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Added to this decline in the number of young people arriving on the labour market was the fact that the introduction of compulsory secondary school education would rule out employing fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds in production. In 1965 the Russian Federation had 287,000 young workers of that age, and it would still have 263,000 in 1970. But the figure would fall to 130,000 in 1980.

Obviously, demographic factors were introducing a new blockage. The predicted reduction in the youth cohorts entering production was attributable to falling birth rates, which had been especially marked since the beginning of the 1960s. In 1950 the rate was still 27 births per 1,000, but in 1967 it was no more than 17 per 1,000 (14.5 per 1,000 in the Russian Federation itself). Despite the drop in mortality in these years, falling birth rates had substantially reduced natural population increase, from 17 per cent in 1950 to 10 per cent in 1967 (less than 8 per cent in Russia). Birth rates had fallen in the twelve Soviet republics – especially in Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia and Kazakhstan. The phenomenon was especially troubling in the Soviet Union’s two metropolises: between 1960 and 1966, Moscow’s birth rates had fallen from 7 to 2.2 per 1,000 and Leningrad’s from 6.4 to 3 per 1,000. According to some estimates, in 1972 Moscow’s mortality rate would be 3 per cent higher than its birth rate, and in 1973 Leningrad’s would be 2 per cent higher. In 2000, the figure for deaths would be 2.5 times that for births – equivalent to a population decrease of several hundreds of thousands.

Over the Union as a whole, the drop in birth rates in towns was higher than in the countryside. But an utterly novel trend had emerged: overall birth rates in the Russian Federation, where a quarter of the USSR’s rural population lived, were lower than in the towns. Of the seventy-one administrative units of the Russian Federation, eighteen had birth rates below those of towns. In areas like Novgorod, Pskov and Kalinin, birth rates were lower than mortality rates.

The rate of reproduction of the population was plummeting. For the whole USSR, it had dropped from 1.4 in 1938–9 to 1.12 in 1968, which was lower than that of leading capitalist countries (1.56 in the USA, 1.13 in Canada, 1.38 in France, and 1.44 in the UK).

In the USSR (and the Russian Federation), women had an average of 2.6 children (1.9 in towns and 3.3 in the countryside). Research by the Central Statistical Office indicated that an average of 3 children was required for normal population reproduction. This meant that the urban population was no longer reproducing itself, but growing only thanks to an influx from the countryside.

The decline in birth rates in the USSR was more rapid than that experienced by the other socialist countries and the capitalist countries. What would its effects be on the supply of labour? Some demographers argued that it presented no threat to living standards. But Kasimovsky differed: if the decline in births persisted, workers’ living standards would suffer.

Population density remained low in the USSR – thirty-two inhabitants per square kilometre – and was lower still in Siberia. Falling birth rates would slow down any increase in population density and thus further reduce the prospects of populating Siberia, which was now a major problem. If birth rates did not pick up, the outcome could be stagnation, or even reduction, in living standards, which were already too low.

THE CAUSES OF DECLINING BIRTH RATES

Births had fallen during the war and had not yet recovered. The structure of the population in terms of sex and age had changed. In the first instance, this involved the disparity between men and women. But there was also a gap in the 30–50 age groups. In 1959, the 20–24 age group counted 106 women for 100 men in towns and 98 women for 100 men in the countryside. In 1967, the corresponding figures were 98 women for 100 men in towns and 95 women for 100 men in the countryside. Thus, the situation had almost been normalized in the towns, but it had deteriorated in the countryside. For the 25–29 age group, in 1959 there were more women than men in the towns; and in 1967 the situation was worse. In the countryside there were 131 women for 100 men. These imbalances represented a serious handicap in terms of labour supplies and demographics. They obviously had a major impact on birth rates and the reproduction of the population.

The sharp increase in the number of women employed in production (19 million in 1950 and around 40 million in 1968) was also a factor. The proportion of women in production in the Russian Federation had doubled. But the birth rate among working women (workers or employees) was 30–40 per cent lower than that of women working at home or on the family plot. The main reason was the greater difficulty experienced by working women in caring for their children. Many of them had no relatives to help out and could not afford a nanny. In many towns there were no places in the crèches and kindergartens. The fact that women (several million of them) were often employed in very heavy, non-mechanized labour – mining, machine construction, metallurgy – was a further element. Kasimovsky reckoned that the time had come to revise the list of jobs open to women, so that they could both work and bear children. Another well-known factor was birth controclass="underline" the number of abortions exceeded that of births.

In the first quarter of 1968, the research institute of the Russian Federation’s Gosplan, the Health Ministry, the Finance Ministry and the Central Statistical Office studied the causes of falling birth rates in thirteen large towns and ten rural regions in Bashkiria, Krasnodarskii krai, Kaliniskaia and Pskov. The responses of 1,600 women asked about the reasons for their abortions confirmed the results of an earlier inquiry among 26,000 women: 22 per cent of them stated that they did not want a baby because of inadequate housing, which would only deteriorate with the arrival of a baby; 18 per cent mentioned the difficulty of finding a crèche; 14 per cent believed that their income was insufficient and would fall with a baby. These three reasons accounted for half of the causes invoked.

Although house construction had been accelerated, the situation remained unsatisfactory in many towns. Places for children in crèches and kindergartens were also increasing, but only half of existing demand was met. Moreover, despite the rise in the minimum wage to 60–70 roubles a month, household incomes remained too low – especially in the case of single-parent families, which were quite common. Benefits were given to only a small number of people, and more substantial help was offered to women only with the birth of their fifth child. In 1967 a mere 3.5 million women received family allowance. Of these, 2.1 million had five or more children. Many women had abortions for health reasons, often as a result of heavy labour. Because the period of convalescence following an abortion was not paid, many women resumed work immediately, which often led to complications and even sterility.

Birth rates also suffered from increased instability in conjugal relations. In recent years, the number of divorces had risen steeply, especially in the countryside. In 1960, there were roughly nine marriages for every divorce; by 1966, only three.

In the conclusion to his report, Kasimovsky indicated that, some months prior to this inquiry, a population study laboratory had finally been created at Moscow University (an institute of the Academy of Sciences that had existed before the war had not yet been re-established). Measures to increase the birth rate and a study of the whole issue had been submitted to the government and the Central Committee.