There is no doubt that Western experts work w ith the most modern and sophisticated analytical tools available. They have at their disposal statistics, numerous interviews with Soviet emigres, as well as exact methods of research and means of collecting quotations from the speeches of Soviet leaders as backup. Shimanov and those like him have nothing to counter this with except their own personal observations, teehngs and presentiments. But, unlike the accurate and rational experts, the earth is shaking underneath their feet. In the very air of the motherland they sense the approach of a threat which brings with it such a fundamental crisis to the empire that even the wildest fantasies could become reality. Shimanov and his colleagues are living in anticipation of their own 1917 which they expect to come before the year 2000 Whom to believe — the Western experts or the preachers of the Russian Idea0
Certainly, no one will follow Sh nanov or bmel .anov it at the end of th s century, the empire does not undergo a 'systemic crisis. But suppose it does? Even the most liberal sovietologists can t deny categorically that this is a possibility in the 1400s.15 Indeed, as far as conservatives are concerned some of them even preach that the Soviet system be pushed into this fateful crisis, not suspecting that they are actually work ng for Shi.Tianov and his strategy for a fascist transformation of Russia.16
One of the most striking observations about the history of the twentieth century is contained in a book by English historian Norman Cohn; There exists a subterranean world where pathological fantasies disguised as .deas are churned out by crooks and half-educated fanatics for the benefit of the ignorant and superstitious There are times when that underworld emerges from the depths and suddenly fascinates, captures, and dominates multitudes of usually sane and responsible people . . . And it occasionally happens that this subterranean world becomes a political power and changes the course of h'story.'17
Cohn presents us here with his conclusions about one historical experiment — that of Germany in the 1920s. An analogous experiment took place in the 1970s in Iran, supporting Cohn's observation In contrast to the preaching of Gennadii Shimanov, this observation cannot be dismissed as mere fantasy. Yet, this is precisely what we are doing. Why?
Notes
1 See Da\ id Singer, 'Historical Experiment as a Research Strategy in World Polities', Political Inquiry, 1 Februan 1974.
'I he difference between a 'regime' and 'systemic' crisis is discussed in my concluding chapter.
Straw i mri 1984, No. 1 —2, p. 51.
Novvi rmr, 1985, No. 9, p. 32.
Zerkalo, [The Mirror), 1985, No. 3, p. 2.
Ibid
Ibid,, |J 7.
Ibid , p. 8.
Ibid., p. 10.
David К Shipler, Russia: Broken Promises, Solemn idols, Penguin Hooks, 1983, p. 328
Ibid., p. 327.
Strana i mir, 1984, No. 1 —2, p. 54.
Russkoe. samosoznanie [Russian self-awareness], 1984, No. 4, pp. 11 — 12. Capitalized in the original.
It is of no consequence that, personally, N. Emel'ianov is, as one might expect, a maniac and in 1981 was imprisoned for murdering his wife. Fanatics, as is well known, can be ideological leaders, but rarely are well-balanced people,
1 5 J,et us recalclass="underline" 'If conservative or reactionaries gain the upper hand in ihe 1980s, or if bungled reforms come to naught . . . pressing problems will go urirectified. 'Ihe likelihood would then be high that the 1990s would bring a crisis of legitimacy and far more searching dilemmas for the regime, with its core structures and values open to question and under attack as never before.' (Timothy J. Colton, 7he Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet (Jnion, Council on Foreign Relations, 1984, pp. 78 — 9).
See, for example, Richard Pipes, Survival is Not Enough, Simon and •Shuster, 1984.
Norman R. C. Cohri, Warrant for Genocide, Harper and Row, NY. 1966, pp. 17-18.
20
Is the West Ready for the 'Year 2000 ?
fn any science that concerns dynamic objects an historical approach is the standard investigative strategy. We cannot imagine a geologist studying the dynamics of the formation of the earth's core, a psychiatrist analysing a patient's illness, or even a market analyst, vvho would voluntarily deny themselves the opportur ity of examining
in its entirety — the past of the object they are studying Sovietology, though proud of its status as a social science, seems to be the only exception to this universal rule. Moreover, as Richard Pipes complains, it 'aggressively flaunts its ignorance of Russian history.'1 It does not strive to determine the fundamental paradigms of change in the object it studies. It knows nothing about them and — something that genuinely makes it unique in the world of science — it doesn't want to know It is as though sovietology has drawn around itself an imaginary chalk circle which includes only those events that occurred in Russia after 1917.2 Sovietologists, believing in the magical power of generational change within the Soviet establishment, have — ironically
failed to notice that a change of generations within sovietology itself has not produced any kind of magical transformation in the Western public's perception of Russia, or even changed their own conceptions.
It is true that a younger, revisionist generation of sovietologists rebelled against their teachers in the l%0s. They cast down the old idols. Yet the main taboos and stereotypes remained, and accordingly the rebels stayed within the limits of that imaginary chalk circle. Here we encounter the first paradox of America's Soviet debate: the rebellion in sovietology provoked by Krushchev's reforms met the same fate as those reforms themselves — it petered out into intellectual stagnation
Those sovietologists who do dare to cross over the imaginary boundary line, such as Richard Pipes or George Kennan, are very rare.
Yet even they do not move forward with their models, but rather backward, attempting mechanically to transpose the traditional histoi-ographic paradigms, popular in the last century, on to contemporary political reality.3 Thus, they too end up inside an imag:'nary chalk circle, only a d-fferent kind — one that was drawn a century ago by pre-Soviet Russian historiography. This is the sccond paradox of the modern Western debate over Russia.
The third paradox, and perhaps the most amusing, is that Clio, the muse of history, has seen fit to punish both opposing camps for their neglect of her. She has not allowed them to escape the limitations of the past As a result, today both s.des diligently repeat the misconceptions and errors of those who were most involved in the debate over Russ a's destiny at the turn of the century.
In fact, aren't the Western conservatives repeating the arguments of the old Russian extremists (r>rst and foremost the Bolshev ks) in their zeal to deepen the emp re's 'regume crisis by every means poss/ble, so as to bring t to the wb;te heat of a 'systemic с isis — and, thus, once and for all, to r'i the world of the curse of Communism? On the other hand, aren't liberal sovietologists, in denying the poss'oility of a 'systemic' crisis, fraugnt with historical calamity, simply reiterating the arguments of the old Russian liberals? They complacently be -eved in the viability of the tsarist system, refusing to support Stolypin's reforms which were, in essence, the last desperate attempt to halt the empire's slide toward 'systemic' crisis. Western liberals today are just as certain as their Russian predecessors were that, even if they don't lift a finger to support Gorbachev's reforms, the Soviet system will still somehow, on its own, overcome ts 'regime' crisis.