As evidence built up, and could no longer be disregarded, that a state of hostilities might at any moment exist between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, contingency plans on both sides were brought out and dusted off. The difficulty for the Americans was that in addition to losing an intelligence ship they had lost the initiative. The Russians, on the other hand, though clumsy in execution, knew exactly what they were trying to do. Moreover, at this juncture, although they were deeply involved both politically and militarily in the Middle East and in Southern Africa, two additional factors favoured the Russians. First, the satellite status of their allies in the Warsaw Pact, while a prime cause of the growing dissatisfaction which had done so much to bring about the present Soviet pressure on the Americans, had always had the advantage of giving them firm control over all the Pact armed forces, their deployment and operation. Not so with the Americans. Although continually justified to the American people as being indispensable to the national security of the United States, the military alliances of which she was a member, and in particular NATO, had equally been justified by the governments of their other members to their peoples as being indispensable to their national security; hence decision-making had to be shared.
The Americans, therefore, unlike the Russians, would have to consult with their allies about any military action. But this was not all. Unless the Russians chose deliberately to attack within the NATO area, they could be reasonably certain that NATO would take no action to come to America’s assistance.
This inherent weakness in the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty deserves explanation. When the Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949, the Soviet Union was not a major naval power. She had begun to establish a strong force of submarines based upon the Kola Inlet, where they would have ice-free access to the North Atlantic. But the seas and oceans of the world were not to be treated as extensions of sovereign territory. All that was needed was to include attacks upon the ships and aircraft of a member of the Alliance as cause for acting in collective defence, as with an attack across a land frontier. But surely, it was thought, there must be some geographical limit at sea. Clearly, the waters adjacent to the eastern seaboard of the United States had to be included. As to ocean limits, it was suggested that the boundary be placed at the maximum distance to which submarines operating from the Kola Inlet were likely to proceed on patrol. The Tropic of Cancer was chosen as the limit.
A number of arrangements had been made over the years to mitigate the unfortunate consequences to NATO of the Tropic of Cancer boundary. Chief amongst these was the pooling of Allied naval intelligence. This clearly could not be limited to the North Atlantic Treaty area. After all, wherever in the world the maritime trade of the member nations was to be found, most of it would sooner or later have to pass into the North Atlantic. How could measures for its protection there be co-ordinated without full knowledge of sailing times and routes? And how could the most economical use of shipping be organized, for the support of peoples and a war effort, unless a worldwide view of the available resources could be taken NATO plans provided, therefore, that a Naval Control of Shipping Organization should be set up, and also a Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. It was through the members of these groups, acting informally as individuals and in conjunction with the worldwide shipping community, that an appropriate response began to be evolved to the Soviet Navy’s activities in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.
It was the British Ambassador in Washington who first communicated to the President of the United States the urgent plea of shipowners not to over-react to Soviet naval provocation. It was pointed out that the Iranians would be bound, in exercising control of shipping in the Gulf, to ensure that the movement of oil cargoes to countries other than the United States would continue. The Japanese, for example, remained almost totally dependent upon Middle Eastern oil. Provided the oil was not cut off at source — and Iran would not connive at this — all was not lost. By switching the destinations of many cargoes already on the high seas and by relying on buffer stocks and alternative sources of supply, the United States should, it was argued, attempt to ‘ride the storm’. The important thing was to determine, if possible, the political objectives which the Soviet Union hoped to achieve by bringing naval pressure to bear on the USA’s Middle Eastern oil supplies, and to consider its best counters.
The Soviet naval attacks and the Iranian response had the effect of alerting NATO — already apprehensive of the consequences of disturbances in Poland and tension in Yugoslavia — to the possibility of a direct connection between events in Europe and those in the Middle East. Indeed, the NATO Military Committee, in reporting upon the blowing up of an oil well in the North Sea shortly after Soviet ships had been in the vicinity, on 3 January 1985, drew attention to it. That the Russians had denied responsibility and had suggested that the incident provided ‘good reason for Western Europe to keep out of present troubles’ was significant.
The fact that the oil well happened to be British had an effect which may not have been foreseen by the Kremlin. The action taken immediately by Britain had the tacit approval of the Political Sub-Committee of the North Atlantic Council, meeting in emergency session. This was to announce the setting up of a Northern Seas Environmental Control Agency (NORSECA) by agreement between the North Sea countries concerned, with an executive situated at Pitreavie, the Maritime HO of the RN Flag Officer, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and his RAF colleague. Already known, and well practised, as an Air-Sea Rescue Co-ordination Centre, and accustomed to conducting operations in concert with both civil and armed forces authorities around the North Sea, the Pitreavie HQ was able to put into effect quickly and smoothly the plans for NORSECA, which had been maturing for some years. The initial phase required the establishment of standard shipping routes through the North Sea, adherence to which would be mandatory if the right of uninterrupted passage through the area was to be enjoyed. The routes led clear of oil and gas installations, and moving fishing zones were also declared, using the standard medium of Notices to Mariners.
The implementation of this scheme, a possibility for some years, was facilitated by a major change in the NATO command structure which had been put into effect in 1983 (see Appendix 3). It had long been recognized that the command structure, particularly as it affected the naval and air forces in the Atlantic, North Sea and English Channel, had ceased to correspond to strategic and operational realities. It was indeed questionable whether it ever had.
Sweden, Soviet Russia, Poland and East Germany, as individual states whose shipping and fishing vessels were regular users of the North Sea, were invited to be represented, if they wished, on the NORSECA Council, in addition to the littoral states. Meanwhile, the British naval C-in-C arranged with his RAF colleague (C-in-C Strike Command) for armed surveillance of the Soviet group which appeared to be responsible for blowing up the North Sea oil well.
Elsewhere events had been moving at an equally dramatic tempo.
31 December 1984. Riots take place in East Berlin, with West Berliners standing on vantage points near the Wall, under full TV cover, cheering the rioters on. The riots are put down by Soviet troops, taking over almost at once from the East German police, much more firmly and bloodily than those in Poland the month before.