Given the efforts undertaken to improve the civil and criminal codes and modernize the judicial system, can we speak of a Rechtsstaat? No. For this category to be appropriate, legality would also have had to apply, at least partially but unambiguously, to the top leadership. The system would also have had to extend rights to critics, or at least grant oppositionists the right to a fair trial. This was not the case. On the other hand, we certainly may speak of a vastly increased role for the law and legal system following the abolition of secret extra-judicial procedures and arbitrary executions.
‘Mass disorder’ of the Novocherkask variety haunted the KGB, because it did not know how to deal with it: in that particular instance, military intervention had produced a considerable number of casualties. A recent book based on archival research provides data about events of this kind, which were of such concern to Semichastny.[1] In the Brezhnev period, there were nine cases of mass rioting, seven during the first two years. Under Khrushchev, the figure was two and a half times higher. Between 1957 and 1964, weapons were used in eight cases; under Brezhnev, in three (all of them in 1967). Under Khrushchev, the number of dead and wounded among the rioters totalled 264, as against 71 under Brezhnev. The total number of casualties during riots in the space of twenty-five years amounted to 335 – most of them wounded (but the number is not specified). Thus, the annual average was 13.4 wounded or killed (although many years witnessed no riots). It would be useful to have details about instances of rioting in other countries (incidence and casualties). Was the Soviet figure – 335 casualties in twenty-five years – exceptional, given the huge size of the country and a non-democratic regime?
The panorama of changes, innovations and reforms we have provided hopefully makes it possible for readers to appreciate the difference between the Stalinist and post-Stalinist models. The elimination of mass terror as a means of governing forced the authorities – and the party, in the first instance – to engage in what I have called ‘negotiation’ with the main social and bureaucratic actors, increasing the regime’s dependency on them.
‘Over-Stalinizing’ the whole of Soviet history, by extending it backwards and forwards, is a common practice that serves a variety of purposes – but not that of historical inquiry. We have no reason to ignore the extent and significance of the changes in the social structure, the strategic weight of particular social groups (large or small), the fusion between the state apparatus and the party, the end of mass terror – unless, of course, we are pursuing some ideological hypothesis, as opposed to trying to unravel a complex historical reality.
That said, we must not forget that this society and regime were not insulated against the emergence of reactionary ideological and political currents, including from within the state and among party leaders. Here we shall tackle this huge subject exclusively with respect to the difficulties of de-Stalinization and the pressure for a rehabilitation of Stalin. The continuing internal debates among the post-Stalinist leadership, and the opposition to Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization, were focused not on the continuation of Stalinism as such, but on the image of Stalin as state-builder and head of a ‘great power’ (derzhava); and a readiness to use drastic methods when state interests were at stake. Unquestionably, and not surprisingly, some among the leadership of a dictatorial regime defended this attitude. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite all sorts of trial balloons and half-measures towards restoring Stalin’s image as a great leader, rehabilitation did not occur because it no longer made sense. Even among the Stalinists, no one any longer defended the idea of bloody purges. Political arrests certainly continued. But they involved actual critics and real political activities, not imaginary or hallucinatory crimes that people were forced to ‘confess’ to. This did not have much in common, whether in character or scope, with the Stalinist period.
But this verdict on what the system no longer was would remain suspended in a vacuum if we did not offer a broad picture of what it had become. Seen from below, it was a veritable maze: masses of people and agencies acted as they saw fit, while a significant number of decrees and laws issued by the Central Committee or, more solemnly, jointly by it and the Council of Ministers, were not observed or were followed only half-heartedly. Mass phenomena like labour turnover remained just as pronounced. Officials did not actually lose their jobs even if they were sacked. Judges who disagreed with the severity of some laws sought to reduce charges when they felt that punishment made no sense; others did exactly the opposite, in the belief that the new policies were too liberal. What all this indicates is that a history restricted to government policy would be misleading. The historical events we are observing took the form of processes that depended on policy measures only in part. In fact, they mainly – even completely – derived from spontaneous developments (the stikhiia we have already encountered).
‘Those above’ were not just promoters of a voluntarist politics. The Politburo governed with the help of a 2–4 million strong layer of nachal’niki (‘bosses’ in the broad sense): around a million of them in top positions, a million in administrative positions of lesser importance, and a further million in charge of industrial enterprises. This amounted to a broad social stratum with its own history and sociology. Its members were conscious of their own interests – just like the workers, peasants and intellectuals who worked under their authority. Thus we find the managers of industrial enterprises setting up their factories in well-developed areas even if it was formally prohibited, and maintaining labour reserves and hoarding other stock – schemes that were also proscribed and, what is more, not financed. (So where did the money come from? Secret funds?) Even nomenklatura rules were circumvented to offer good positions and promotions, making it possible to constitute a network of cronies around a boss, with its attendant coteries, cliques and clienteles, as any sociologist would have expected.
Such spontaneous developments involve every social group, whatever the regime: the higher ups concentrate on their own affairs, while their subordinates do everything they can, licit or illicit, to further their own interests. Consequently, when a broad range of factors is involved, we can make out several interacting dynamics that render reality more complex than is portrayed by official cliches. The social changes that occurred during the hectic phase of urbanization ushered in a new stage in social complexity, expressed in the increased momentum of the ‘social factor’ (greater freedom of movement for labour, creation of a labour market for specialists which helped enhance the role of the intelligentsia). This degree of complexity was bound to test the limits of the political system severely.
Attending to the ‘social factor’, as we have done throughout this book, aids us in appreciating a complex social reality and the profound changes that accompanied it. The existence of the Soviet regime in the post-Stalin period was relatively short, but it was characterized by a historical experience of exceptional intensity. After Stalin’s death, we witness not only the abandonment of mass terror, but also the disappearance of other features pertaining to the ‘enserfment’ of the population. The changes consequent upon the end of this state of serfdom were especially significant: they marked an expansion in personal freedom that should be acknowledged, and not dismissed with contempt on the grounds that a democratic system offers much more. The subsequent fate of the regime would be unintelligible without this increased breathing space for popular and other classes. The improvement in social conditions, the greater attention to safety at work, the shorter working day, longer holidays in more readily accessible holiday resorts, higher wages (albeit not spectacularly so) – all these must be factored into our reflection on the system. Thus, as we indicated in Part Two, labour relations were now based on the labour code and legal guarantees granting workers the right to switch workplaces. The rights of workers and employees were more clearly defined and better protected: legal dispositions made it possible to challenge management decisions and pursue cases in tribunals or special chambers created to settle work disputes – tribunals where workers had a good chance of winning.
1
V. A. Kozlov,