After completing his studies, Stolypin joined the Ministry of the Interior. In 1889 he was sent to Kovno, in what used to be Polish-Lithuanian territory, where his wife, the socially prominent O. B. Neidgardt, owned property. Here he spent thirteen years (1889–1902), serving as Marshal of the Nobility (an appointed office in this area), devoting his spare time to the improvement of his wife’s estate and studies of agriculture.
21. P. A. Stolypin: 1909.
The years which he spent in Kovno were to exert a decisive influence on Stolypin’s thinking. In the western provinces of Russia communal landholding was unknown: here peasant households held their land as outright property. Comparing the superior condition of the rural population in this region with that of central Russia, Stolypin came to agree with those who saw in the peasant commune the main impediment to rural progress; and because he considered rural prosperity a precondition of national stability, he concluded that the preservation in Russia of law and order demanded the gradual elimination of the commune. The commune inhibited improvement in the peasant’s economic condition in several ways. The periodic redistribution of land deprived the peasant of incentives to improve the soil since it was not his property; at the same time, it ensured him of the minimum needed to survive. It also encouraged the enterprising and industrious peasant to engage in usury. Stolypin believed that Russia needed a large class of independent, landowning peasants to replace the decaying dvorianstvo and provide a model for the rest of the rural population.34
In May 1902, impressed with his performance as Marshal of the Nobility, the Ministry of the Interior appointed Stolypin governor of Grodno: at forty, he was the youngest holder of that office in the Empire. After serving less than one year, he was transferred to Saratov, one of the Empire’s most troublesome provinces, with a record of agrarian unrest and a strong SR presence. He is said to have owed this appointment to Plehve, who sought to appease public opinion by selecting officials with a liberal reputation.35 His experience in Saratov strengthened Stolypin’s hostility to the commune, but it also made him aware of the strong hold it exerted on the muzhik, who liked its “leveling” effect. As Stolypin saw it, however, the commune allowed only for “leveling down.” To allow the peasants’ energies to “level up,” he came on the idea of having the government distribute Crown and State lands to independent farmers in order for a significant private peasant sector to emerge alongside the communal.36
Saratov was very turbulent in 1905. Stolypin displayed intelligence and courage in coping with rural unrest. Unlike many governors who reacted to peasant violence by closeting themselves in their offices and leaving the task of pacification to gendarmes and soldiers, he visited the areas of disturbance, spoke with the rebellious peasants, and debated radical agitators. He persisted in this policy despite several attempts on his life, in one of which he was wounded. Such initiatives enabled him to quell the agrarian disorders in Saratov with minimal resort to force. In right-wing circles this earned him a reputation for “softness” and “liberalism” which was not helpful in his subsequent career.
St. Petersburg, however, took notice. His proven administrative abilities, his courage, and his known devotion to the dynasty made him an ideal candidate for ministerial office. On April 26, 1906, following Witte’s resignation, he was offered the portfolio of the Interior in Goremykin’s cabinet. After some hesitation, he accepted the post and moved to the capital. Although favored by the Court for his slavish devotion, the sixty-seven-year-old Goremykin proved entirely unable either to handle the Duma or to quell public disorders. The archetypal bureaucrat-steward, dubbed “His Illustrious Indifference” (Ego Vysokoe Bezrazlichie), he was let go on the day of the First Duma’s dissolution (July 8, 1906). Stolypin now assumed the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers while retaining the portfolio of the Interior.
In approaching his new responsibilities, Stolypin acted on the premise that the October Manifesto had marked a watershed in Russian history: as he told Struve, “there was no possibility of restoring absolutism.”37 This outlook placed him at odds with the Court and its conservative supporters. Stolypin found himself from the outset pursuing a policy that did not enjoy the sympathy of either the Crown or many of his subordinates in the Ministry of the Interior. The latter preferred the traditional repressive measures. Stolypin, albeit with a heavy heart, agreed to repression, to quell disorders, but he thought it futile unless accompanied by reform. He had an ambitious program in mind which centered on administrative decentralization as a device for raising the cultural level of the population.38
In March 1907, he outlined a sweeping program of reforms which called for the expansion of civil liberties (freedom of religion, personal inviolability, civic equality), improvements in agriculture, state insurance for industrial workers, extension of the powers of organs of local self-government, reform of the police, and the introduction of a graduated income tax.39
Determined to carry out his duties with the cooperation of society, he established contact with the leaders of all political parties save those committed to revolution. He also sought to build up in parliament a coalition of supporters, on the example of George Ill’s “King’s Friends” and Bismarck’s Reichsfreunde. He was prepared to go to great lengths to achieve this end, agreeing to legislative compromises and resorting to bribery. His Duma addresses were outstanding examples of parliamentary oratory, by virtue of not only the force of arguments but also their tone: he spoke as a Russian patriot to fellow patriots rather than as a royal steward communicating the master’s wishes. In actions as well as public pronouncements, he took it for granted that the interests of Russia had precedence over all private and partisan interests.
This endeavor met with little response in a country in which the sense of nationhood and statehood was as yet poorly developed. To the opposition Stolypin was a lackey of the despised monarchy; to the monarchy he was an ambitious, self-seeking politician. The bureaucratic establishment never accepted him, because he had not risen through the ranks of the St. Petersburg ministries.
The most urgent task confronting Stolypin was the restoration of public order. This he accomplished by harsh measures which earned him odium among the intelligentsia.
The immediate justification for launching a campaign of counterterror was a nearly successful attempt on his life.
After moving to St. Petersburg, Stolypin maintained the gubernatorial custom of keeping on Sundays open house for petitioners. He insisted on this practice despite warnings from the police. In the afternoon of August 12, 1906, three Maximalists, two disguised as gendarmes, sought admission to his villa on Aptekarskii Island. When a suspicious guard tried to detain them, they threw briefcases, loaded with explosives, into the building.40 A frightful carnage ensued: twenty-seven petitioners and guards, as well as the terrorists themselves, were torn to pieces by the explosion and thirty-two people suffered wounds. Stolypin miraculously escaped harm but both his children were injured. Reacting with characteristic coolness, he directed the removal of the victims.
The assault on Stolypin was only the most sensational manifestation of terrorism which continued to hold the country in its bloody grip. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet and the governors of Warsaw and Saratov fell victim to it. Hardly a day passed without a police official losing his life. To make matters worse, monarchists, emulating revolutionary tactics, resorted to counterterror, and on July 18 murdered the Jewish deputy, Michael Gertsenshtein, who had presented to the Duma the Kadet land program with a demand for compulsory expropriations.* No government in the world could have remained passive in the face of such violence. Since a new Duma had not yet been elected, Stolypin had recourse to Article 87. He subsequently made frequent use of this clause: during the half year that elapsed between the dissolution of the First Duma and the convocation of the Second, Russia was in effect administered by decree. Because he believed in the rule of law, he regretted having to do so, but he saw no alternative: such procedures were “a deplorable necessity,” justified on the grounds that at times the interests of the state took precedence.41