON had done), but it no longer confined itself to global strategies or histoi cal parallels (in contrast to Vechc and From Under the Rubble); was starting to speak to the Soviet state in its own language. It was beginning to demonstrate the concrete advantages the system can derive from allying itself with the Russian Right — against the clique of Marxist 'priests'. In essencc, it was already accusing its opponents of anti- Sovietism.
It accuses them of undermining the nfluence of the USSR 'in the eyes of progressive world opinion', of inciting internal conflicts' withm Russia itself. It puts before the 'leaders' a practical proposition, weigh up how much you stand to gain or lose before relying on the Marxist ideological clique. It attempts to compete with this clique on the basis of practical politics by showing that the 'leaders' have more to gain by relying on the Russian Right than on its competitors. It addresses the leaders' deeply hidden subconscious fears and asks them with an air of innocence: which is more important to you — tattered Marxist dogma or real power? If power, then reliance — at the moment of crisis — on the 'patriotic masses' :s far safer than an alliance with an impotent ideological clique. Unlike other factions of the New Right, Shimanov conducts his own PR and does business: he advertises his own wares to the consumer and runs down his compet 'tors'.
To the Russian Orthodox intelligentsia he sells the strategy of transformation . For this, high pathos and impassioned preaching are needed. To the leaders, he sells the politics of transformation and the guarantee of their rule This requires business-like prose and vulgar advertising jargon. In both cases, he speaks in a language that is easily understood by the consumer.
To their former allies Shimanovites were 'Ultras'. Yet, in fact, they are not militant at alclass="underline" they are practical politicians offering the leaders more flexible and effective tactics, a deeper social base, and a broader field of operations for political manoeuvre il case of cnsis. In fact, Shimanov is suggesting nothing more than a Russian variant of the 'historic compromise'. If this is possible for the Italian Communist
Party — and it can remain chaste in spue of it — then why shouldn't it be possible for the Soviet Communist Party?