Eastern Europe in peace. Leont ev s dilemma can be summed up as follows: we haven i been able to integrate Poland into our imperial, Byzantine' culture over the course of nearly a century; what would happen to us if we had to handle another half-dozen Polands? To Leont'ev, such a course could even lead to the destruction of Byzantine culture. In fact, he thought that the empire was doomed from the moment it conquered the Western Slavs. The middle class he so despised ('bourgeois Philist;nes') w as traditionally much stronger and more articulate m Eastern Europe and would set about its destructive work, dragging behind it its Russian partner in a direction 'congenial to Western interests'.
A few decades later another dictator, Josef Stalin, who had no Leont'ev to advise him, was unable to resist the expansionist impulse of Russian dictatorship. He accomplished what the pan-Slavists had wanted Alexander III to do, or, from Leont'ev's standpoint, committed the crudest of errors, one fatal to the empire. As a result, Eastern Europe became the mediaeval empae's westernmost frontier. If Leont'ev was right — and he alone in the 1880s predicted a socialist revolution in Russia — then the problem for Stalin and his successors was whether the civilized world would take advantage of the situation to bring about what L eont'ev feared, the political modernization of the empire. Indeed, can the West transform the powerful potential of the Eastern European m<ddle class into leverage for the elevation of its Soviet counterpart?
For understandable reasons, the peoples who have fallen into Russia's imperial orbi* have so far shown little interest in I.eont'ev's dilemma. They wish to break away from the empire's embrace, not to concern themselves with its modernization. The Germans in East Berlin in 1953 and the Hungarians in 195b tried to do this 'Polish- styk — by frontal assault, a national uprising. This ended, of course, the same way as Polish attempts in the previous century, in bloodshed and failure. The mediaeval empire does not succumb to frontal attack The Czechs, naively relying oil socialist fraternity, tried to escape, in 1968, via the roundabout route of national democratization. Soviet tanks quickly crushed their hopes. Polish 'Solidarity' in 1980 thought it could succeed where the Czechs had failed. Poland is now under military dictatorship. As in tsarist times, the empire cannot be duped. So vanished the last hope that any single province might be able to break free of the empire's clutches — without modernization of the imperial centre.
' his tragic history has a corollary, however. Just as Leont'ev predicted, 'half a dozen Polands' are indeed constantly working away at the empire s destruction. So far, over the course of a few decades, they haven't been able to find a fulcrum with which to overturn their mediaeval stepmother. But in 1968 it was as though one small province, having learned from its own bAter experience, haa inadvertently hit upon Leont'ev's dilemma. Hungary began its process of liberalization not with an uprising, not with a revolutionary attempt at national democracy, but rather with the elevation of its own bourgeois Philistines'. Naturally, to achieve this, it first of all had to breach the empire's economic model which, as always, had been set up to block the upward movement of the middle class. Without any noise or fanfare, Hungary succeeded where both the Czechs and the Poles suffered defeat and failure. In less than two decades Hungary has been transformed into a prospering and — as far as possible within the framework ol a mediaeval empire — liberal state, based on the strengthening of its middle class. Radical econonr с reform accomplished what neither revolt nor attempts at national democratization could. Consequently; Hungary has become the first province in the empire where, by law, two or more cand.dates are required to stand in each election, where there ,s an essentially open border with a capitalist state, where censorship has been reduced to a minimum and every citizen has the legal right to travel abroad, and where there are neither emigration problems, nor food crises, nor queues for consumer goods.
Hungary has demonstrated that liberalization is possible w itbin the mediaeval empire, and has offered herself as a model for the rest of the empire to follow. No more than that can be expected of ber. In the final analysis, she is a tiny country, with her own problems, frightened of her own success, and not daring to dream about seriously- influencing the empire. In no way, can Budapest pretend to the role of a second, reformist, centre of the empire, competing for influence with Moscow. Warsaw, on the other hand, is a different matter. Poland has always been the key country of Eastern Europe. If Poland were to follow Hungary, and, in addition to this, were to enter into a kind of alliance with Hungary, utilizing Hungary's experience to strengthen her own middle class, a second, reformist, centre of the empire could become a reality. It could act as a magnet to the whole western flank of the empire and as a signal for the rebirth of the whole Eastern European middle class, including the middle ciass of the imperial centre. In other words, Poland could такс Leont'ev's nightmare come true.
Tor this to happen, the peoples on the empire's Western fringes must first and foremost understand the main lesson of their struggle for liberation: that the path to national liberalization, and ultimately to the ndependence of Waisaw, Prague, Bucharest and Sofia, lies through the liberalization of Moscow, through successful — and irreversible — Soviet reform. If the Poles do manage to achieve liberalization, it's because the Hungarians have already shown them how it can be done within the mediaeval system. But the recognition of this fact by the peoples of Eastern Europe is, by itself, not enough to transform Leont'ev's nightmare into reality. It is naive to expect Poland s mL.tary government to be capable of a Hungarian-style initiative, ''hey have neither the authority, nor the resources, nor even the necessary backing of the people, to break with command economy.
he West, however, could offer Poland what its current government lacks.
Here, too, as in the case of trade with Russia discussed earlier, the situation demands a well thought-out Western strategy. A 'mini- Marshall Plan' for Poland predicated on the condition that she go the Hungarian way would be analogous to the suggestion to maximize Soviet —American trade on condition that corporations deal directly with each other. Also, as before, it could by no means be called a political ultimatum It would involve only the natural desire of creditors to receive what is due to them and help the borrower to avoid bankruptcy. It would be based solely on the desire to support radical reform within the Soviet system, shared — if we are to believe their own declaiations — by both the national leadership in Moscow and Richard P:pes n Cambridge (judging from his last book).6
Sovietological liberals are also well disposed toward reform In any event, they would certainly wish to avoid the unprecedented crisis predicted by Timothy Colton if reform should fail 7 What is there to prevent both liberal and conservative sovietologists — Pipes and Colton >n this instance — from sinking their ideological differences in favour of a concrete and practical opportunity to avert a major catastropne — the 'Year 2000"?
The Mediaeval System s Resources
Of course, to Pipes and Colton, (as well as to American politicians) tht 'Year 2000' can hardly be more than an abstraction. They wouldn't take seriously Veche's reader mail or Solzhenitsyn's diabolerie. They probablv never heard of Shimanov's strategy and Emel'ianov's tactics. After all, there can be no shortage of elevator operators in America who in their leisure time prophesize the imminence of Armageddon
Having been reared under a modern system of values, experts naturally have difficulties to perceive the role ideology plays in a pre-modern state. The very idea of the USSR as a mediaeval state is completely alien to them They will probably ask me the same questions about this book as the critics asked about The Russian New Right: How many supporters of the Russian Idea are there in the Soviet Union? How many of them are nfluenUal in the court circles in Moscow? I don't know, I'll tell them. Nobody knows. Then they'll turn away, shrugging th< ir shoulders n bewilderment, totally convinced that Shimanov is just a lunatic and the plans of the Russian Idea for its 'Year 2000' are die delusions.