Whether, today, a group of reform-minded outsiders will be able to do for Gorbachev's reform what Herzen attempted to do for Alexander (Is, remains to be seen. All 1 can offer, by way of conclusion, are two examples (or elements) of a possible alternative Western game plan to counter the Russian Idea. They are intended to show that it is perhaps possible for sovietology to fulfil such a function.
The Eternal Tree ot Life'
teory, my friend, s grey, but the eternal tree of life is green,' Mephistopheles explained to Faust. Suppose for a moment that we had never heard of any grey theories such as 'Soviet ideology' or 'the Soviet regime', that our rmnds were fresh and open to observations on the Rusr;an tree of ife. How would the problem of trade between the USSR and the West appear to us then? Would it be reduced to the single recurrent question, 'To trade or not to trade?', which we have been heat ng from the experts for years? If this question makes any sense at all, then it is only from the point of view of those 'grey' theories. As soon as we start to look at things from the position of the Soviet middle class or Russia's political modernization, different questions ar ;e.
Is it possible to use trade with the Soviet Union to strengthen the reformist groups within the Soviet establishment — and accordingly to weaken the counter-reformist ones? To put it another way, is it possible to use trade as leverage for deeper ng the innate antagonisms between Soviet elites and to encourage the elevation of the middle class? If this is possible, then how?
On the So\ et side, I see three p.incipal actors, not a faceless monolithic 'Soviet regime', involved in the issue of trade with the West The first is the gigan с foreign trade bureaucracy (an important component of the Central Economic Bureaucracy; group 9 in Figure 3). This was created by Stalin as art impermeable screen between Western corporations and their natural partners in the Soviet Union, the rr ddle managerial class. This class itself represents the second of our principal political actors concerned with this issue on the Soviet side (group 4 in the same F jure). The third actor, whose voice may be decisive in the conflict between the first two, is the national leadership, wl ch ncludes, n my view, the Politburo, the Central Committee Secretariat and the office of Secretary General. The national leadership occup es the central position in our Figure (group 6) and represents an independent, though also the most powerful, set of interests in the Soviet establishment. Naturally, these interests are not at all identical either w h those of group 9, or with those of group 4. In the second half of the 1970s sovietologists observed the fluctuation of the national leadership between group 4, who demanded direct access to trade with Western corporations (following the example of the Hungarian middle managerial class) and group 9, who desperately opposed any attack on their prerogatives.5 The struggle ended in a compromise, after the collapse of Russia's detente with the West at the end of the 1470s. The Soviet middle class did not receive 'Hungarian rights' in full measure, but it did make a breach m the foreign trade bureaucracy's monopoly, giving Soviet corporations the right to trade directly with their East European partners.
What is going on in the area of foreign trade in the Soviet Union is reminiscent, at least in one respect, of what happened m mediaeval Europe at the dawn of modern history. The reformist elements of the middle class have risen up against a bureaucratic hierarchy which was cutting them off from direct contact with the source of thcii inspiration — it much the same way as Protestantism rose against a Catholic hierarchy that was allegedly cutting believers off from direct interaction with God. This analogy may look superficial, but in fact, it boldly reflects the mediaeval character of the Soviet political system. Is the situation of the Soviet middle class in the mediaeval USSR hopeless? The Reformation's success in England, Germany and parts of Eastern Europe would suggest that it is not. This success is also evidence that, in each i istance, the Reformation depended on the position of the national leadership- ii succeeded where the national leadership agreed to dismantle the monopoly of the Catholic hierarchy. In no instance did the Reformation lead to the undermining of the national leadership's position, only to its reorientation. This is analogous to the way foreign trade reform did not undermine the position of the national leadership in Hungary when its 'Protestant' group 4 won out over 'Catholic' group 9. The middle managerial class simply took the place of the former bureaucratic hierarchy — entering on to the world scene and acqmrmg new skills and experience, new responsibility and new international connections. In so doing, it signiiicantly strengthened its political position within the Hungarian establishment
The prospect of repeating this experiment in the Soviet Union depends, therefore, on the position of the national leadership. We assume that its position is not rigidly fixed and that it is free to side with the 'Protestants', should it consider this course of action to be advantageous to its own group interests. Evidently, the maximization of Soviet —American trade is posited as one of the leadership's fundamental goals In this respect, the position of the American national leadership, on whom such trade links depend, becomes decisive in the struggle between two elites within the Soviet establishment
Therefore the traditional argument over whether to trade or not to trade with the USSR makes no sense. The real question is, 'Who should we trade with in the Soviet Union?' Should ;t be the 'Cathohc hierarchy', which would strengthen the forces of counter-reform, or with the 'Protestant' middle class, which would reinforce the position of reform? The American national leadership could, for example, offer to maximize trade (and credits) on the condition that business be conducted directly between Soviet and American corporations without bureaucratic intermediaries. This kind of an offer would in no way resemble a political ultimatum — in fact, it wouldn't have anything to do with politics. It would be motivated exclusively by the pragmat : business objective of easing the trade process, and would correspond to the interests of both Soviet and Amer. jan corporations At the same time, it would be strengthen "ng the Russ an m ddle class and preparing it for the coming 'regime' crisis.
This is just one example of a possible American strategy oriented toward supporting the Soviet middle class I mention it here only because over the course of many years in Moscow I had the opportunity to study the problems of the Soviet middle class professionally, trying, as best as I could, under the constraints of a censored press, to articulate its group interests. Western expeits don't have to contend with censorship. They have descnoed, analysed, catalogued and produced detailed statistics on each and every nuance of Soviet society Has all this effort been expended so that this fabulous wealth of information should gather dust on Tbrary shelves, or so that sovietological conservatives and liberals go on picking holes in each other's arguments? Couldn't Western experts have at their disposal dozens of viable strateg'es, like the one just described if only liberals and conservatives would work together on the practical problem of moving the Soviet system irl the direction of political modernization? In fact, it is only through joint practical work that sovietology can become an effecli^e counter to the Russian Idea — by helping to school the Russian middle class and the West for the 'Year 2000'.
Leont ev's Dilemma
Another possible Western game, this time perhaps a little more complex, concerns what I call Leont'ev's dilemma.
in the 1880s Konstantin Leont'ev, the most incisive of the Russian conservatives of the past century, nsistently advised the dictator Alexander III not to be swayed by pan-Slavic sentiments, but to leave