From the latter part of March, Roger and his fellow aides-decamp had little leisure. As the chosen band who, with a few of Bonaparte's most trusted Generals, were alone in the great secret, they were called on to carry out a thousand errands needing firmness coupled with discretion. By the end of April the General-in-Chief's demands on them had increased to such an extent that they had to forgo all social activities and were lucky if they could drop into their beds by the early hours of the morning.
On May 1st Roger and several other Staff officers quietly left Paris. On May 9th Bonaparte joined them in Toulon. Everything was now in readiness. The expedition had by then been organized as four sections. The largest, concentrated on Toulon and Marseilles, was under Bonaparte's personal command. Another from Genoa under Baraguay d'Hilliers, a third under General Vaubois, was to sail from Ajaccio, and the fourth under Desaix from Civitavecchia.
When united, the armada would consist of thirteen ships-of-the-line, fourteen frigates, seventy-four smaller war vessels and between three and four hundred transports. On board there were some forty thousand troops, ten thousand seamen and several hundred civilians whom Bonaparte had decided, for a variety of reasons, to take. The Senior Naval Officer was Admiral Brueys; but he had been placed under the orders of the General-in-Chief, who accepted full responsibility for the direction of the expedition.
For some weeks rumours had been rife about the destination of this great concentration of troops and shipping. Some people believed that the intention was to seize the Sultan's dominions in Europe and free the Greeks and other Christians from the Mohammedan yoke. Others thought that the armada would sail round the Cape of Good Hope to wrest India from the British. A few rightly guessed that its objective was Egypt. But the majority were of the opinion that it was to be a follow-up, on a far greater scale than had ever before been attempted, of the old plan to land an Army in Ireland.
On arriving in Toulon, Bonaparte gave added credence to this last belief by a stirring proclamation addressed to his troops in which he termed them the ' Left Wing of the Army of England', the inference being that the right wing had mustered in the Channel ports and that, when the two French Fleets had united to destroy that of Britain, both Armies would descend on the hated English.
Bad weather delayed the sailing and, during the days of waiting, Josephine, who had accompanied her husband to Toulon, begged him repeatedly to allow her to sail with him. She argued that since she had been brought up in Martinique she would find the heat of Egypt pleasant rather than exhausting. Feeling that her presence would distract his thoughts he refused, but at length relented to the extent of agreeing that she should follow him in a few weeks' time.
On May 19th the bad weather at last abated, so it was decided to put to sea. Roger, with the rest of Bonaparte's Staff, was in the hundred-and-twenty-gun L'Orient, the largest warship afloat. In the great ship were also most of the senior Generals and a considerable number of distinguished intellectuals whom Bonaparte was taking with him to unravel some of the mysteries of the East. Roger had been allocated a bunk in a fairly spacious cabin, which he shared with three other aides-de-camp, and it was quite near to that which had been given to Bourrienne.
Shortly before anchor was weighed Roger looked in on the Chef de Cabinet, who had already settled down to work.
Glancing up at him, as he stood in the narrow doorway, Bourrienne handed him a paper and said, ' What d'you think of this? I received it only as the last crates of chickens were being hoisted aboard.'
It was an intelligence report and read:
Government in London still believed to credit Deception Plan and assume armament assembling in Mediterranean ports has as object (1) combination with Brest Squadron and Army of the North for descent on England or (2) possibly invasion of Ireland. Reliable information recently received that on A pril 20th Cabinet decided to send powerful squadron into Mediterranean with object of intercepting French expedition before it can enter Atlantic and combine with Franco-Spanish forces there. Above now confirmed by squadron detached from Lord St. Vincent's fleet passing Straits of Gibraltar under command of Rear Admiral Sir Nelson.
Roger had been wondering when he would manage to get back from Egypt. As he returned the intelligence report to Bourrienne, he began to wonder if he would even get there.
9
'Who wouldn't be a Soldier, ah! It's a shame to take the pay'
The activities in the Mediterranean ports during the past two months had been so exceptional that Roger had felt certain that news of them could not have failed to reach the British Government. But it came as a surprise to him to learn that, after having been compelled to withdraw from the Mediterranean eighteen months before, the British should again have taken the initiative.
He promptly reasoned that the assumption in the intelligence report—that the British Government still credited the Deception Plan—was wrong and that, although he had been unable to send home information of the expedition's destination, they had learned from some other source that Bonaparte intended to invade Egypt. Otherwise, surely St. Vincent would have waited until the French armada was well out into the Atlantic and so far more vulnerable to attack.
In any case, it was incapable of defending itself against a strong British Squadron; and Admiral Brueys had made no secret of it to Bonaparte's Staff that, should he be attacked, he was far from happy about his chances of convoying the Army safely to its objective. The French Navy was still suffering seriously from the effects of the Revolution. During that time nine-tenths of its experienced officers had either been sent to the guillotine or gone into exile and all offences still had to be tried by jury, which meant
138
that discipline was almost non-existent. Three of the battleships were old and rotten, many of the transports were barely seaworthy, cables and sails were of poor quality, much of the equipment was badly worn and there were very few spares of any kind. In consequence, if an Admiral with the dash and determination of Nelson came up with the armada the result must be a massacre.
As an Englishman, Roger was naturally pleased to learn that there was now a good prgspect of his country gaining a resounding victory and destroying the flower of the French Army at one blow. However, as he was at present with that Army and in a ship from which there was no possible means of escape, he had to face the unnerving fact that he might well be destroyed himself.
Actually his fears were, for the time being, groundless; for Nelson had entered the Mediterranean a few days earlier, with only three ships-of-the-line and five smaller craft, his instructions being to reconnoitre the French coast and, if possible, find out the intended destination of Bonaparte's armada. This latter fact was not, as Roger supposed, known to the British. It was not until some days later that Earl St. Vincent received orders from London to send a strong Squadron into the Mediterranean and despatched, to come under Nelson's command, a further fourteen ships-of-the-line, whose Captains were some of the ablest officers in the British Navy.
Moreover, when the armada had been only one day at sea a tempest sprang up and, while the French Fleet escaped with a severe tossing, Nelson's ships were caught in the centre of the storm. His own ship was dismasted and he had to take refuge under the lee of Sardinia to refit, thus losing his first chance of intercepting the French expedition.