We need more anti-tank helicopters with a day-and-night and a 3,000-meter stand-off capability. There are some, but we need more. We also need, as has often been pointed out, many more ATGW, to be mounted on special purpose vehicles and preferably under armor on MICV [Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicles], in order to withstand the enemy’s suppressive fires, which we understand are certain to be very intense. What we really need in US divisions in the Central Region is an aggregate of at least 1,000 major anti-tank weapons in each, made up of 300-plus mounted in tanks and 700 ATGW to be otherwise deployed. We have the tanks. We do not, in these numbers, have the ATGW.
At corps and division level we have been greatly in need of much improved intelligence, reconnaissance and target acquisition systems. Improvement in these last two years there has been. Signal intelligence has benefited from better methods and much better equipment. We have a good range of remotely-piloted vehicles for surveillance and target acquisition, together with some provision of airborne moving target radars, both helicopter and fixed wing, and radar locators. The degree of visibility we now have over the battlefield will greatly help the interposition of our smaller forces on the main axes of enemy effort and the development of effective battlefield interdiction operations.
The effectiveness of our intelligence on the battlefield has sharply increased with the introduction of the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System [JTIDS]. We are still running this system in. It has never yet taken a full operational load and we shall not know how best to exploit it until it has. But in this, as in other fields where electronics are of vital importance, we are conscious of an enormous potential which is a powerful source of confidence at every level.
I am glad to be able to report improved operational procedures and capabilities for joint air-land warfare. Joint action is now effective in reconnaissance and surveillance operations, to a lesser extent in suppression of enemy air defenses, battlefield interdiction and electronic warfare, but above all in joint control of close air support using artillery forward observers with laser designators.
The drawdown of theater stocks in support of operations elsewhere by other nationalities (of which those by the Israelis were at one time typical) have long since been made good, as you know. Prepositioned stocks of equipment for reinforcing units are complete, and there will be little difficulty in bringing up to combat level, for example, the heavy divisions expected at an early stage. One of these is even now in process of being lifted in. Ammunition stocks are now up to scale and, even more important perhaps than that, negotiations with the FRG, actively pursued in 1980 for the re-siting of certain major installations east of the Rhine, were successfully concluded nearly two years ago, and vital stocks are now no longer so likely to be denied to forward troops by interruption of lines of communication. Similar advantages will be generated by the substitution of a theater line of communication through the Low Countries for that through Bremerhaven in north Germany, though this is not yet complete and the new air defense problem it has thrown up has not yet been completely resolved. Movement towards fuller integration of Allied logistic systems has made progress. We are fortunate in having fewer problems here in CENTAG in this respect than they have in NORTHAG.
I have further to report continual improvement in command and control systems, in air defense and control, and in measures to avoid surprise.
Finally I have to report, in answer to two questions raised by Senators, that although, of course, French national policy is still to remain outside NATO, the participation in our own planning of command and staff of II French Corps with its two divisions and supporting troops stationed in the FRG is close, if highly confidential. The two US brigades that were deployed in north Germany to make good weaknesses in depth in NORTHAG have now been redeployed because NORTHAG has recently taken encouraging steps towards the remedying of the weaknesses there. Each of these US brigades is the basis of one of the reinforcement divisions which will form a very important element in the regional reserves now being developed by AFCENT [Allied Forces Central Europe].
The Chief of Staff came to an end and stepped aside. The Commander-in-Chief, the Commanding General of the United States Army in Europe, then rose. He was a tall, good-looking man in his middle fifties, trim of figure, clean-shaven, well-groomed, with dark hair just beginning to turn grey. His manner was quiet, his speech deliberate. ‘All generals are always on the stage,’ said Frederick the Great, who knew a good deal about generals. The C-in-C USAREUR was no exception. He was playing a part and knew it, and because he was his own producer and was an efficient, intelligent and quite ambitious man it was a very well produced part, as well as being well played. He was also, like very many generals, a brave, sincere and selfless person. He knew what was required and he knew a good deal about how to get it done.
Your army in Europe [he began] is in better shape than anyone, I think, has realized, especially the Russians.
The Vietnam experience is out of our system. We are rejuvenated and modernized. Our indoctrination to battle has been pressed hard.
The main focus of the US Army’s doctrine and training has been for these several years past the Central Region of NATO — right where we are now. Almost every combatant member of the officer corps of the United States Army has served at least once in Germany. We know the terrain. We know the weather. We know our enemy.
US divisions have been optimized for combat in Europe against the tank-heavy forces of the Warsaw Pact. They have been trained to believe that even when outnumbered they can win.
Our tank crews have been taught to shoot first and to hit with the first shot, 60 or even 70 per cent of the time, out to ranges of a mile or more.
Combat teams of infantry and tanks, working closely together, have been trained to use the rolling terrain and hill country in our sector, with its plentiful forests and towns, for cover and concealment.
Our troops have been exercised against forces set up to represent most closely Soviet strength, equipment and tactics.
Colonels and generals are expected to fight moving, active battles, always seeking an advantage from the use of terrain, surprise and mobility.
Generals are expected to concentrate defending forces in front of the main thrusts of the enemy so that the fighting troops do not have to meet a greater ratio of strength against them than three or four to one.
Colonels have been taught to fight in forward defense alongside their German allies.
The captains and their troops have learned that modern weapons in the defense can and should inflict losses on an attacker, in comparison to their own, of well over three to one. They have learned, in short, that a successful defense against considerable odds is possible.
It is with convictions and tactical concepts such as these that the US forces in the Central Army Group are prepared to meet a Soviet attack.
Let me only add a word about our German allies. The two German corps in CENTAG are of similar strength and composition to our own. Some of their equipment is of the same pattern as ours. Most of it is of their own design. They have lately in service, for example, a new tank, the Leopard II.
It represents a different tank philosophy from that upon which our own XM-1 is designed, or the British Chieftain for that matter, but I can tell you that it is very good. All their equipment is good. The German Army has also made great headway in the organizing and training of Home Defense units of the reserve. These can be expected to play a very important part in the defense of their country, particularly against internal dangers.