It has been speculated that what is impaired in children like Elly is the capacity for abstraction, and it is true that Elly was, and for the most part still is, incapable of giving meaning to words like ‘love’, ‘hate’, ‘fear’, whether used as nouns in their full abstraction or more directly as verbs. But my experience suggests a different formulation — not in terms of abstract and concrete, but in terms of relative and absolute. It is true that an abstract word such as ‘fun’ was beyond her capacity. But she was equally slow to grasp that least abstract of entities, the particularity of a specific individual as manifest to sight and touch and expressed in a name. Moreover, she grasped with especial ease a whole class of word-concepts that are generally considered the product of abstraction, in that the mind in order to arrive at them must proceed from a number of individual experiences, abstract their significant common characteristics, and fix these in a word. Even at two and a half Elly had applied the general term ‘ball’ to objects as different as a flattened rubber oval and a sphere of perforated plastic. This was not very impressive, perhaps — until you reflect that at this time when she had only five or six words, one of them was a product of abstraction. (Balls that looked like balls did not elicit the word; Elly was responding to the concept, not the appearance.) At three and a half the idea of a circle was so clear in her mind that she had commandeered music to do duty for the word she did not know. At five and a half, when she was at last ready to learn words in quantity, she learned ‘triangle’, ‘square’, and ‘rectangle’ as easily as at three she had distinguished one block from another. The simple ideas behind the words ‘Where did Becky go?’ or ‘Do you like candy?’ — questions to which an average three-year-old can respond — were beyond her comprehension. But her teachers could say ‘Draw a red triangle, Elly,’ and she would do so. When she learned the other words for shape they came so easily it could hardly be called learning. Her sisters showed her them one summer morning, to amuse her: pentagon, hexagon, heptagon, octagon… There was no hesitation, no need for practice or repetition. They spoke the words once; thereafter she simply knew them. Six months later she asked me for ‘heptagon’. I thought she’d said ‘hexagon’; those we sometimes drew and talked about. Not so. Making a heroic effort at clarity, she said ‘heptagon — seven sides!’ It was as if she had had the concepts for years and had been waiting for the words to describe them. And of course she had; when people had still been invisible to her she had responded to shape and colour. Rectangle, a diamond, a square — these words are nothing if not abstract. When ideas were significant to her, Elly had no difficulty with abstraction.
We had not been able to teach her any colour words until that fruitful summer of her fifth birthday, although of course we had named colours before, as we had named shapes. As soon as she did learn them, however, she used them to record the niceties of a colour sense more acute than even we had suspected. [19] ‘Pink-orange! Green-blue!’ This at five — by seven, peacock-green and peacock-blue cars were carefully and enthusiastically distinguished. Colour was so important to her that I could use it to call attention to things she would not ordinarily notice. I would say ‘purple mountains’, ‘brown horse’, and Elly, who had little interest in animals and none in landscape, would see horse or mountain, which had now acquired significance from its colour, and learn the word for it. It was not, however, the particular thing which interested her, but the generalized notion of colour, which could be applied to any object.
There were many such abstract words she could have learned, but I was concentrating on the human, the ordinary and familiar. Like the Victorian governess whose charge described the shape of the earth as an oblate spheroid, I thought that it was much nicer for a little girl to say that it was shaped like an orange. It was more than a year later that it occurred to me to teach her ‘curved’ and ‘straight’. Only one drawing was necessary. Again it had been the word, not the idea, that was lacking. Elly demonstrated that on one of our walks. As we approached a house we had not visited for a year or more, Elly suddenly spoke, loudly and intensely. ‘Curved stairs!’ I rang the bell in some excitement. I myself had never noticed the staircase, though I had been here more often than Elly. I might have known I could rely on her. As we entered the hall I saw that it swept up and around in a splendid curve. Certainly her capacity for making this kind of abstraction was not impaired. It was in fact so great that it had been able to sustain itself in her mind over months without the support of any words, to surface when they were supplied.
As we observed Elly’s developing speech, it seemed divided into words she could learn instantly once they were pointed out to her, and words she could not learn at all. For a long time there seemed to be no middle ground. What she was able to grasp were absolute terms, whether concrete or abstract — those that reflected concepts that could be defined and understood in themselves. ‘Box’, ‘cat’, ‘giraffe’. ‘Rectangle’, ‘number’, ‘letter’. What she could not understand were relational terms — those that must absorb their full meaning from the situations in which they occur — situations in which the human element plays a part. Elly acquired the word ‘man’ a year before she learned the name of any specific man — ‘man’ is an absolute concept. Once you know the word for a being with short hair and trousers, you need understand no more; from then on, men as such will be recognizable. ‘Man’ is absolute and abstract, but particular men are people, to whom one relates — if one does. ‘Teacher’ is a word which, like ‘man’, is the product of abstraction, but it is first learned in a relational situation: ‘my teacher’. Similarly for ‘sister’, ‘friend’, or ‘home’. It is characteristic of the average child that he learns concepts best in situations in which he can find a personal relation. With Elly, the personal relation seemed at best irrelevant, at worst a hindrance. We wanted to give her words that would enable her to function in the familiar world of a small child. But it was we who defined what a child should find familiar; Elly did not see it our way. Which was more familiar to her, a rectangle or a friend? Her sense of what was important, or unimportant, was simply different from our own.
I recall her, some months past five, looking at a Dick, Jane, and Sally pre-reader with the familiar pictures in series. Dick is painting a chair, in four stages. He has a brush and a can of red paint. I am trying to encourage Elly’s new ability to learn names. Pointing to the picture, I say ‘boy’, and meet with comprehension; I then say ‘Dick’. Elly reacts instantly with unusual pleasure; she smiles, she bounces up and down, she repeats the word, she applies it to the succeeding pictures. I am pleased too. For her to learn a personal name so fast is unheard of. But suddenly she gets up and goes to the wall. It is painted blue. ‘Dick,’ she says, with emphasis and satisfaction. She moves into another room, goes to another wall, a pink one this time. ‘Dick.’ I realize what I should have known; what she has abstracted is not the boy’s name, but the concept of ‘paint’, which is also inherent in the picture series, and which to her is both more interesting and more available than the ‘simple’, ‘direct’ idea of a person with a name.
Elly’s weakness in understanding human situations was especially marked in her difficulties with personal pronouns. She was six before she used any pronouns at all. This was not as surprising as it might have been; instinctively, in search of sure comprehension, we had spoken of ourselves and her by name, as one does to a two-year-old. But when we did begin, deliberately, to substitute ‘Would you’ for ‘Would Elly like a cookie?’ we realized the severity of the problem. The answer, at six, would be, not ‘yes’ (that came much later, not spontaneously, but as a result of careful teaching), or even ‘I like a cookie’, but a simpler echoing: ‘You like a cookie?’ This echolalia, complete to the rising intonation of the question, was, we knew, part of the autistic syndrome; autistic children who, unlike Elly, do speak at a normal age, still speak not flexibly, for communication, but like parrots. Elly had not shown that symptom earlier because she couldn’t talk that well. Now she could, and here it was. ‘Daddy gave you a present,’ I would say. And as time went on she did more than echo after us; she herself would volunteer the words, with full enjoyment of the fact of the gift. ‘Daddy give you a present.’ And now we recognized another specific characteristic of the speech of autistic children. In any statement, ‘you’ is the equivalent of ‘I’ or ‘me’.
19
The most striking confirmation of her colour-intelligence occurred when she was six. I had brought several boxes of powder paint for her, and mixed small quantities on demand, so she could paint at home as well as at school. The colours, of course, came out pure — plain red, blue, black — and Elly seemed quite satisfied with them. When we returned to the store for more she asked for white, and we brought a box home and put it on the shelf with the others. A week later she asked for paint, and when I asked what colour replied ‘pink’, ‘light blue’ — colours she had never before requested. It was obvious to her that we could now make these colours, that white was the ingredient needed to produce pastels — something many normal six-year-olds have to be taught.