Lenin’s programmatic text on the national question, dictated on 30–31 December 1922, reflects this new perception of the state of the system.[3] It was a unique – critical and self-critical – document, in which Lenin expressed his sense of guilt before the country’s workers for not having intervened sufficiently firmly and energetically on the ‘notorious problem of autonomy’, officially called the problem of the USSR. Illness had hitherto prevented him from doing so. The gist of what he said is as follows: The unity of the apparatus is a prerequisite, but what apparatus are we referring to? An apparatus borrowed from the Tsarist past, a mixture of Tsarist and petty bourgeois chauvinists, traditionally used to oppress the people. We should at least wait until this apparatus improves, since otherwise the much-bruited principle of the right to secede from the Union will be nothing but a piece of paper, offering the other nationalities no protection against the istinno russkii chelovek, biurokrat, nasil’nik, velikorusskaia shval’ – a set of derogatory epithets that is difficult to translate, but which basically refer to the brutish Russian nationalist oppressor. And Lenin pursued his indictment: Defenders of the project claim that administration deemed important for the preservation of local cultures and mentalities is being turned over to the republics. But is this really the case? And another question: What measures are being taken to defend the ethnic minorities (inorodtsy) from the authentically Russian bully (ot istinno russkogo derzhimordy)? The answer is: none.
It is important to understand the vehemence of Lenin’s condemnation of the oppressive characteristics of the Russian bureaucracy and Russian ultra-nationalists. Such oppression dated back centuries – hence the need to dispel the distrust of the ethnic minorities who had suffered so much injustice, and who were (Lenin insisted) particularly sensitive to any form of discrimination. And he proceeds: ‘In his haste and his infatuation with administrative methods, not to mention his animosity towards social nationalism, Stalin has played a fatal role. Animosity [ozloblenie] is the worst thing in politics.’ With these words, Lenin put his finger on something that should have disqualified Stalin from a position of power in the first place.
What was to be done? Lenin responded by stating that the creation of the USSR was necessary; the diplomatic apparatus (the best thing we have) should remain in the centre. The use of national languages should be firmly guaranteed. Ordzhonikidze should be punished. Stalin and Dzerzhinsky were responsible for this whole Russian nationalist campaign. More generally, the USSR project should be rethought in its entirety and, if necessary, redrawn. This could be done at the next Congress of the Soviets. Let the centre retain military and diplomatic functions; all other functions should revert to the republics. Lenin reassured his audience that there was no reason to fear a fragmentation of power. If deployed judiciously and impartially, the party’s authority would be sufficient to achieve the requisite unity. ‘It would’, Lenin wrote,
be unacceptable, just as the East is awakening, for us to undermine our prestige by bullying and committing injustices against our own national minorities. We must criticize foreign imperialism. But it is even more important to understand that when we ourselves adopt an imperialist attitude towards oppressed nationalities, if only on points of detail, we are reneging on our own principled commitments.
It should by now be obvious that Lenin’s attack on Stalin was part of an attack on what he regarded as a replica of the old great-Russian imperial ideology (velikoderzhavnichestvo). And there can be no doubt about it: Lenin was identifying and attacking political enemies. He sensed what was going to happen (we might speak of foresight, even inspiration). For this was indeed the direction in which Stalin was going and which, in due course, would become official policy.
It is no wonder, then, that in his ‘testament’ Lenin made it clear that Stalin should be removed from his party post. Aware of his physical debility, Lenin asked Trotsky in a note of 5 March 1923 to ‘please take upon yourself defence of the Georgian case in the Central Committee’. The same day, in a letter addressed to the Georgians Mdivani and Makharadze, he wrote: ‘I am following your case with all my heart.’ But his political activity ceased abruptly four days later, on 9 March. On that fatal day, a further extremely powerful stroke incapacitated him for good. Henceforth, until his death on 21 January 1924, he was incapable of doing anything except listening to Krupskaya read him press articles. He could understand what he was hearing, but bereft of speech he was able to react only by inarticulate sounds and by moving his eyes.
In the meantime, as requested, Trotsky had on 6 March 1923 written a strongly worded memorandum for the Politburo, in which he declared that ultra-statist tendencies must be resolutely and ruthlessly rejected and criticized Stalin’s theses on the national question. He stressed that a significant section of the Soviet central bureaucracy regarded the creation of the USSR as a way of beginning to eliminate all national and autonomous political entities (states, organizations, regions). This should be fought as an expression of imperialist and anti-proletarian attitudes. The party should be warned that, under the cover of so-called ‘unified commissariats’, the economic and cultural interests of the national republics were in fact being discounted.
Yet the following day, in a letter to Kamenev, Trotsky adopted a rather puzzling position. He wrote: ‘Stalin’s resolution on the national question is worthless and a sharp turn is needed’ – which accorded perfectly with Lenin’s personal appeal to him. But thereafter, one has the sense that Trotsky, aware of Lenin’s second stroke, was unsure of the next step. He suddenly displayed great magnanimity and a conciliatory attitude towards Stalin. He declared himself opposed to perestroika and did not wish to punish anyone:
I am against liquidating Stalin and expelling Ordzhonikidze. But I agree with Lenin in principle: nationalities policy should be radically changed; persecution of the Georgians must cease; administrative methods of pressurizing the party must come to an end; industrialization should be pursued more resolutely; and we must establish a collaborative spirit at the top. The intrigues must stop. We need honest collaboration.
Was Trotsky daydreaming out loud?
On 7 March 1923, Kamenev informed Zinoviev that Lenin had disavowed Ordzhonikidze, Stalin and Dzerzhinsky; had expressed his solidarity with Mdivani; and had sent Stalin a personal letter breaking off personal relations on account of the latter’s mistreatment of Krupskaya. Kamenev adds that Stalin responded with a brief, sour-tempered apology that will hardly satisfy the starik (old man). Lenin ‘will not be satisfied by a peaceful settlement in Georgia, but obviously wants certain organizational measures to be taken at the top’ (Kamenev’s emphasis). ‘You should be in Moscow at this time’, Kamenev concludes.
3
Lenin, ‘K voprosu o natsianalnostiakh ill ob “avtonomizatsii”’, in