If the Ispolkom shied away from this logical conclusion of its premise, it was because it lacked the courage of its convictions. The socialists who controlled it wanted the Provisional Government to serve as a lightning rod for popular discontent, while they manipulated affairs from behind the scenes: they wanted to rule without reigning. As Trotsky was later to boast, this gave the Bolsheviks the opportunity to seize power by demanding that the Soviet become de jure what it was de facto.
The relationship between the two organs of authority was symbolized by their respective locales. The Soviet and its Executive elbowed their way into Taurida Palace, the seat of the Duma and the center of opposition under tsarism. The Provisional Government installed itself first in Mariinskii Palace, the seat of the Imperial Council of Ministers, and in July moved to the Winter Palace, a tsarist residence.*
The Ispolkom legislated in every field of activity. Yielding to the pressure of workers, it decreed an eight-hour working day in all enterprises, including those working for defense. On March 3 it ordered the arrest of members of the Imperial dynasty, not excepting Nikolai Nikolaevich, the designated Commander in Chief.161 The logic of its self-assigned role as the organ of “democratic control” over the “bourgeoisie” quickly led the Ispolkom to adopt repressive measures reminiscent of the worst days of tsarism. Thus, on March 3, it “authorized” the postal and telegraphic services to function, but subject to “surveillance” by Soviet organs.162 Press censorship followed. On March 5, the Ispolkom ordered the closing of all publications of a “Black Hundred” orientation, including the right-wing daily Novoe vremia, which had the temerity to come out without securing its permission.163 Two days later, the Ispolkom advised newspapers and journals they were not to publish without express authorization from the Soviet—that is, itself.164 This attempt to restore pre-1905 censorship provoked such an outcry it had to be rescinded.165 But it is indicative of the rapidity with which the socialist intelligentsia, while professing the most lofty democratic ideals, violated a cardinal principle of democracy—namely, freedom of opinion.
The Ispolkom continued to bureaucratize. As early as March 3, it created a network of “commissions” to deal with pressing problems, such as food supply, railroads, post and telegraphs, and finances—a regular shadow government that duplicated and, through duplication, controlled the operations of the government. The principal institution serving this purpose was the “Contact Commission” of five socialist intellectuals (N. S. Chkheidze, M. I. Skobelev, Iu. M. Steklov, N. N. Sukhanov, and V. N. Filippovskii) created on March 7. Its task was to “inform the Soviet of the intentions and actions of the Provisional Government and the latter about the demands of the revolutionary people, to exert pressure on the government to satisfy all these demands, and to exercise uninterrupted control over their implementation.”166 Thus, by a verbal sleight of hand, the wishes of a body of intellectuals appointed by the socialist parties became the wishes of the “revolutionary people.” According to Miliukov, initially the government satisfied all the demands of the Contact Commission. Tsereteli concurred, declaring in late March that “there were no instances when, on matters of importance, the Provisional Government did not seek agreement” with the Contact Commission.167 To make certain this practice continued, on April 21 the Ispolkom asked the Provisional Government to make no “major” political moves without informing it beforehand.168
For reasons stated, the Ispolkom paid particular attention to the armed forces. “To facilitate contact,” on March 19 it appointed commissars to the Ministry of War, the Army headquarters, and the headquarters of the diverse fronts and fleets. These commissars were to follow instructions sent them by the Ispolkom. In the front-line zone, no orders issued by the military were to go into effect without prior approval of the Ispolkom and its commissars. The latter helped to resolve disputes that arose within the armed forces and between the military command and the civilian population in or near the combat zone. The Minister of War directed the military commanders to assist the Soviet commissars in executing their duties.169
The Ispolkom kept on expanding. On April 8 nine representatives (all SRs and Mensheviks) from the Soldiers’ Section were added to the ten already in the Ispolkom: they were the first elected members of that body. The ten previously appointed members were reelected: no Bolshevik won a seat. The representatives of the Workers’ Section were handpicked by the Menshevik, Bolshevik, and SR parties.170
During the first month of its existence, the Petrograd Soviet served only the capital city, but then it expanded its authority over the entire country. The All-Russian Consultation of Soviets, convened in Petrograd in late March, voted to have the Ispolkom admit into its membership representatives of the provincial city soviets and frontline army units, which transformed the Petrograd Soviet into the All-Russian Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.171 Sixteen delegates from other parts of Russia were added to what now became the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK or CEC). By now its membership had grown to seventy-two, among whom were twenty-three Mensheviks, twenty-two SRs, and twelve Bolsheviks.
To direct and systematize its work, the Ispolkom created on March 14 another bureaucratic body, a Bureau. In mid-April, the Bureau had twenty-four members (eleven Mensheviks, six SRs, three Trudoviki, and four “non-faction” Social-Democrats). The Bolsheviks initially refused to join on the grounds that they had been offered insufficient places.172
The Ispolkom and its Bureau supplanted the incorrigibly undisciplined Soviet Plenum, which convened less and less frequently; when it did, it was to approve by acclamation the decisions of the Executive. In the first four days of its existence (February 28-March 3), the Plenum met daily. In the rest of March it met four times, in April six. No one paid much attention to its noisy proceedings. The separate Workers’ Section and Soldiers’ Section met somewhat more frequently.
Although the Ispolkom, with its Bureau, and the Soviet, which followed their bidding, posed as the authentic voice of the country’s masses, they had among their members no representatives of peasant organizations. The peasants, 80 percent of the population, had their Peasants’ Union, which kept aloof from the Soviet. The All-Russian Soviet thus spoke for only a fraction of the country’s inhabitants, 10 to 15 percent at best, if allowance is made for the peasantry and the “bourgeoisie,” neither of which was represented.
Operating under such difficult conditions, the Provisional Government concentrated on “democratic” legislation, which was easy to turn out and certain to secure the approval of the Soviet. Cabinet meetings took place in the evening and sometimes late at night. The ministers arrived exhausted and were observed to doze off.
In the weeks that followed its assumption of power, the government passed numerous laws, some designed to rectify the abuses of the old regime, others to implement the eight-point program. Soldiers received full civil rights, and those serving in the rear were no longer subject to courts-martial. All civil disabilities due to religious or ethnic affiliation were lifted. The death penalty was abolished. The right of association and assembly was assured. Poland was promised full independence after the war (although qualified to the extent that it would remain “united with Russia in a free military union”) and Finland was guaranteed the restoration of her constitutional rights. This legislative industry was the most productive sector of the Russian economy.173 The trouble was that whereas laws that enhanced freedom were promptly acted upon, no one paid attention to those that imposed new obligations.