When Ruzskii urged the Tsar to adopt the formula “The sovereign reigns and the government rules,” Nicholas said that
this formula was incomprehensible to him, that he would have had to be differently brought up, to be reborn.… The Tsar, with remarkable lucidity, ran through the opinions of all those who could, in the near future, administer Russia in the capacity of ministers responsible to the [legislative] chambers, and expressed the conviction that the civic activists who would undoubtedly form the first cabinet had no administrative experience and, having been entrusted with the burden of authority, would prove unable to cope with their task.112
The conversation with Ruzskii ended around 11:30 p.m., at which time Nicholas was handed Alekseev’s cable with Basily’s draft manifesto. The documents from the highest officer in the armed forces made on him a deep impression. After retiring for a few minutes, Nicholas recalled Ruzskii and told him he had made two decisions. Ruzskii was to inform Rodzianko and Alekseev that he would yield and allow the Duma to form a cabinet. The second order concerned Ivanov. He was to be sent a message reading: “Until my arrival and receipt of your report, please undertake no action.”*
With these instructions, Nicholas gave up the idea of suppressing the Petrograd disorders and took the path of political conciliation. He hoped that his concessions would, in time, have the same calming effect on the country as the Manifesto of October 17, 1905.*
The date was March 2, the time 1 a.m. Nicholas retired to his sleeping car, but he stayed awake through the night, tormented by doubts whether his concessions would work and by worries about his family: “My thoughts and feelings are all the time there,” he wrote in the diary, “how hard it must be on poor Alix to go through all this by herself.” He was still awake at 5:15 a.m.113 Ruzskii contacted Rodzianko at 3:30 a.m. Their conversation, which lasted four hours, was to have a decisive influence on Nicholas’s decision to abdicate, because from it Ruzskii and, through him, the other commanding generals learned how desperate the situation in Petrograd had grown and realized that the manifesto granting the Duma the power to form a ministry had come too late.114 They, in turn, exerted on Nicholas pressures to abdicate.
Ruzskii advised Rodzianko that the Tsar had consented to the formation of a cabinet appointed by and responsible to the legislature. Rodzianko responded:
It is obvious that His Majesty and you do not realize what is going on here. One of the most terrible revolutions has broken out, which it will not be so easy to quell.… The troops are completely demoralized, they not only disobey but kill their officers. Hatred of Her Majesty has reached extreme limits.… I must inform you that what you propose is no longer adequate, and the dynastic question has been raised point-blank.
In response to Ruzskii’s request for clarification, Rodzianko answered that
troops everywhere are joining the Duma and the people and there is a definite, terrible demand for abdication in favor of the [Tsar’s] son under a regency of Michael Aleksandrovich.†
He recommended that the dispatch of front-line troops to Petrograd be halted “since they will not move against the people.”
As Ruzskii conversed with Rodzianko, the tapes of their exchange were passed on to telegraphists to be forwarded to Alekseev. Alekseev was stunned by what he read. At 9 a.m. (March 2), he wired to Pskov a request that the Tsar be awakened at once (“All etiquette must be set aside”) and shown the Ruzskii-Rodzianko tapes—at stake was the fate not only of the Tsar but of the dynasty and Russia herself.115 A general on the other end of the Hughes telegraph responded that the Tsar had just fallen asleep and that Ruzskii was scheduled to report to him in an hour.
Alekseev and the other generals at headquarters now decided that there was no alternative. Nicholas would have to follow Rodzianko’s advice and abdicate.116 But Alekseev knew the Tsar well enough to realize that he would do so only under the pressure of the military command. So he took it upon himself to communicate the text of the Ruzskii-Rodzianko conversation to the commanders of the fronts and fleets. He accompanied it with a personal recommendation that Nicholas step down in favor of Alexis and Michael, in order to save the armed forces, make it possible to pursue the war, and safeguard Russia’s national integrity as well as the dynasty. He requested the recipients to communicate their views directly to Pskov, with copies to himself.117
Ruzskii reported to Nicholas at 10:45 a.m. bearing the tapes of his conversation with Rodzianko. Nicholas read them in silence. Having finished, he went to the window of his railway car and stood motionless, looking out. When he turned around, he said that he would consider Rodzianko’s recommendation. He added that he thought the people would not understand such a move, that the Old Believers would not forgive him for betraying the coronation oath and the Cossacks for abandoning the front.118 He affirmed
his strong conviction that he had been born for misfortune, that he brought Russia great misfortune. He said that he had realized clearly the night before that no manifesto [about the Duma ministry] would be of help.… “If it is necessary, for Russia’s welfare, that I step aside, I am prepared to do so.”119
At this point, Ruzskii was handed the cable from Alekseev requesting his opinion of Alekseev’s recommendation that Nicholas abdicate. Ruzskii read the message aloud to the Tsar.120
Around 2 p.m., Pskov was in receipt of the army commanders’ responses to Alekseev’s cable. All agreed with Alekseev. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich begged the Tsar “on his knees” to give up the crown to save Russia and the dynasty. General A. E. Evert, who commanded the Western Front, and General A. A. Brusilov, in charge of the Southwestern Front, concurred. General V. V. Sakharov of the Romanian Front thought the Provisional Government “a gang of bandits” but he, too, saw no way of avoiding abdication.*
Ruzskii called on Nicholas again, between 2 and 3:00 p.m., accompanied by Generals Iu. N. Danilov and S. S. Savvich and bearing the cables from Nikolai Nikolaevich and the other front commanders.121 After perusing them, Nicholas requested the three generals to state their frank opinion. They responded, with much emotion, that in their view, too, the Tsar had no choice but to step down. After a moment of silence, Nicholas crossed himself and said that he was prepared to do so. The generals also made the sign of the cross. Nicholas then retired, reappearing a quarter of an hour later (at 3:05 p.m.) with two messages that he had written by hand on telegraphic blanks, one addressed to Rodzianko, the other to Alekseev. The first read:
There is no sacrifice that I would not make for the sake of the true well-being and salvation of our Mother Russia. For that reason, I am prepared to renounce the throne in favor of My Son, with the understanding that He will remain with Me until attaining maturity, and that My Brother, Michael Aleksandrovich, will serve as Regent.122
The cable to Alekseev was essentially the same except that it made no mention of the regency.123
Nicholas requested headquarters to draft an abdication manifesto. Alekseev entrusted the task to Basily. Drawing on the Code of Laws, Basily drafted the text, which at 7:40 p.m. was wired to Pskov for the Tsar’s signature.124
All the evidence indicates that Nicholas abdicated from patriotic motives: the wish to spare Russia a humiliating defeat and to save her armed forces from disintegration. The argument which swayed him was the unanimous opinion of the commanders of the disparate fronts, especially the cable from Nikolai Nikolaevich.* No less significant is the fact that Nicholas carried on talks about his abdication, not with the Duma and its Provisional Government, but with General Alekseev, as if to emphasize that he was abdicating to the armed forces and at their request. If Nicholas’s foremost concern had been with preserving his throne he would have quickly made peace with Germany and used front-line troops to crush the rebellion in Petrograd and Moscow. He chose instead, to give up the crown to save the front.