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Close reading of Witte’s memorandum indicates that he was familiar with the program of the Union of Liberation and, in particular, the writings of Struve, its chief theorist. Without saying it in so many words, he proposed the adoption of the platform which Struve had been urging in the pages of the Union’s organ, Liberation: “The slogan of ‘freedom’ must become the slogan of government activity. There is no other way of saving the state.”† The situation was critical. The country had become dangerously radicalized, and the masses, having lost confidence in the government, were poised to destroy the country’s very foundations:

The advance of human progress is unstoppable. The idea of human freedom will triumph, if not by way of reform then by way of revolution. But in the latter event it will come to life on the ashes of a thousand years of destroyed history. The Russian bunt [rebellion], mindless and pitiless, will sweep everything, turn everything to dust. What kind of Russia will emerge from this unexampled trial surpasses human imagination: the horrors of the Russian bunt may exceed everything known to history. It is possible that foreign intervention will tear the country apart. Attempts to put into practice the ideals of theoretical socialism—they will fail but they will be made, no doubt about it—will destroy the family, the expression of religious faith, property, all the foundations of law.102

To prevent such a catastrophe, Witte proposed to satisfy the demands of the liberals and in this manner detach them from the revolutionaries. The united front of the opposition broken up, the liberals could be pacified and the radicals isolated. The only realistic course of action—it had to be taken at once, there was no time to lose—was for the government “boldly and openly to take charge of the Liberation Movement.” The government should adopt the principle of constitutionalism and democratize the restricted franchise adopted for the consultative Duma. It should consider having ministers chosen by and responsible to the Duma, or at least enjoying its confidence. Neither a constitution nor a legislative parliament, Witte assured Nicholas, would weaken his authority: they would rather enhance it. Witte further proposed, as a means of calming social unrest, improvements in the condition of workers, peasants, and the ethnic minorities, as well as guarantees of the freedom of speech, press, and assembly.

It was a revolutionary program, born of desperation, for Witte realized that the government did not dispose of the military strength required to restore order by force.* Although on October 9–10 and the days that followed he would list military repression as an alternative, he did so pro forma, knowing full well that the only realistic option was surrender.

His proposals were subjected to intense discussions at the Court and in high bureaucratic circles. Because Nicholas could not decide on the drastic changes that Witte had suggested, he initially agreed only to a bureaucratic measure which had long been urged on him—namely, creating a cabinet of ministers. On October 13, Witte received a telegram appointing him Chairman of the Council of Ministers “for the purpose of unifying the activity of all the ministers.”103 Assuming that this meant his reform proposals had been turned down, he requested to see the Tsar. He told him he saw no possibility of serving as Prime Minister unless his entire program was adopted. But on October 14 he was invited to return to Peterhof the next morning with the draft of a manifesto.

While Nicholas was mulling over Witte’s suggestions, the country was coming to a standstill. The week that followed Witte’s first visit to Peterhof (October 10–17), critical in the history of Russia, is difficult to disentangle because of contrary claims of various oppositional groups which the sources presently available do not make it possible to sort out. In the eyes of the well-informed police authorities, the general strike and the St. Petersburg Soviet were the work of the Union of Unions. Trepov unqualifiedly credited the Union with creating the St. Petersburg Soviet and serving as its “central organization.”104 Such was also the opinion of the chief of the St. Petersburg Okhrana, General A. V. Gerasimov, for whom the Union exerted its impact in October 1905 by providing the scattered oppositional groups with a common program: “The principal initiative and organizational work in the aforementioned strikes belongs to the Union of Unions.”105 Nicholas wrote his mother on November 10 that “the famous Union of Unions … had led all the disorders.”106 Miliukov in his memoirs endorsed this view although he preferred to credit the parent organization, the Union of Liberation. He states that the initial meetings of the workers which led to the creation of the Soviet took place in the homes of members of the Union of Liberation and the first appeal to convoke the Soviet was printed on the Union’s presses.107 The Mensheviks hotly denied this claim, insisting it was they who had launched the Soviet; in this, they received support from some early Communist historians.108 There is, indeed, evidence that on October 10 the Mensheviks, mostly students, appealed to the workers of St. Petersburg to elect a Workers’ Committee to direct their strike.109 But indications also exist that the workers, following the precedent established by the Shidlovskii Commission, independently chose their representatives, whom they called starosty, the name given elected village officials: some of these had served on the Shidlovskii Commission.110 The most likely explanation is that the Union of Unions initiated the Soviet and that Menshevik youths helped rally factory workers in its support. This was the conclusion reached by General Gerasimov.111

On October 10 communication workers and service employees of public as well as private enterprises in St. Petersburg went on strike. The following evening, over 30,000 people, mostly workers and other non-students, filled the assembly halls and lecture rooms of the university. The crowd voted to join the railroad strike.112 By October 13 virtually all rail traffic in Russia stopped; the telegraph lines were also dead. More and more industrial workers as well as white-collar employees joined the strike.

On October 13, the Soviet held its first session in the St. Petersburg Technological Institute. On hand were some forty intellectuals and workers’ representatives. The meeting was called to create a center to direct the strike. Initially, the Soviet was no more than that, a fact reflected in the names which it used in the first four days of its existence: Strike Committee (Stachennyi komitet), United Workers’ Soviet (Obshchii rabochii sovet), and Workers’ Committee (Rabochiii komitet). The name Soviet of Workers’ Deputies was adopted only on October 17.* Fifteen of the workers’ representatives present were elected that day, the remainder having been chosen earlier in the year to serve on the Shidlovskii Commission.113 The opening session dealt with the strike. An appeal was issued calling on workers to maintain the work stoppage in order to force the convocation of a Constituent Assembly and the adoption of the eight-hour working day.

At the second meeting of the Soviet, on October 14, the Menshevik George Nosar (Khrustalev) was elected permanent chairman. (In 1899, he had been one of the leaders of the student strike at St. Petersburg University.) By then, public life in St. Petersburg had come to a standstill. Nevsky Prospect was illuminated by projectors mounted on the Admiralty spire.

At this point (October 14) Trepov issued a warning against further disorders, threatening to resort to firearms.114 He had St. Petersburg University surrounded by troops and after October 15 allowed no more rallies there. A few days later, he shut down the university for the rest of the academic year. Right-wing elements began to beat up Jews, students, and anyone else who looked like an intellectual. It became dangerous to wear eyeglasses.* This was the beginning of mob violence, which after the proclamation of the October Manifesto would assume massive proportions, claiming hundreds if not thousands of lives and causing immense destruction of property.