On one level, Deane’s report to Townsend was yet another example of the kind of shaggy dog episodes that typified his final moments in Amsterdam. But it was interesting in that it revealed Deane’s concise and astute powers of recall and observation, his ability to interpret a situation, his skill as an intelligence officer and ultimately his indispensability to Townsend.
16
Neither at Peace or at War
Late November 1725 was quiet. Deane’s last letter to Townsend that month was a letter apologising for not having sent a letter recently because nothing had happened.
In its early stages the O’Connor business promised to birth one of the great tales of the pioneering days of espionage, but in the end appeared to amount to very little. Yet it was deceptive to think of it like that. O’Connor’s recruitment and the information he had provided was vital. He had confirmed what Townsend had feared, that Jacobites were embedded across Europe. Townsend now knew that they were well-funded, organised and supported by many of Britain’s enemies. He realised that they were particularly entrenched in the Russian court and posed an authentic threat to Hanoverian stability. Thanks to Deane and O’Connor, Townsend knew the identities and character of much of the Jacobite high command. In O’Connor they still had a man on the inside if they could ever decide on how further to use him. From Townsend’s point of view, O’Connor’s role had been vital in confirming that the Jacobites had been talking about the utilisation of twelve Russian ships paid for by Spain and the papacy. Combined with existing intelligence and Deane’s first-hand knowledge of the three ships bound for Spain, Townsend was convinced an invasion was imminent. The fact that O’Connor was reporting a half-heard conversation and that Deane had decried the three ships as ‘good for nothing’ did not arrest Townsend’s determination to prepare for the worst. New intelligence that seemed to suggest that the Russian navy in Revel was preparing for war could only confirm Townsend’s deepest suspicions. Townsend was now fully convinced that a Russian/Spanish coalition supporting the Jacobites would invade Scotland and the west of England simultaneously. Townsend believed the invasion was six months away. Townsend lobbied for certain Russian ships to be seized and searched. He wanted an increased show of naval strength in the West Indies where it was believed money was being sent to fund the Jacobite rebels. Walpole intervened.
Although initially cynical about the levels of Jacobite organisation, the prime minister soon changed his mind. Walpole seemed to have a better understanding than his foreign secretary of the military resources available to Britain and the need to tread carefully with other nations. To send the British navy to the West Indies was too provocative. It would also spread the navy out too thinly when they would be better employed near their own coast in strength. Walpole split the navy into two fleets. One fleet would patrol the British coast. The other would patrol the Baltic. It was a pre-emptive exercise in muscle flexing designed to avoid a war if at all possible. All the while Townsend was free to hunt for weapons in Scotland and try to get to the bottom of what the three Russian ships were doing in Spain.
Deane and O’Connor’s time together was at an end. They went their separate ways. O’Connor received his pardon and a £100 reward for services to the Crown. Deane wrote up his account of his time in Russia in an official document entitled An Account of Affairs in Russia, June–July 1725. He also wrote an intelligence report entitled The Present State of the Maritime Power of Russia. Townsend made good on his promise and secured Deane a position. With the increase of British warships in the Baltic, Captain John Deane had been ordered to accompany Sir Charles Wagner’s squadron as both a political adviser and an interpreter. At least those were his official orders. In reality, Townsend had sent Deane on another spying mission. Deane was to scour the coast, seeking out sympathetic acquaintances and old friends whose friendly conversation he might convert into intelligence and information that shed further light on Russia’s intentions and Jacobite movements.
John Deane spent the spring and summer of 1726 stationed on board the Torbay, a 540-man, 80-gun warship, making forays into the coastal ports as and when opportunity dictated.
Writing in April to Townsend from Copenhagen, John Deane mentioned that he had dined with a Russian named Mr Beltashoff. The dinner was ostensibly friendly but Deane knew that he was being gleaned for information about the strength and destination of the British squadron and how long they were likely to remain in the area. Deane was sociable. He gave nothing away but sought to extract his own information from Beltashoff who appeared to have news regarding a trio of Russian ships. Some time previously, three Russian ships had passed by that way from Spain. According to Beltashoff the ships’ cargo had been, ‘oil and wine, and some fruit that they had taken in at Cadiz’. The ships had been forced to winter in Spain. The perishable part of their cargo had rotted. Beltashoff informed Deane that the presence of the three ships in Cadiz was a mercantile statement of intent from Russia. Their presence in Cadiz was intended to show that Russian ships were now fit to engage in trade in the East Indies and Madagascar, although the Russians had not yet secured any trade treaties in those provinces.
Beltashoff was disturbed at the presence of so many British warships so far north when he believed ‘we and all the powers this way were at peace’. In reply, Deane invoked his conversation with Count Tostoi. He informed Beltashoff that relations between Russia and England existed in a strange martial limbo where both nations were ‘neither at peace or at war’. Deane wanted to know about recent Russian demonstrations of naval strength. Beltashoff said that any show of strength was a false display of power. The Russians were keen to appear more ‘formidable than they really are’. Beltashoff estimated the present strength of the Russian navy to have been little more than ‘twelve ships of the line and two or three frigates’ that were fit to sail.
In May, John Deane went to Stockholm and spoke with a baron whom he had served in Russia. The baron had information ‘related to the Russians’ preparations’. Walpole’s strategy appeared to be effective. The Russians had not expected the British fleet to appear on their doorstep. The good news was tempered with bad. The baron relayed information regarding old friends and enemies. Apraxin was ‘rather desirous of retiring than commanding at sea’. As far as his replacement was concerned it seemed unlikely that Deane’s ally Sievers would be given command of the fleet as he did not have the confidence of the Russian court. Deane’s old foe Thomas Gordon was most likely to succeed Apraxin, should he retire.