The other type of Russian political crisis - the 'systemic' crisis - deprives the system's leadership of control over the regime change, saving the system with no option but counter-reform. In such cases,' it isn't the fate of the regime that is at stake, but rather that of the system itself. The only way to avoid the collapse of the system in a systemic' cixsis has, throughout Russian history, been by the
establishment of a garrison-state based on a fortress mentality.
'System .c' crises have been rare in Russia. When they have occurred, they have been the result either of powerful reforms that threatened to become irreversible (like the reforms of the 1550s or February 1917) or of the extreme SJ ritual and political exhaustion of the system which threatened its collapse (as in the 1690s and October 1917). Each of the resulting metamorphoses was a genuine and great revolution However, they performed a function directly opposite to that of the great Western revolutions: they did not destroy, but rather renewed and strove to perpetuate, the system s pre-niodern character. They required not only mass terror and a great purge of the old elites, but also radical changes n the mentality of the new elites They not only brought about sweeping political and institutional changes, making Russia almost unrecognizable compared to its former self, they also made ideological revolutions. Each of them marked a catastrophe for the Russian m Idle class, and a return of the system to its initial mec.. aeval parameters — only on a higher level of complexity.
It i ei dent from Figure 2 thai as far as political crises in the Russian autocracy are concerned, the centuries-old patterns still hold m the Sov 'at emp re. Lenin's garrison-state was followed, according to che pattern, by a 'reg ne' crisis which in turn led to the establishment of a reformist re^me (NEP). The failure of NEP created another regime' cr sis which, again according to the pattern, led to the establishment of a counter-reformist regime and so began a new historical cycle. The end of dictatorship created one more 'reg me crisis which ended, appropriately, not with another dictaiorsh:' "> but m a new reg^ ne of reform. Where should the new 'regime' cris!s created by the failure of this first reform in a new cycle lead? According со the pattern, into a regime of political stagnation. And so it did. This regime of political stagnation ultimately created a new 'regime' crisis We witnessed it in the early 1980s. It could have led to a new rej^ me of reform. To the dismay of the Russian New Ь ght (but s111 true to our pattern), it did. What now?
In all previous 'regime' crises — without exception — and there have been quite a number of them (as we have seen), the Soviet empire followed the age-old patterns obediently. In this respect, Western sovietology's presumption seems to be wrong while that of the Russian New Right has been validated. Russia's 1 storical record simply doesn't suggest any reasonable grounds to expect her to deviate from the general pattern — unless its current cycle is broken by an irreversible reform.
Our overview, however, yields another, much more ambivalent conclusion. Apparently, Russia will not be able to escape a crisis in the 1990s rrespeclive of whether Gorbachev's reforms achieve a breakthrough and he succeeds .11 bringing Russia into the European fam.ly of nations, The crucial question is whether the approaching crisis will remain within the limits of a 'regime crisis or go further and bring about a new metamorphosis, whether the reformist leadership will lose control of the situation and so make the Russian New Right's game plan for the year 2000 a credible alternative.
The answer depends on whether Russia's nnddle class is strong and articulate enough to be able to meet this crisis, to withstand a new extremist fit within the system, In 1917, as we know, Russia's middle class — even with free enterprise, political parties, a strong voice in the Duma (state assembly) and the initial success of Stolypin's reforms — proved unable to resist the Bolshevik counter-relorm Would it be able to stand up to a fascist counter-reform around the year 2000 — without political parties and without a Duma? Looking at it like this, it does seem that the Russian New Right's optimism is by no means .11-founded. A 'systemic crisis in Russia at the end of this century is indeed a strong possibility. It might become a reality — unless the New Right's game plan is confronted with an equally powerful and realistic reformist strategy designed to strengthen Russia s middle class and prepare it for the coming 'regime' crisis Yet to achieve this, the current reformist effort — unlike all its predecessors down through the centuries — must succeed in breaking the vicious circle of autocracy and become irreversible.
But what are the chances of this happening0 What has taken place m Russia or in the world at large that sets the end of this millennium apart from all Russia's earlier experiences of reform? Given that Russia s political past is a history of failed and reversed reforms, why should the outcome be any different this time? Where is the elaborate strategy needed to confront the Russian New Right's game plan to come from — after all, it was not in evidence either in the 1960s, the 1920s, 1917, 1905, or indeed in any prior instance of Russian reform?
An Unprecedented Phenomenon
It would seem that such a strategy cannot be developed within the Russian leadership, perennially steeped in quasi-mediaeval ideology. Just as Stolypin was sincerely convinced of the unsurpassed advantages of Orthodox monarchy, so Khrushchev believed in the absolute superiority of what he called socialism. Today, Gorbachev still believes in this. There is virtually no chance that any of these leaders, for all their refinea political instinct, energy and dynamism, could in the past — or can today — make the elevation of the middle ctass the primary focus of their political programmes. The very political culture in wh.ch they have been brought up, essentially religious, secretive, rooted in the traditions of censorship and self-censorship, deprived them of clarity or political vision. Add to this that Byzantine tangle of mutual fears and hatreds which is the Russian establishment and you will see that it is no accident that no viable reformist strategy has ever been developed within tne Russian leadership
The 'mplications of this are somewhat grave, especially in this nuclear age. For it means that a suitable strategy could only be developed outs Je of the system. Such things rarely happen True, modern history ncludes examples of emigres returning home in triumph to "mpose on their native land strategies developed outside of it. Th s happened in England in the 1660s and in France in 1815. More recently, it happened to Lenin in 1917 and Khomeini in 1979 But these were all examples of successful counter-reformist strategies. To the best of my knowledge there has been only a single case of an outs der, an en gre, who offered support in developing a strategy of reform to a government he couldn't help but dislike and distrust. This was Alexander Herzen, who, with Hs friends, tried to influence the course of Russian h story from London in the early 1860s through his famous paper The Bell. Amaz.ngly, though an exile, Herzen did for a short while ach' ;ve the prominence of a 'second Russian government'. His enormous influence was ruined, however, when Poland unexpectedly rose in rebellion in 1863. Herzen s ded with the Poles, against the overwhelming mapjority of Russians who, to his surprise, appeared no less imperial-minded in a crisis situat' эп than the imperial government itself.
Nevertheless, Herzen s short reigr as a 'second Russian government' set an important precedent. It showed that only those who combine in themselves a superior knowledge aoout Russia with Western intellectual culture are capable of accomplisl rig that which has eluded Russia's reformist leaders for centuries: a strategy for Russian reform, however debatable. Might it not also be true that the permanent absence, outside the system, of a powerful intellectual group capable of developing such a strategy is one of the princ эа1 causes of the perpetual failure of all Russ' tn reforms?